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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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TASS Reports on Gerasimov's 10 Oct Briefing

Soviets Want To Leave Iraq

LD1010145690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Oct (TASS)—Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, speaking at a briefing here today, touched upon the issue of Soviet citizens' departure from Iraq. "According to the agreement," he said, "1,500 Soviet citizens should leave Iraq over the course of a month. All in all, 1,800 Soviet experts have expressed a desire to leave that country, mainly oil industry workers. Apart from them, builders and gas industry workers are also leaving."

"As contracts expire," Gennadiy Gerasimov announced, "military specialists will also leave. At present there are some 140 of them in Iraq, whereas at the start of the evacuation there were 193 there."

The diplomat informed journalists that there is no timetable for the departure of Soviet citizens from Iraq. "The question of which categories of specialists will leave Iraq at any given time," he added, "will be decided on the spot. The dates and numbers of those leaving are determined depending upon the fulfillment of exit formalities required in Iraq. The types of aircraft and scheduling of flights will also depend upon this."

Nonaligned Gulf Stance Lauded

LD1010163190 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Moscow has taken note of the appreciable positive thrust of a recent joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of nonaligned countries over the Gulf crisis in New York last week, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The statement described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as unacceptable and deplored Baghdad's refusal to positively respond to efforts by some nonaligned, including Arab, countries to settle the conflict.

The statement also voiced concern about the risk of outbreak of an armed conflict with unpredictable consequences in the Gulf.

It demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the reinstatement of the latter's lawful government, the restoration of Kuwaiti independence and territorial integrity, and an immediate release of foreign nationals held hostage by Iraq.

Moscow, Gerasimov said, "gave its due" to the foreign minister's appeal to all nations to unswervingly abide by the package of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the issue.

"The Soviet Union welcomes the Nonaligned Movement's intention to instruct its chairman—Yugoslavia—to undertake a mission of good offices to settle the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait on the basis of Iraqi compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions," the Soviet spokesman said.

"One cannot but agree with the foreign ministers that an early settlement of the crisis should contribute toward ensuring a similar attitude by the world community to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieving a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East," he said.

Nuclear Test Settlement Urged

LD1010163990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1534 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 10 Oct (TASS)—[passage omitted] As Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, reported at a briefing today, as of September, 2,050 nuclear explosions have been carried out in the world, and over half of them—that is 1,080—have been carried out in the United States. About 714 have taken place in the USSR, 180 in France, 42 in the United Kingdom, and 34 in China.

Accordingly, this problem is to be tackled by joint efforts of the whole world community. Moscow is in favor of its immediate settlement.

Shipping Agreement With U.S.

LD1010162490 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov described the inter-governmental Soviet-American agreement on shipping, which has entered into force, as a document laying a "firm legal foundation" under cooperation between the USSR and U.S. in sea transport.

He spoke at a briefing here today.

Gerasimov said that the agreement signed during the Washington summit in June 1990 is an impressive contribution to Soviet-American interaction".

Noting that the agreement was reached as a result of new thinking in Soviet-American relations, Gerasimov noted that "it has been impossible to achieve a settlement in this important sphere since 1982."

The Soviet and American merchant fleets may now operate on the two countries' freight markets without any restrictions and haul not only goods of bilateral trade but also shipments to third countries.

Each side opened 48 ports to each other's merchant ships. The agreement also provides for calls at these ports.

Gerasimov described the principles incorporated in the agreement as an important feature of this document. These principles "will give significant impetus to the development of relations in shipping between the two countries and will positively influence the development of international shipping."

Polish Foreign Minister's Visit

LD1010140690 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS corespondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski will arrive in Moscow today at the invitation of the Soviet Government, Soviet spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He said it was Skubiszewski's first official visit to the USSR as foreign minister.

The Polish minister will have talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze, expected to focus on a wide range of bilateral issues.

In addition, Gerasimov continued, the Polish foreign minister will have talks at the Soviet parliament's Committee for International Affairs, meet Russian Federation leaders and address an audience at the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic academy on Friday.

Skubiszewski will also visit the Ukraine and Belorussia at the invitation of the leadership of these republics and hold talks with their leaders.

Interception of Greenpeace Ship

LD1010163290 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a news briefing here today about the recent interception by Soviet Border Guards of a Greenpeace vessel near the Novaya Zemlya islands.

The Soviet Union is well aware of Greenpeace activities and understands and supports its ideas and goals, Gerasimov said. Soviet public organisations are actively cooperating with Greenpeace, taking part in many international actions organised by this organisation.

The Greenpeace ship happened to be near the Soviet shores when it was pursuing one such international action—comprehensive research of the ecological situation in the White Sea, Gerasimov said.

The ship visited Arkhangelsk and Naryan-Mar, where it dropped anchor to pursue previously agreed upon tasks. After that, however, the vessel "suddenly" changed course for Novaya Zemlya, and was intercepted, he said.

Soviet border guards boarded the Greenpeace ship and, in line with corresponding legal acts, sealed the ship's radio compartment, he said.

The Greenpeace crew thus were denied access to communications equipment until the end of the investigation. The ship's captain refused to obey border guards' orders and take the ship under escort to the Kola Peninsula. The guards had to tow the ship, he said. "According to our information, the Greenpeace vessel, towed by the Yenisey border patrol ship and escorted by the 26th CPSU Congress border patrol ship (the ship which intercepted the Greenpeace) will arrive near Murmansk later today or early tomorrow, depending on weather conditions," the spokesman said.

At the time of the interception, four crew members were on the high seas in a raft. They were also detained by Soviet border guards and taken aboard the 26th CPSU Congress ship, he said.

The Soviet Prosecutor's Office will investigate the incident on the spot, Gerasimov said.

Having stressed the "noble character of the Greenpeace mission," Gerasimov said: "There are laws that should be abided by."

He then disagreed with a Greenpeace spokesman present at the meeting, who tried to justify the Greenpeace voyage to Novaya Zemlya. The spokesman said that the movement had requested the required permission from the Russian parliament several months prior to the incident.

"Whether you submitted a written request or simply asked for it, the permission was not given. Soviet authorities on the spot, apparently, decided—no permission, no travel," Gerasimov said.

Asked about charges against the Greenpeace crew in Murmansk, Gerasimov said the Prosecutor's Office will probably charge them with violating Soviet borders.

Return of POW's in Afghanistan

LD1010170490 Moscow TASS in English 1625 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

Moscow October 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov commented on an article recently published by the Soviet ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly concerning the readiness of Afghan rebels to send a delegation to Moscow.

Speaking at a briefing today, the spokesman noted that the weekly alleged that the Afghan armed opposition is ready to send a delegation to Moscow at the invitation of President of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin to negotiate the release of Soviet prisoners of war.

The spokesman quoted an official statement by rebels in Peshawar, which says that "this question is not among their priorities." He added that "nobody plans to come to Moscow from there."

Gerasimov also noted that Soviet departments, mass organisations and army men who were elected to the Soviet Parliament and the Russian Parliament are actively working to track down and release Soviet soldiers captured by Afghan rebels.

The Afghan Government led by President Najibullah is also very helpful in this respect.

Servicemen A.R. Tikhonov, N. Khudimuratov, I.M. Soatov and A.G. Kolpadze were recently released and brought home thanks to assistance from the Afghan side and efforts by Soviet departments and the Soviet Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad.

Utmost efforts are being made to release another group of Soviet servicemen in the near future, Gerasimov stressed.

Missles in Afghanistan Denied

LD1010172790 Moscow TASS in English 1701 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied the report in a Pakistani newspaper that Soviet troops stationed in the Okhansk corridor in Afghanistan had seized several hills in Pakistan, deploying missile systems there.

The reports carried by the FRONTIER POST Pakistani newspaper, are "malicious fiction," Gennadiy Gerasimov told a news briefing here today.

The newspaper also alleged that Soviet military aircraft violated Pakistani airspace.

"Moscow has regarded with satisfaction a statement by an official spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, who characterised the publication as 'fabrication,'" Gerasimov said.

"We hope Islamabad will take steps to prevent such provocative inventions," he said.

Woerner Favors Increased NATO-USSR Cooperation

LD1010194390 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Sysoyev]

[Text] Athens October 10 TASS—"NATO advocates the establishment of a Europe that would include a democratic Soviet Union respecting human rights," NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner told the Greek KATHIMERINI newspaper on the eve of his visit to Athens.

Both NATO and the united Germany seek to develop friendly relations with the USSR and other East European countries. "The epoch of confrontation has passed. We are now trying to lay foundations for cooperation with the Soviet Union, which accords with the West's interests," he noted.

In Woerner's opinion, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has made an "extremely great personal contribution" to rapprochement between the West and the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

Gorbachev now has many supporters in his country. Woerner believes that this guarantees the irreversibility of positive processes in the USSR.

"We are interested in perestroyka taking the upper hand," noted Woerner, stressing the West's desire "to promote changes in the USSR in every way."

The Soviet Union should take principled decisions and actions, while the North Atlantic bloc has the opportunity "to promote this process in the political sphere."

On the other hand, NATO preserves "limited contingents of armed forces to ensure the necessary stability."

"We must be sure: Whatever happens in the USSR, this should not lead to a military conflict in Europe. Our present-day aim is to encourage changes while preserving stability," Woerner stressed.

Radio Program Assesses German, Gulf Situations

LD0510195590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Oct 90

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program, presented by all-Union radio foreign policy commentator Igor Surguchev, with "colleagues" Konstantin Patsyuk and Sergey Pravdin, and journalists Lyubov Mityanina and Ashot Nashibov—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Surguchev] On the subject of German unification once again, Comrade Smirnov from Moscow believes that unification is being rushed, that this fact might be taken advantage of by right-wing forces and first of all the neofascists, of whom there are many on German territory, he writes, and who are trying to get into parliament and then into power. If they succeed in doing this, they will not take any notice of anyone, including our country. Therefore, the writer draws the conclusion that the unification of Germany must not be allowed. My colleague Konstantin Patsyuk has a different opinion about this.

[Patsyuk] The fast flow of life has made a correction to that letter. What Comrade Smirnov writes about in the future tense has already taken place. Germany became united a few days ago. But now let me talk about the essence of the letter. One must pay tribute to the logic of the listener's arguments. He is right in some things. Indeed, one must not forget what victims, sufferings, and destruction were caused to our people and our country and to other peoples and countries by fascism and one must never allow any repeat of the past. Neither will anyone deny that the process of the unification of Germany developed very rapidly. Few people imagined that the Germans would unite literally a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Their striving to acquire a united homeland was too strong.

And, in general, no one hindered them in this. The unification of Germany is first of all a matter for the Germans themselves. both our country and the other victorious powers believe in the Germans' solemn undertaking that war will never again start from their territory.

And, finally, on the subject of neofascists. Yes, both in the GDR and in the FRG they did not sit idly by when the process of the unification of Germany began. They thought that their hour had come. The West German neonazis stirred into action. At the beginning their revanchist propaganda was greatly aided by the unclear and at times ambiguous position of the Bonn authorities on the question of European borders and primarily the Oder-Neisse line. This added strength to the neofascists who began even more insistently to put forward territorial claims aginst other countries. Particularly fervent were the members of the Republican Party of the FRG who, by the way, did much to create in the GDR a party with the same name and close to it in spirit. This was not difficult to do as neonazism had not been eliminated in the GDR.

Thus, the brown scum which had long lain hidden once again rose to the surface. The defiling of monuments to victims of fascism and to Soviet servicemen began. Nazi symbols began to appear more frequently in public places and on buildings. Only powerful demonstrations by the democratic forces of the GDR put an end to these revanchist attacks.

Meanwhile, the FRG government made a definitive statement about the inviolability of European borders. And in Moscow in September the participants in the two-plus-four talks signed a treaty on a final settlement with regard to Germany which clearly defines the borders with its neighbors and Germany renounces any territorial claims. Thus, the calculations of the neofascists and revanchists were not justified. They wanted to fish in muddy waters in connection with the unification of Germany but they clearly got nothing out of it.

True, the neonazis are not dejected. I think that they also had a hand in the demonstrations in Berlin on the day of the birth of the united German state. There is one fact which makes one very wary: Among the ranks of the hooligans armed with iron chains and bars there were local right-wing radicals who were the instigators of the disorders. And it has long been known that these forces are close to the neofascists.

As far as concerns the attempts by neofascists to have their representatives elected to parliament, this is hardly likely to succeed. There is a now different situation in Germany, which intends to construct friendly relations with its neighbors and to be guided in its policies by principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This policy has the support of the overwhelming majority of Germans, so that the disposition of forces in Germany is turning out not to the advantage of the revanchists. And I would not start to fear that they might come to power.

[Surguchev] Some comrades are indignant that the international community is reacting so acutely to Iraq's aggressive actions. The reason for this indignation is this: Why is everyone so up in arms about Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait, while Israel has been occupying Arab lands for many years and no sanctions are applied against it. We have letters on this from, for example, Aleksandr Ivanovich Vashpanov from Cherepovets, Venyamin Stepanovich Kalyanov from Saratov, and Zinaida Kuprianovna Kradina from Krymsk, Krasnodar Kray.

The position of these comrades when they insist on more resolute international actions against Israel is understandable. Indeed, it is time for the United Nations to use its authority and powers to force Tel Aviv to take account of its resolutions. However, for this a consensus in the Security Council is needed, and there has not been one in the past and there is not one now. for the unresolved nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli occupation of Arab territories is a long-standing, chronic problem which has come down to the world community from the times of the cold war. At that time, in the conditions of confrontation between East and West, between the USSR and the United States, no success was achieved in reaching a just settlement of it.

Now, however, the situation in the world has changed radically. The cold war and confrontation have disappeared into the past. Mankind today is more united than ever before in rejecting aggression, occupation, and annexation of others' lands. This means that Israel, too, has less chance of keeping what it has seized. But the U.S. protection of israel is still being maintained and this does not allow the United Nations and, primarily, the Security Council to influence Israel effectively.

But then the Iraq-Kuwait conflict broke out, during which the aggressor not only seized a part of someone else's territory but swallowed up the whole of Kuwait and eliminated it as an independent state. And, naturally, the appropriate reaction followed after this flagrant act of international piracy. And, in this case, one cannot find fault with the United States or the West as a whole. They have come out resolutely on the side of international law and justice in defense of the victim of aggression. The almost universal condemnation of Iraq is a good thing and one should not be indignant at it.

Indeed, as yet the international community has not been able to call Israel to reason, but should this serve as a reason for refusing to restore justice with regard to Kuwait? And I would like to stress the following, too. The Arab-Israeli and the Iraq-Kuwait conflicts are quite different in character, and I believe it is incorrect to apply the same criteria to them. In the final analysis Kuwait never threatened Iraq's security. But there have been times when the Arab states threatened to destroy Israel, saying, in the words of their leaders, that they would throw it into the sea.

Comrade Kradina considers that the West, and first of all the United States, is interfering in Arab affairs. She writes that the Arabs will sort it out for themselves. It would be good, or course, if they sorted it out for themselves. But at present this does not look likely. For this reason, many countries consider it appropriate to show Baghdad the military fist so that it knows that things will not be limited to appeals and economic sanctions. The fact that the West, and the United States in particular, is being particularly active in this regard seems to me to be laudable. One could call this interference but this is interference on behalf of what is right, in the interests of stopping international piracy.

And one should not forget that alongside the Americans, English, French, Italians, and Spanish making up the multinational forces, Iraq is being opposed by Egyptians, Saudis, Syrians, and even Senegalese and Argentines. [passage omitted]

Ambassadors to Mauritania, Rwanda Replaced

PM0910141790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS-attributed "Diary" report]

[Text] The USSR president has appointed Vladimir Sergeyevich Shishov as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

The USSR president has released Leonid Mikhaylovich Komogorov from the duties of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in connection with his retirement on pension.

The USSR president has appointed Petr Vasilyevich Komendant as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Republic of Rwanda.

The USSR president has released Gennadiy Dmitriyevich Sokolov from the duties of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Republic of Rwanda in connection with his retirement on pension.

Comparison of Shevardnadze-Velayati Meeting

PM0310133890

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 2 October 1990 carries in its Morning Edition on page 4 a TASS report on a meeting between Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati. The IZVESTIYA item, published under the general heading of "Meetings in New York," has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published in the 1 October Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the headline "Meets Iraqi, Chilean Ministers," page 8, revealing the following variations:

Page 8, column one, sixth complete paragraph, sentence one, IZVESTIYA reads: ...Velayati. They expressed profound mutual satisfaction with.... (adding "profound")

Same paragraph, sentence two, IZVESTIYA reads: ...of Soviet-Iranian relations. Both sides intend.... (deleting clause)

Same column, seventh complete paragraph, first sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...identity of assessments: The action taken by Iraq is an unacceptable and.... (rewording, picking up second sentence)

Same column, penultimate paragraph, last sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...on this issue.

Shevardnadze's conversation with.... (deleting paragraph)

United States & Canada

New York Stock Exchange Seminar Held on Reforms

Gorbachev Meets U.S. Financiers

LD1010184590 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev met New York Stock Exchange President John Phelan and other leading U.S. financiers, including John Chalsey, William Schreyer, James Bradford, David Shields, Aulana Peters and David Feldman, who are in Moscow for a New York Stock Exchange seminar, in the Kremlin today.

The seminar was organised in line with agreements to promote economic reforms in the Soviet Union reached by Bush and Gorbachev in Malta.

Gorbachev told the visitors about economic and political reforms in the country.

The two processes are interconnected. A lasting union between Soviet republics is in their economic interests, Gorbachev said. The president spoke about efforts to stabilise the economy, saying that the time has come for decisive actions.

He then dwelt in detail on the transition to a market. This is a complex issue, the resolution of which requires a lot of effort and changes in people's psychology, he said.

Gorbachev spoke about plans to provide consumer goods on the market and measures to reduce the budget deficit.

A most important task now is to put finances in order, shore up the ruble and make it convertible in the future. The people should seek the ruble rather than shun it, he said.

Western partners could help stabilise the Soviet economy. There is an understanding in this sphere, which should be translated into concrete agreements, especially since large joint projects are now in the works, including in the oil and gas and aviation industries, Gorbachev said.

U.S. business circles are impressed by Soviet economic reforms, Phelan said, and hope the Soviet Union will succeed in converting itself into a market economy.

Before coming to the Soviet Union, the visitors doubted the Soviet determination to carry through the reforms, he said.

Upon leaving the country, the financiers are much more optimistic and are certain that the reforms can be implemented, he said.

The course of action charted by Gorbachev could put him in control of the situation and enable further progress, he said.

The sides then expressed hope that Soviet and U.S. financial circles will pursue mutually beneficial cooperation.

Finance Minister Comments

LD1010184690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Interview with Vladimir Abramovich Rayevskiy, USSR deputy finance minister, by correspondent Ivan Akuratov on the result of the Soviet-U.S. seminar on the stock exchange in Moscow on 10 October—live or recorded]

[Text] [Rayevskiy] The results are that relations between our two countries are entering a new phase, a phase of cooperation in a specific direction. This testifies to the fact that the accords in Malta reached by the presidents of our two countries are actually being implemented. The main thing is that we have received the information we need in very compact and qualified form. I think the fact that we have achieved an accord, an agreement on future cooperation very quickly, will also be symptomatic. This will be an agreement in the sphere of consultation for our movement toward a financial market and on the training of specialists.

[Akuratov] You were in the hall, you listened to the questions. What do you think, is the level sufficient for taking part in the formation of a financial market and of the work of a stock exchange?

[Rayevskiy] I think that the level of the questions differed among the participants. This should not be feared, because we are at such a stage where there are people who previously entered on the path of reform—these are the representatives of, let us say, joint enterprises, leased enterprises, of the cooperative movement, representatives of the commercial banks—and there are people who are being gradually drawn into this process. The different levels of the answers reflects this. But I would like once again to stress that our American colleagues are entirely satisfied with virtually all of the questions.

[Akuratov] The creation of a financial market requires the adoption of certain laws. When will they be adopted?

[Rayevskiy] I would say that the time limits on the adoption of laws, as we were told today by our American colleagues, are quite long, not only here, but there as well. But time does not wait and for this reason the government has adopted a temporary clause on joint-stock companies and a temporary clause on securities which will permit the first steps toward a financial market to be taken. The draft laws with the same names on joint stock companies and on securities are virtually ready as well as a draft law on the stock exchange. But these documents still require additional work.

[Akuratov] When will the financial market be introduced? What time period do you envisage?

[Rayevskiy] The financial market already exists although, of course, in an undeveloped form. We are dissatisfied with its functioning, including the system for its regulation. It seems to me that quite optimistic time periods are named in the governmental program for the opening of the stock exchange in the first place—but this does not mean that the financial market, that the opening of the stock exchange at the end of next year will not take place. Specialized financial institutions are appearing, there are many action groups of people who are setting up brokering offices and investment offices which can be included in this process.

Agreement Signed

LD1010220890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Interview with Finance Minister V.S. Pavlov by correspondent A. Melnikov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The leaders of the New York Stock Exchange today also signed agreements with the USSR Finance Ministry and the USSR State Bank on training and mutual contacts.

[A. Melnikov] The documents were signed at the International Trade Center. The agreement envisages the expansion and development of business contacts between the New York Stock Exchange and the relevant Soviet institutions. It is proposed to give us assistance, not only in setting up the first Moscow stock exchange, but also in modernizing the whole country's financial system. An exchange of specialists from both sides to perform research work, instruction, and practical training is expected. The sides agreed to exchange training literature, other educational material for this professional field, and financial information. Answering journalists' questions, the USSR finance minister said, in particular:

[V.S. Pavlov] Contrary to some impressions we are working on the basis that neither the exchange nor the banks should repeat the administrative structure. There are people in this country now who want definitely to have financial institutions tied to administrative boundaries. This is not a market.

Primakov Interviewed on U.S., International Ties

91UF0019A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 40, 3 October 90 p 14

[Report on interview with Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer Igor Belyayev; place and date not given: "The USSR and the United States in a New World"]

[Text] **This interview with Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer Igor Belyayev is devoted to the achievements, problems and prospects of Soviet-American relations.**

[Belyayev] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are at the top of our scale of foreign policy priorities. They have obviously changed for the better. What, in your opinion, has promoted the radical changes that have taken place in these relations?

[Primakov] In order to answer your question it is necessary once again to think about what our relations were like five years ago. This would also be advisable in order to show the skeptics—although there are not many still exist—what a long path has been trod and what decisive changes have been made. We were literally standing with missiles at the ready against each other and had reached a point where "pulling the trigger" was inevitable. Of course, even then the two sides had not completely abandoned common sense. But events were pushing them toward that point.

I think that the main reason for the radical changes that have taken place lies in the mutual recognition that it was impossible to go any further in that same direction. But everyone came to that recognition primarily through perestroyka in the Soviet Union. We proclaimed new approaches to international relations and set a course toward de-ideologization of interstate ties. And here, right from the start we pursued two clearly defined goals: on the one hand, to remove the thermonuclear threat hanging over mankind, and on the other hand, to create the most favorable foreign conditions for the transition from a totalitarian state to a democratic state, from a unitary state to a union of sovereign republics.

Of course, the increased realism in American foreign policy and the recognition by the U.S. leadership of the profound interest which the United States, the West, and mankind in general had in the success of perestroyka in the USSR also played a large part in this. And here it is a question of positive shifts in the foreign policy approaches not only of the United States but also of many other countries, from the West European states to great China.

[Belyayev] Can we assume that in the process of normalizing Soviet-American relations key stage tasks have already been resolved?

[Primakov] Yes, I think that we could say that an entire stage has already been completed. The essence of this stage is that we have drawn up "rules of conduct" that have been successfully applied to extricate us from inflexible confrontation and create conditions of stability in relations between the two countries and in the world in general. We can reckon that at this stage a civilized character has been imparted to our relations. The "cold war" has thus ended and is a thing of the past.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of success in this matter. The words of Winston Churchill now apply to the results that have been achieved to a greater extent than they did to the times when they were uttered. At the height of World War II, Churchill said: "If we win perhaps no one will pay much attention, but if we lose there will be no one there to pay any attention." We have won.

[Belyayev] If you talk about a first stage, then obviously you must say that relations between the two countries have entered a different stage. In your opinion, what characterizes this stage?

[Primakov] The new phase in our relations is less inherently automatic with respect to decisions reached. For the deterministic nature of decisions in the past was largely the result of recognition that a real danger of mutual destruction existed.

The present phase is also undoubtedly also determined by a larger number of "variables" than heretofore. It is not just the tasks facing the two states in the process of changing the nature of the mutual relations and the medium in which Soviet-American ties are being developed that are expanding.

[Belyayev] And what do you have in mind by changing tasks, and a greater number of "variables"?

[Primakov] Whereas previously the priority was to eliminate the threat of war between the two opposing military giants, in other words, to eliminate for mankind the threat of annihilation, I would now define the task this way: how to eliminate the state of "no war no peace" in the world by using their potential and great authority, and also the experience already gained in cooperation. In other words, to devise a new world order that could insure stability after the end of the "cold war," security and justice and the creation of conditions for progress for all mankind considered, naturally, as a single whole. And of course, here it is not a question of establishing some kind of condominium of the two states and preserving their status today as the strongest in the world militarily.

And if we talk about new conditions, or rather, new elements in the situation, which directly affect the development of Soviet-American relations, then they cover many fields—political-psychological, military-strategic, and economic.

[Belyayev] But given all these new factors, about which I hope you and I will be speaking in more detail, do you nevertheless believe that trust between the two states is adequate to move ahead more hopefully than before?

[Primakov] In fact, the last five years have been a reliable platform from which to continue the movement under the new conditions. Trust between the USSR and the United States has been established at a quite high level. This can be seen in the relations between the two country's political leaders, and through the specific nature of the relations—and this is most important—between the two presidents. I have been present at virtually all the summit meetings. I must say that the picture is constantly changing to a more positive plane. The degree of trust between Presidents M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush, shown at the last meeting in Helsinki, was unprecedented in our relations. It seems to me that we can believe that the time when each side saw a potential enemy in the other are far behind us.

[Belyayev] And what is the political-psychological "variable" you mentioned that is affecting the process of change in Soviet-American relations?

[Primakov] First and foremost it is the complicated processes of perestroyka in the USSR and the guarded or wait-and-see reaction to this by a part of American public opinion, and even certain circles in the Congress. I underscore **"part"** and **"certain"** because the majority nevertheless perceives what is happening in the Soviet Union positively and still entertains sympathy for us. However, knowing the dynamic nature of both public opinion and the moods of congressmen, it seems to me that we should now be paying attention to the reaction of the "minority." The more so since in the United States and in other countries the euphoria about the perestroyka that started in the Soviet Union five years ago—a euphoria dictated perhaps by its unexpectedness—and also about the drastic changes in the USSR, is dissipating. What will replace it when perestroyka begins to move through a zone of trials? That is the question.

If something similar had occurred five years ago, during the era of sharp confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, then many American politicians would not have been able to resist the temptation of looking at our not inconsiderable difficulties through the prism of a "no-score game": What is bad for the Soviet Union, they would have said, is good for the United States and the entire Western community.

I do not think that all political figures in the West have totally abandoned this seemingly outworn approach. In proof of this we might cite the fact that in the West, unfortunately, a number of deliberately anti-Soviet manifestations can still be seen, from malicious and largely unjustified criticism aimed at the center with respect to particular republics, to false accusations of insincerity and ambiguity. Such assessments are not only being splashed on the pages of the press but also sometimes figure in official statements, including in the U.S. Congress. Indicative of this, for example, was the foreword written by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney to a recently published Pentagon booklet, "Soviet Military Power." He asserts—and this was totally unexpected for me—that the USSR's military potential is still aimed against the United States and its allies. In R. Cheney's words, "this fact has not changed."

You will agree that the ability to overcome such archaic ideas is one of the tests for Soviet-American relations.

[Belyayev] A number of American politicians have recently been making statements about the need for "closer work" with the opposition in the Soviet Union. Is this serious politics or a game?

[Primakov] Perestroyka in the USSR is leading to a multiparty system in our political infrastructure. Opposition forces have emerged that are engaged in a struggle for power. We are not dramatizing this situation but have started to regard it as natural. But we do not want it to be used by outside forces to the detriment of perestroyka in our country, no matter what slogans are used. Of course, it is not a question of normal contacts by our foreign partners with the various circles, parties, and movements in the Soviet Union, which is quite natural. Instead, both in the United States and in certain other countries in the West the mood of "playing" with the opposition in the USSR has become apparent. Either in the hope of acquiring "opportunities for the future" or in the desire to make us more pliable today regarding decisions in which the interests of the two sides are in imbalance but are weighted in favor of the West. This kind of maneuvering is of no use for either side, nor indeed for that matter is it of use in general. It seems to me that support for President M.S. Gorbachev and those around him in their difficult activity of peacefully transforming Soviet society is in the general interest.

[Belyayev] In your opinion, how does the United States and West Europe look at what is for us a very important question—whether or not to help the Soviet Union?

[Primakov] It is a secret to no one that the Soviet Union is experiencing serious economic difficulties. Some of them are objective in nature—they are inherent in the period of transition from the command-administrative system to a regulated market. Others are subjective and the result of mistakes and imperfections even during the process of perestroyka. One way or another the USSR is more interested than at any other time in receiving economic support from the Western states. Incidentally, not just economic support but the strengthening of our country in liberalizing its economy and attuning it to the world division of labor.

We see that different approaches are being made in the West to the problem of economic support for the USSR at this time. Some reflect a desire to help us stay on the track of perestroyka. Others prefer to temporize or wait a while until everything "settles down" on both the political and the economic planes. Yet others even think that delay in economic help for the USSR will, they say, prompt us to take more decisive steps in reforming the economy. As if one could heal a man by weakening his body. And another idea is also being broached: If economic support is given it should be not to the central leadership, not to the President of the USSR, but directly to the republics.

These sentiments are also being promoted by many, to put it mildly, unsophisticated statements emanating from our country and intended for potential Western economic creditors or partners: Well, they say, set up all your ties with the republics and have nothing to do with the center. Naturally the republics should have a free hand in their economic ties with partners abroad; this is one of the manifestations of their sovereignty. But why deliberately set those ties in opposition to the Soviet Union as a whole? It is high time that the people who are doing this understood that through their political intrigue, combined with a lack of professionalism, they usually put Western partners on their guard and hold them back completely from any large-scale economic ties with our country. These kinds of statements have already succeeded in preventing us from receiving many billions in credits.

[Belyayev] Does it not seem to you, Yevgeniy Maksimovich, that some people in the United States are nevertheless trying to dictate a line of conduct for the Soviet Union, and even set conditions that must be met before aid is offered?

[Primakov] I cannot answer your question unambiguously. To judge from everything, this is not the line of the President of the United States or the secretary of state. But it is finding support in some circles. Take the question of Congress repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which prevents the broad development of economic ties between the two countries. For many years repeal of this amendment had been linked to liberalization of emigration from the USSR. About a year ago the condition for granting us most-favored-nation status was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet with passage of the law on emigration, which, incidentally, passed at the first reading and was included on the agenda for the autumn session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But in the U.S. Congress we heard the voices of those who would make repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment conditional on a new set of demands, from halting aid to Cuba to giving the Baltic its "independence." The discriminatory practices of COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls] are preserved without substantial changes. It is obvious that in the West they can in no way have finished with the prohibitive philosophy in their approach to the Soviet Union. I do not think that negativism with respect to economic help for perestroyka in the USSR has a future. But even manifestations of negative trends can create problems where they should not exist.

[Belyayev] You have also mentioned new factors in the military-political situation. What do you have in mind? Let me put the question even more specifically: Do you think that these changes can alter the military-strategic parity between the two states?

[Primakov] This is an interesting question. Military-strategic parity has still not been settled in history as a category. I think that the very process of detente and the further forward-looking movement in relations between the USSR and the United States on a certain plane became possible because of military-strategic parity. This parity is also maintained at the present time. For its meaning lies not in some quantitative balance but in the ability of either of the sides to deliver a retaliatory strike with results unacceptable for the other side. This capability is also maintained today. It is another matter that the level of this parity should be at a reasonable minimum. And both the USSR and the United States are doing everything possible to lower it even further.

Meanwhile, the substance of the world military-political situation is really bringing in new elements. Today we do not have that "symmetry" that even a few years ago had been created in the strategic field by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Under present conditions, as a military unit and a military alliance the Warsaw Pact cannot be compared to NATO. This must be said in all candidness. In order to insure stability under these conditions it seems to me that it is necessary for both the Warsaw Pact and NATO to gradually move away from their military function and increasingly acquire the nature of political alliances.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has reacted calmly to the changes taking place in the East European countries—its Warsaw Pact allies. This reaction has been dictated by a number of reasons: by the fact that we ourselves are moving away from the command-administrative model of socialism, because the criterion for our assessments is no longer confrontation with the United States, and because the moral and ethical factor has prevailed in our policy. But the question remains: Will the other side try to take advantage of the situation in its own interests?

[Belyayev] There is yet another important factor in today's world—the reunification of Germany. How will it affect Soviet-American and international relations?

[Primakov] The reunification of Germany has engendered a number of problems of a military-political nature. We have successfully started to deal with this range of tests by signing the treaty on the final settlement on Germany in September in Moscow, within the framework of the "two plus four" mechanism, and by initialing a treaty on good-neighborliness, partnership, and cooperation between the USSR and Germany. These documents also proclaim the inviolability of European borders since World War II and prohibit Germany from possessing weapons of mass destruction. Limits have also been set on the numerical strength of the Bundeswehr and the temporary maintenance of our Armed Forces in the eastern part of united Germany. All these agreements have become possible only as the result of the changes in the world in the last five years.

At the same time it is obvious that it is simply not enough to express satisfaction at what has taken place and leave it at that. Implementation of the treaty provisions themselves requires effort by all parties and their constant adherence to the spirit and letter of the documents signed. We must not close our eyes to the fact that the changes in the configuration of the state formations in the center of Europe and the changes in the nature of the regimes in the eastern part of Europe have led objectively, as the military people underscore, to a "reduction in depth" in our defense. Hence it is still important to strive to achieve change in the nature of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Special importance attaches to careful consideration with respect to reductions in armed forces and weapons, mainly conventional weapons, and to the creation of a reliable security system in Europe.

[Belyayev] Will disintegration of the blocs, detente, and the improvement in Soviet-American relations help in the regional conflicts that are our legacy from the "cold war," and dangerous crisis situations, as, for example, in the Persian Gulf region?

[Primakov] In the bad old times the very occasion of these kinds of situations and even more their development would have been virtually impossible without the involvement of the two opposing powers. There was a very negative aspect to this that made each situation a detonator that could undermine world stability. But, paradoxical as it was, there was also a positive aspect: Given Soviet-American agreement it would have been possible to prevent any "supercritical" unfolding of events.

Now an issue cannot be resolved so simply. Conflicts arise outside our relationship. Nevertheless, as before a very great deal does depend on Soviet-American solidarity and parallel actions or joint political actions, if possible, and on mutual restraint if planned military measures entail risk to the security of many states and nations.

Naturally, all of this relates directly and fully to the crisis in the Persian Gulf region. I recently shared in your newspaper some impressions of the Helsinki meeting and talked more or less in detail about the agreements reached. I think that the line laid down in Helsinki has a continuation. No matter how dangerous the crisis in the Persian Gulf and no matter how important it may be to bring the affair to settlement, it seems to me that it is essential here to proceed on the premise that this is a unique kind of "laboratory" where the efforts being made to create a new world order following the "cold war" are being tested. These efforts must undoubtedly include the impossibility of imposing our will on other countries and the right of any people to freedom of choice in its path of development and its state arrangement. There is no doubt that the mechanisms of the United Nations should play a special and growing role here.

[Belyayev] We have been focusing on Soviet-American relations. Given all their importance, however, they do not supplant the development of relations between the Soviet Union and other states. Do you not think that the Soviet-American train, I might even say "express train," has largely determined the composition of other trains?

[Primakov] I think that other trains are moving with the express train. The Soviet Union's relations with many

West European states—France, the FRG, Italy, England and others—are also developing rapidly, favorably, and reliably. The positive shifts that have taken place in Soviet-Chinese relations can be described as a major breakthrough. They are developing in a stable manner on an ascending line. Considerable ground has been covered in resolving border issues, and this is particularly important because it removes one of the main causes of tension in the past and opens the door for demilitarization of the border. We can only be pleased by how quickly border trade is developing. The USSR and the PRC are holding political consultations and they occupy identical positions on many fundamental international questions. This is also the case with respect to the Persian Gulf crisis.

I say nothing of the fact that the traditional relations of friendship between the Soviet Union and India are distinguished by stability. And in general our policy in the Asian-Pacific region has been activated. Diplomatic relations have just been established between the Soviet Union and South Korea. Economic relations between the USSR and other so-called newly industrialized countries are promising.

[Belyayev] But do you not think that Soviet-Japanese relations are letting this "train" pass by? In this connection it is often said that the so-called territorial problem is blocking it.

[Primakov] I do not want to get into the arguments of the sides, but we have already covered some ground from the starting point when the Soviet Union flatly denied that the problem even existed while Japan looked at absolutely everything through the prism of the so-called northern territories. Things have already moved from this zero point, although not far. The complexity of continuing this movement stems, I would say, from the political-psychological situation in both the USSR and Japan. Continued arguments by the Japanese side about sovereignty over the four Kuril Islands are leading us into total impasse because retreat from the positions occupied by both sides in this issue will not be accepted among strata of the populations in the USSR and in Japan.

It seems to me that the solution lies elsewhere. There must be an exchange of opinions on how to bring our positions closer together with respect to all issues involving the islands—joint economic activity in various forms, humanitarian questions, and perhaps even military-political aspects. And in this way the doors will be opened more widely for the development of large-scale Soviet-Japanese relations along political, economic, scientific and technical, and cultural avenues. And obviously, with their development the time will come when it will be possible to resolve other issues that are today seemingly unresolvable.

The example of Chinese-Japanese relations makes me optimistic, because China found a solution to the dispute with Japan on a territorial issue that proposed leaving any decision on the problem of ownership of the Senkaku Islands to a future generation. Japan, which regards these islands as its own, agreed to this.

[Belyayev] It is common knowledge that in April next year the president of the USSR will be visiting Japan. The world has already grown accustomed to having many of the major problems resolved during summit meetings with the Soviet leader, and to a favorable climate being created for further advance in relations between states in various fields. Do you think that M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan will be an exception here?

[Primakov] This visit could undoubtedly be an epoch-making event that will leave its imprint on the entire future development of relations between the two countries. At the same time I would be cautious about the specific predictions that are, perhaps, being artificially circulated in Tokyo. According to some of them the president of the USSR will resolve controversial questions with Japan by unilaterally abandoning position occupied earlier. According to others, the president will set proposals before the Japanese neighbors and they will take their choice. It seems to me that this hope is illusory. The future lies with the search for an area that unites the interests of the two countries. The future lies in achieving a balance between those interests. And so preparing proposals while trying to make them mutually acceptable is a matter for both sides.

[Belyayev] Notwithstanding, given all the complexity of the picture in international relations, is it possible to believe that the changes that have taken place in the world are irreversible?

[Primakov] I think that the positive changes taking place in the international situation are stable and are creating a good platform for further advance. In this I number myself among the optimists.

Joint U.S. Conference Examines Nuclear Safety

LD1110041290 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—A Soviet-American conference on monitoring the safety of operations in the nuclear power industry was held in Moscow today. The conference was preceded by an exchange of delegations of inspectors at nuclear stations.

The conference's aim is to deepen cooperation between joint working groups on drafting rules and norms for nuclear plants as well as methods of monitoring their execution.

The main thing in the work of inspectors is to raise the safety of operationg nuclear power sets to use accumulated experience in drafting requirements to the designs of a new generation of reactors, said James Taylor, executive director of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Conference participants noted that a shortage of financial and material resources interferes with the use of American experience in the USSR.

Frolov Meets With U.S. Heritage Foundation Group

PM0910135790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by G. Batsanova: "Our Guests"]

[Text] A group of directors and trustees of the U.S. Heritage Foundation has arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of Moscow's Center of Scientific and Technical Activity, Research, and Social Policy.

PRAVDA Chief Editor I.T. Frolov received them 4 October.

What did the Soviet and U.S. interlocutors talk about? About the threat of totalitarianism and President Gorbachev's sense of humor, about the complex relationship between fathers and sons and the importance of repeating what has been done in history.

Justifying their name, the trustees and directors of the Heritage Foundation see it as their supertask to safeguard traditional, unshakable values. Such as, for example, freedom of the press, whose purpose they see in freedom of criticism and opposition. Nevertheless, they believe that the voice of reason must prevail even in the most critical and opposition-oriented epoch.

Frank Shakespeare, former USIA director who for long years headed Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, is convinced that "freedom of the press" is in a certain sense a myth, "because in all times there is someone who says what to print and what not to print. Those are the rules of the game." He said the following about the principle of a party press, which ruled for long decades in the Soviet Union: "There is nothing bad in that. Because it is not the principle that is important, but the tradition."

It has to be said that the Heritage Foundation directors and trustees are no novices or dilettantes in sailing through the stormy waves of Soviet reality. Thus, as long ago as 1929 Ketrin Devis [name as transliterated] traveled on horseback right through the Caucasus in search of traditions in common between the Georgian Svans and the American Aleuts. On the other hand, Leon Aron feels "at home" in a different epoch—he is writing about B. Yeltsin for the Heritage Foundation.

After agreeing on further meetings, the U.S. conservatives left PRAVDA, taking with them a souvenir: a first issue of the newspaper, published with workers' kopeks in 1912.

U.S. Entry Law Favors Skilled European Workers

PM0910160390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Nadein: "Doors Wide Open. U.S. Congress Votes in Favor of New Immigration Law"]

[Excerpts] Washington—The U.S. Congress has voted to substantially increase the number of people annually allowed to enter this country. Highly qualified workers, engineers, managers, and emigres from a number of European states from where the flood of new Americans has diminished owing to immigration regulations established 25 years ago will be given a crucial advantage. [passage omitted]

As is well known, the United States has been experiencing difficulties for a long time now owing to massive illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants distort the picture of manpower resources, nurture the shadow economy, and promote a rise in crime. In 1986 a special law was adopted amnestying 1,700 people who had entered the country covertly in the part and giving them the right to apply for U.S. citizenship.

The present decision does not make provision for concessions of this kind and, as a result, illegal immigrants are still liable to administrative deportation. However, an exception has been made for East Europeans resident in the United States since 1 October 1989. Their appeals will be considered under a special procedure and they will be accorded a number of advantages.

The Congress decisions make no mention of Soviet immigrants. However, the press often provides in-depth coverage of the problems experienced by Soviet intelligentsia and qualified workers, stressing that their work is inadequately rewarded under the administrative system.

If the adoption of a new law on entry to and exit from the USSR does not coincide with the resolute steps to provide Soviet workers and employees with fair pay for skilled labor, they could prove to be serious rivals for the people asking U.S. embassies for immigration visas. American observers believe that this could have tremendous advantages. Our losses will, accordingly, be at least as great.

It has now been announced that the administration has 14 amendments and comments for the Congress to pass judgment on. However, the White House has no objections to the arrival of fresh talent and skilled workers.

Northeast Asia

Commentary Notes Continued Debate Over Kurils

OW1110045390 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1000 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Commentary by Oleg Shchedrov]

[Text] A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement on 8 October denying the report that the Soviet Union is ready to return two of the four southern Kuril Islands to Japan. This statement was issued in relation with a series of Japanese media reports, including KYODO news agency. The 7 October reports said a draft agreement on the return of the two islands was handed over to a delegation from Japan's leading Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] when it visited Moscow in late September. Regarding the issue of the four southern Kuril islands, Moscow Radio commentator Oleg Shchedrov comments as follows:

The territorial problem is the most difficult issue existing between the Soviet Union and Japan. The four southern Kuril Islands—Shikotan, Habomai, Itorofu, and Kunashiri—were handed over to the Soviet Union on the basis of decisions made at the Yalta conference held in 1945 and other other international agreements.

Japan does not approve of the legitimacy of these decisions since they were made without Japan's participation. The Soviet Union and Japan signed a joint declaration in 1956, which stated that the Soviet side was ready to return Shikoran and Habamai Islands to Japan. However, this proposal became null four years later when the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry recently denied the report on the spot, saying it did not hand over any document revitalizing the contents of the 1956 declaration to the Japanese side. However, there remains some problems in this connection.

First of all, attention is focused on the fact that official Japanese sources have shown their interest in the proposal the Soviet side alledgedly made. Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama, who was visiting Middle East nations at that time, said that this proposal reflects the Soviet authorities' intention to improve ties with Japan. However, it is hard to imagine that the foreign minister made such remarks on the basis of newspaper articles alone.

Secondly, further attention was paid to the fact that the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced the denial after Japanese political circles renewed their demand for the return of the entire northern territories, saying that a return of only two islands was not sufficient.

In this connection, some observers say that with President Gorbachev's visit to Japan just ahead, [the proposal], if it is not coincidental, is a careful sounding of the so-called northern territories situation.

Following the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, however, Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, said that [the Japanese side] should not expect Soviet authorities to make a fundamental review of its attitude toward the so-called northern territorial issue during the course of President Gorbachev's visit to Japan. The visit is scheduled for next year. Moreover, a TASS commentator clearly stated that these islands are Soviet territory.

The recent sensation [as heard] was formally ended this way. However, the southern Kuril Islands issue still remains and it has to be solved some day.

In his recent remarks, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze pointed out that there are many variant solutions, which could be satisfactory to both sides. As for one of these solutions, the Soviet side cites the possibility of entrusting the settlement of the Soviet-Japnese territorial issue to the next generation, like the Sino-Japanese agreement on the pending Senkaku Islands issue.

Yanayev Meets With Japanese Officials on Ties

PM1010190290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Oct 90 First Edition pp 1, 7

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent I. Latyshev: "On the Eve of Positive Changes"]

[Text] Tokyo, 10 Oct—A meeting of prominent representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public has taken place in Tokyo under the slogan "Renewed development of Japanese-Soviet relations."

The participants on the Soviet side were G.I. Yanayev, member of the politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; N.Ya. Petrakov, assistant to the USSR president on economic issues; A.I. Volskiy, president of the USSR Science and Industry Union; and 20 other prominent representatives of the Soviet public. On the Japanese side, the meeting was attended by some 400 well-known state and political figures and leaders of business circles, including Yoshio Sakurauchi, speaker of the Japanese Diet House of Representatives; Bumpei Hara, chairman of the Diet Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association; and Tetsuo Sato, chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Trade Association.

At the meeting there was a comprehensive discussion of questions relating to perestroyka in the Soviet Union as well as questions concerning the present state of Soviet-Japanese relations and the prospects for their development. Certain questions prompted heated debates, which are very useful for clarifying the two sides' positions and deepening mutual understanding.

After the meeting, G.I. Yanayev, summing up its results, told your correspondent:

"What are the reasons for the prolonged stagnation in Soviet-Japanese relations? There are many of them, but chief among them, it seems, is the fact that our relations lacked a key element: a genuine interest in each other as partners. In the cold war era, when political realities in the world were defined primarily in terms of the Soviet-American confrontation, the USSR and Japan were at opposite poles. Japan, which linked its fate closely with the United States, acted mainly on the basis of the interests of that alliance, which under the circumstances implied treating the USSR as a potential enemy. Furthermore, economic ties, which could have strengthened relations, far from developing positively, actually grew weaker as the gulf between the two countries' economic structures intensified. For the USSR too, it became increasingly obvious that Japan could not be expected to take an independent initiative in international affairs, while in bilateral relations everything ran aground on the tricky 'territorial question.' The Soviet leadership developed the view that Soviet-Japanese relations are not a sphere in which to engage in big politics.

"However, we are now witnessing and participating in impressive changes in the world. The cold war era, the era of nuclear confrontation, has ended, and the world is moving toward collaboration and mutual assistance. Under these conditions, Soviet-Japanese relations can no longer be allowed to take their former course.

"But new relations do not develop of their own accord. We must, in particular, work consistently to break down the many stereotypes and myths that distort our perceptions of each other.

"As for the problem of concluding a peace treaty between the two countries, I wish to say that the absence of such a treaty is, in my view, the main political problem in Soviet-Japanese relations. These relations are still not normalized, and to this day, we do not have a border between the two countries enshrined in a treaty.

"In recent years much work has been done to study this problem, particularly by the USSR and Japanese foreign ministries' working party. This was a major expert analysis of all the aspects. And each side accumulated a large arsenal of arguments to support its position. Two conclusions suggest themselves: First, it is necessary to show mutual respect for each other's positions and be ready to discuss all arguments and problems. Second, this testifies to the extreme complexity and obscurity of the problem itself, arising from the specific historical context in not only bilateral but also international relations. It follows from this that it is most desirable to seek an answer within the framework of political solutions. These solutions become possible when an atmosphere arises in relations between countries which itself insistently demands the removal of all obstacles to their development.

"It is necessary, in my view, to go beyond the narrow, familiar approach and look at the problem from the viewpoint of the future of bilateral relations, the processes taking place in the world, and the global tasks facing mankind, and above all not in terms of the dilemma of the past, as expressed in the formula 'war or peace,' but in terms of the dilemma of the present—'death or survival.'

"USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan is planned for next April. Everyone is impatiently awaiting this very important event, the first in our history. It would, of course, be naive to hope for an instant solution to all the problems. The view of certain Japanese politicians that the Soviet president will bring a 'present' like Santa Claus, smacks of political ingenuousness. The visit should first and foremost lift relations between our countries to a level worthy of their role in the world. We must at last begin to speak the language of equal states ready for cooperation."

Joint Japanese Symposium Held on Relations

LD1010111690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1300 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Soviet-Japanese television symposium chaired by Hiroto Ooyama, political observer of Japan's NHK television company, and Professor Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer, with introductory remarks by academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council, in Moscow, date not given—Japanese participants speak in Japanese with superimposed Russian translation; recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A Soviet-Japanese television symposium took place in Moscow recently, which discussed problems of Japanese-Soviet relations. Prominent politicians, scientists, and representatives of the business world in both countries took part in it. The discussion was chaired by Hiroto Ooyama, political observer of the Japanese NHK company, and Professor Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer. A lively and sometimes hard-hitting discussion went on for several hours. The NHK company will acquaint the Japanese audience with this event; and today we, too, present to you an abridged recording of the exchange of opinions which took place.

Allow me to introduce the participants in our discussion today: Mr. Matsunaga, advisor to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Japanese ambassador to the United States; Mr. Mimura, chairman of the Mitsubishi Corporation and deputy chairman of the Soviet-Japanese economic commission; Mr. Kato, professor of Keio University; Academician Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Mr. Milyukov, head of the Socio-Economic Development Analysis Department of the USSR Presidential Council; Mr. Simakov, head of the Scientific and Economic Cooperation Department of the USSR State Planning Committee.

The discussion was opened by Academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council.

[Primakov] Ladies and gentlemen, esteemed colleagues, comrades! Our symposium deals with the prospects for Soviet-Japanese relations. In order to evaluate these prospects, we must obviously on the one hand describe their present state; and on the other hand, we must examine Soviet-Japanese relations in the context of the changing world.

Relations between the two states have improved somewhat recently. But at the same time, it should be admitted that their development clearly lags behind many of the many positive and favorable processes which are developeing in the international situation. The state of these relations bears absolutely no comparison with the rapidly accelerating Soviet-U.S. and Soviet-West European relations. Soviet-Japanese relations—and one can arrive at this conclusion, too, unfortunately—are failing to keep up with the many positive changes in the region itself. Over recent years, as we know, there has been a breakthrough in relations between the Soviet Union and China, which is developing in a stable manner and on an upward trend. Stable prospects for Soviet-South Korean ties have emerged: we are nearing the point of establishing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. Serious changes have occurred in our relations with other so-called newly industrialized countries. Prospects for active economic mutual relations with them have emerged. And so, to use a figure of speech, lots of trains have already departed, picking up speed as they go. However, the Soviet-Japanese train is clearly lagging behind them.

Thus can one describe the present-day situation. Speaking of the prospects for relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, however, I should like at the very beginning to mention the need to overcome two myths. Myth number one: Many people in the Soviet Union used to think that Japan has a vital interest—and I should like to stress the words vital interest—in the raw material resources of Siberia and the Far East. Therefore, it might allegedly make a number of radical concessions in the political sphere. Myth number two: Many people in Japan used to think—and, it must be said, still think today—that the Soviet Union has an extreme interest in the development of productive forces beyond the Urals and in the Far East, and might in the final analysis make serious political concessions in order to obtain the scientific, technical, and financial support of Japan in order to exploit these territories. The Soviet Union allegedly has no other ways of developing this area.

Neither of these conclusions holds water against reality.

Japan has reliable sources for supplying its economy with raw materials even without the Soviet Union. At the same time, Japan also must understand well that as a result of expanding economic ties, the Soviet Union has no vital need of this. But it would also be incorrect to draw the conclusion from everything I have said that both sides have no interest at all in seriously developing relations. In this regard I would like to dwell on certain factors. Having overtaken the United States, Japan has now become the world's main creditor, possessing immense possibilities in this area. Meanwhile, the situation on the credit market will change, and according to all available forecasts, within a few years not only the United States but also the united Germany will be comparable with Japan.

It is perfectly clear that the Soviet market, the largest in the world in terms of its possibilities, will by no means be playing the least role in this competition among foreign investors. The attractiveness of the Soviet market, phenomenal in its dimensions, is increasing even more as a result of the fact that we are proceeding toward a convertible ruble. It is natural that in the case in question we are speaking both about Japanese capital investments in the Soviet economy, in any forms, and about the export of Japanese goods to the Soviet market.

It is obvious that one cannot speak of the prospects for Soviet-Japanese relations unless we dwell on the problems which at the present time, even if they are not totally blocking their development, are at any rate hampering it. At issue is the territorial problem. You would obviously not consider my speech complete and responsible if I evaded this issue. I do not want to touch on the arguments of the two sides, but we have already moved a certain way from the original situation, when the Soviet Union denied outright the very existence of this problem, and Japan saw absolutely everything through the prism of the so-called northern territories. A departure from this zero mark has already occurred, but, it has to be said, not by any great distance.

The difficulty in continuing this departure stems, I would say, from the political and psychological atmosphere both in the Soviet Union and in Japan. Taking as our point of departure the realities that have developed—this is purely my personal view—the question of sovereignty of the four Kuril Islands should not be emphasized at the present stage. Arguments over sovereignty are leading us into total deadlock, as a renunciation by either side of the positions they hold on this issue will not be understood among the broad mass of either the Soviet or Japanese population. The way out of the deadlock it seems to me lies elsewhere. It is necessary now, without touching on the problem of sovereignty, to conduct a broad exchange of views on how to bring our positions closer regarding all other matters concerning the islands. As a result of this, it seems to me it would be possible to discuss the problems both of joint economic activity and humanitarian matters, perhaps certain military and political issues, and thereby try to soften the acuteness of territorial arguments, so as to more widely open the doors to the development of large-scale Soviet-Japanese relations in the political, economic, scientific and technical, and cultural areas.

Through their development we will evidently come to a point when it will also be possible to address other problems which seem insoluble today. In this context I find a certain optimism in Sino-Japanese relations. After all China—which you will recall, lays claim to a part of the territory under Japanese sovereignty, the Senkaku islands—has proposed leaving the resolution of this question, the question of whom they belong to, to future generations. Japan has agreed with this. Without doubt an epoch-making event which could make its mark on the whole future course of developing relations between the two countries will be the visit by Soviet President

Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan in April next year. The world has already become accustomed to the fact that during visits abroad by the head of the Soviet state, or during summit meetings which take place in the Soviet Union, many major issues are resolved and a favorable climate is created for the development of relations between states in many areas and in various spheres.

I would like to hope that the visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, to Japan will not be an exception in this sense. At the same time, I would exercise caution regarding the forecasts which have been circulated and are even being artificially circulated in Tokyo. The future lies in a quest for the area which unites the interests of the two countries. The future lies in achieving a balance of these interests. For this reason, preparing proposals, while trying to make them mutually acceptable, is a job for both sides. Only in this way is it possible to ensure the success of this visit, and overall, the prospects for Soviet-Japanese relations. Thank you for your attention. [passage omitted]

[Ooyama] And now a question to you, Mr. Arbatov. How do you evaluate Soviet-Japanese contacts in comparison with relations between the USSR, and United States and Western Europe? And a second question: During the war, Japan inflicted damage on other countries, but not on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, however, inflicted significant damage on Japan. What would you say in this regard?

[Arbatov] Well, if we want to devote attention to historical questions, I can try to answer this problem too. There was after all a war, a world war in which Japan was one of Hitlerite Germany's closest allies. All the time, on the very eve of the war, we saw that we had battles with Japan at Khalkhin-Gol, at Khasan, and this has left its mark on the memory of Soviet people. Throughout World War II, Soviet people were afraid that a second front from the east would be opened, and we were forced to maintain a large army there, diverting it from battles with Hitler. This seriously hampered us—I can even tell you as one who took part in the war—and so we considered...[changes thought] We pledged our allies, the United States, Britain and France, that we would enter the war with Japan after routing Hitler. And we fulfilled this. We regarded Japan as part of the coalition created, among other things, against the USSR. But this is history.

I would like to briefly supplement the answer given by Mr. Ambassador to the question from Valentin Zorin, and to say that, well, Zorin asked why is it that the wounds inflicted by World War II are healing with such difficulty. In my view, Mr. Ooyama also confirmed this. It nevertheless stays in our memory. While with America and China it is as if the healing took place more quickly. I think that it is also to do with the fact that our relations with Japan have become a hostage of the cold war. We were afraid of each other. I am ready to understand Japan today, and I ask that we be understood. Japan saw before it an enormous Soviet Union and, in addition, a communist China. It saw the Korean war at its doorstep, and it was afraid.

We saw American nuclear weapons and we even understood the explosions of the nuclear bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not as the last shots of World War II, but as the first shots of the cold war, aimed at teaching the Soviet Union to live according to the new rules which the Americans would dictate. That is how we understood things.

And Japan was a base for America; it is located close to our shores; it became kind of unsinkable battleship for the United States; and we were afraid of this too. That was the cold war and its realities, and nothing can be worse than scared people, scared nations. When people are afraid they can do terrible things. For this reason I think that the contribution of all those who took part in this process is very great, and I am proud that my country and the leadership of the USSR—and Gorbachev personally—made this great contribution so that we finally destroyed this world of fears, or in any case, started to destroy it.

I understand, of course, the northern territories are a problem on which our Japanese colleagues have driven themselves into a corner and on which we have driven ourselves into a corner; we have driven each other into a corner. But I see a good sign in the fact that we have taken a step toward meeting the other side and have said, yes, there is a problem if it is raised by the Japanese side, and that the Japanese side is willing to discuss other issues, too, without making it an absolute condition that this problem should be resolved first. I now ask simply that it should be understood that every ship, you understand, even a very large ship, has its own reserve of buoyancy. Do not overload Gorbachev. Do not overburden him with new problems if you want perestroyka to be successful. Let us improve relations, and as our relations develop we will see what to do and how to resolve this problem, too.

[Zorin] I am very grateful to Academician Arbatov for his reply, in particular to my question which I put to the Japanese participants in our discussion.

[Ooyama] let us move over to the question of how Japan might be useful to perestroyka in the Soviet Union. As has already been observed, one must not overload Gorbachev—things are already difficult for him. In Moscow, when I saw the long queues, I thought about how the economic difficulties in the Soviet Union could be resolved and the nature of these difficulties. I would like to hear this from the Soviet participants.

[Milyukov] Yes, indeed, we have great difficulties in the economy now. Unfortunately these difficulties are not diminishing but becoming more intense with every day. This is alarming. All Soviet people, our leadership, and Parliament are concerned about this now. What indeed is the main point of these difficulties? Of course the first thing is the problems on the consumer market, the shortage that has arisen in an enormous quantity of consumer goods. Hence the increasing social tension and the nervousness which we feel everywhere.

Naturally the question arises: Why has this happened? First, in my view, the main point in why this has now happened is the fact that we essentially declared that the old economic administrative command system was being replaced by a new system of economic relations, a system of relations based upon the production of goods. And we are being quite successful in breaking down this system—we are destroying it. But breaking things down is not all that difficult. Setting up a new system, a new system of economic relations is however a very complex issue, a very complex one, and I also believe a very lenghty one. As a result the new system has not yet been formed, while the old levers, mainly those of administrative control, have been destroyed. Monetary circulation has been violated. The inflow of the mass of money into circulation is running considerably ahead of the quantity of goods, and as a result the balance between the mass of goods and the mass of money has been upset. Demand for goods has been raised and essentially what is taking place is the immediate disappearance of these goods from the shops—often, even, when they are on the way to the shops. Many republics and many regions, having declared their own sovereignty and economic independence, have unfortunately begun to destroy economic links. This gap in economic links, if it is not brought to a halt now, is of course capable of aggravating the situation.

[Zorin] I would like to add that some top specialists are sitting at this table, and if we try to make use of the entire volume of their competence, then we run the risk of spending several days sitting here. I therefore appeal to the participants to be as brief as possible in the contributions.

[Arbatov] I would briefly like to add to what Anatoliy Illarionovich [Milyukov] was saying, as he left out one important reason. It seems to me that one thing must be clear: before you lies a country that is fantastically rich, rich in natural resources, rich in intellectual resources, but a country whose economy has been very badly run, and is very badly run now, too. It is been very late coming; nevertheless, we have gained an idea of what needs to be done, and I hope that this will be converted into a binding, precise program, and that this program will open up new possibilities for our economy and for our relations with Japan. This will be a new era I think in these relations. Of course, something else will be needed in addition to this. A good master will still be needed, a good council of ministers, which we do not have as yet—I am speaking of the union council of ministers—and, of course, all of these breakdowns in links, all of these unpleasant things did not occur by themselves but with its active help, or at any rate inaction. [passage omitted]

[Arbatov] I think that Japan can play a major role in stabilizing the ruble, but not by its own experience—although it has to be studied—but by helping us to saturate the market with consumer goods and make the ruble substantial. In addition, I would say we are faced with the tasks of conversion. If Japan also joins the process of strengthening security and disarmament, this will also be useful. The other day in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the leadership met with our generals, and the commander of the Far East military district referred to Japan, saying that we cannot be calm, we cannot cut our expenditure, because in Japan, for the first time in postwar history, military expenditure has exceeded a trillion yen, in general, at the present time, we are dependent on one another, and if we want to live in an acceptable world, then this has to be taken into account in all of our actions. [passage omitted]

[Simakov] I want to say straight away to my colleagues in our own country and our colleagues from Japan that Gosplan—the center of the administrative system—is already not merely just uttering the concepts of private property, privatization, and competition. It is willing to and is working on the specific implementation of this on our own market. And here Japan's experience, I repeat, is extremely important for us. Now let us look at this through some specific examples: How can we implement this? From 1991 some 220,000 engineering and technical workers with corresponding production capacities and experimental and design base are being released in our country through the conversion of military production—and you are very well aware of the level of our military equipment. We are capable of being partners with equal rights, both as regards technology and design, and in the application of equipment that has been developed. So let us establish a solid partnership in a system of telecommunications, a satellite system of telecommunications.

In this social tension we are today experiencing very great difficulties in medical equipment. I unfortunately have to tell you that our hospitals have less than 50 percent of the modern medical equipment they should have. Only two percent of polyclinics have the ability to carry out ultrasonic scanning for purposes of analysis. Is this not an equipment embargo? The market today is in excess of three billion rubles. Let us set up a privatized enterprise and begin working. Our people will immediately feel the participation of Japanese firms in real perestroyka. [passage omitted]

[Arbatov] First of all, with regard to what has been said by Mr. Matsunaga about Japan's being afraid. I am not sure that Japan is very frightened of the Soviet Union now. It seems to me that that needs to be tested further, that public opinion polls should be held, and so on. Second, if Japan really does have fears of that kind, then why does Japan so stubbornly ignore the Soviet Union's proposals that serious talks should be started on security problems in this region of the Pacific? We have been talking about this for many years. Such talks are taking place in Europe, and very successfully. We are already removing one obstacle after another.

Just look: We do not have medium- and intermediate-range missiles in the Far East, just as in other regions. We have reduced our armed Forces. We have withdrawn them from Mongolia. We are establishing relations with South Korea. Our relations with North Korea are also being demilitarized to a considerable extent. And we are proposing—and this remains open—that if you are seriously afraid, then do not increase, do not rush to increase your military budget; for a start at least, begin talking, because in Europe and in our relations with America and with China—in our relations with everyone—we have moved forward. Here I think that our Japanese friends have to look at this problem in a somewhat new way. I am confident that we can easily remove many of the reasons and the pretexts for your fears. But we have never talked about this. What are you afraid of? What are we afraid of? What has to be done? And we are neighbors after all. I think that this is an exceptionally important question for us from the political viewpoint and from the economic viewpoint.

Second, I think that there is an economic side to this. The Soviet Union is carrying out a certain policy. Out of political considerations and—I will not conceal the fact—out of economic considerations we are reducing our armed forces. We are transferring a considerable part—we are reducing military expenditure and coverting a considerable part of our military industry toward the production of civilian, well, non-military goods. I think that here there are great opportunities for cooperation betwen ourselves and Japan. I am not now talking about industry, where there is an industry at a high technological level: I would just ask for a correct impression to be gained of the Soviet Union. perhaps we ourselves are to blame for the fact that we have created an impression of ourselves as being almost an underdeveloped country which is hunting for high-level technology throughout the whole world, and which is making ends meet with odd handouts that it is allowed by COCOM.

Esteemed gentlemen. Fundamental science in our country is comparable only with that found in America. We have an enormous scientific and technical potential in the defense industries. So far we are making very poor use of all this for our industry and economy, for the lives of our people. However, the potential is great, and I see the Soviet Union becoming one of the main suppliers of high technology on the world market in the very near future. But we need what you have: the capability. Just look. Your metallurgy using in the main—well using to a considerable extent Soviet licenses and patents—has become the highest level metallurgical industry in the world. Now we are ready to import your know-how. But let us do this from the very beginning—we have a great start behind us in this respect: we are capable, but we have not started researching our capabilities.

The prospects here are very great. What they talk about today as being the world market is not a world market. It is a market of economically developed so-called capitalist countries—I wanted to use the word Western, but Japan is also one of them—and what is going on the whole time is a dividing up and a redividing of this limited market. At the same time, production capabilities are growing much more rapidly than the capacities for purchasing what is being produced. The competition is therefore becoming increasingly tough, and I think that in this respect the Soviet Union—it is a market of a 300 million-strong population with enormous capacities and opportunities—will in the future be a very important element in developing the world economy, both as a partner in cooperation and as a market. [passage omitted]

[Matsunaga] The 21st century will become, I am convinced of this, the era of the Asian and Pacific Ocean region. And if cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union is established, then our countries will be able to make an inestimable contribution to global development. That, I believe, is a serious prospect for the future. If such prospects do not exist, if there is no dream of the future, then there cannot be any progress. Academician Arbatov, in speaking about the problem of collective security, asked the question of why Japan does not reply to the Soviet peace initiatives. I would like to reply to that question. I have been engaged professionally in diplomacy for 45 years and I can say from my own experience that policy which does not rest upon reality remains nothing more than armchair policy. No matter how attractive the concept, it is difficult to implement it and bring it to life. What one must have, therefore, is both a dream about the future and also realistic calculations which rest upon reality. To be frank, I do not think that the realities of Japanese-Soviet cooperation are cloudless. But if both countries do make such efforts, then I think that good prospects will open up.

[Arbatov] Well, I think that over these postwar decades, we should have come to the conclusion that we cannot go on behaving in the way we used to behave during the period of the cold war. That is a luxury we simply cannot afford. I am not sure that we avoided a terrible end thanks only to the prudence and caution of the leaders. I think that we were often helped simply by chance, and one cannot always count on chance. Besides that we have squandered considerable resources, a fantastic amount of resources, on unnecessary things. We failed to pick up many dangerous processes in the world, like the disastrous situation of the developing countries, and we allowed problems to make their appearance here which it is going to be very difficult for all of us, for all mankind, to deal with in the foreseeable future. We have behaved recklessly and incorrectly, and we cannot go on behaving like that any more. I am very glad that the last decade of this century is beginning with such great changes when almost all, at any rate all responsible countries and responsible political leaders, are beginning to understand that it is impossible to go on like that, that relations between peoples and between states have to be changed radically.

Will the 21st century be the century of the Asian and Pacific Ocean region? I think that of course the Asian and Pacific Ocean region will of course play an enormous role, but I would not disregard Europe, particularly the post-1992 Europe. I think that a number of other countries will have their second wind. I think that most probably things are moving in the direction of this being the century of increasingly obvious global mutual interdependence, which will also require global international aid. For ourselves and Japan, the main questions are of course localized now in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region, and I think that this region has to be demilitarized. It could and it must become one of the generators of the development of human civilization and of technical, cultural, and political civilization. It depends upon us as to whether we do that or not. [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Reactions to Jerusalem Killings Noted

Israeli Action Termed 'Terror'

LD1010164490 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS political analyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Events that have followed the killing of Palestinian demonstrators by Israeli soldiers in Jerusalem on Monday indicate that the act has prompted condemnation and, to a certain extent, bewilderment throughout the world.

From the humanitarian point of view, the terror unleashed on the occupied Arab lands cannot be viewed otherwise than a crime against all norms of civilised conduct.

From the political viewpoint, the killings in Jerusalem have seriously damaged prospects for a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis. They have added to the tension in the region and, indisputably, played into the hands of the Iraqi leader and his desire to win over those Arabs who are against any foreign presence in the region.

The consequences of the developments in Jerusalem "can be highly dramatic for the unity shown by the interntional community in the face of the Iraqi aggression," the Paris-based LE MONDE newspaper notes.

The Israeli leadership's "super-tough" policy with regard to the Arabs has placed its American ally in an extremely delicate position.

Washington is well aware of what Tel Aviv seems unwilling to understand: The deepening split in the Arab world cannot promote the goals and tasks of the U.S. Middle East policy in any way. It is precisely this consideration that is now compelling U.S. diplomacy to join in the condemnation of Israel at the United Nations, for the first time in the past nine years. Unfortunately, this step is prompted apparently by purely tactical considerations and does not indicate a radical turn in U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 has yet to be implemented, 23 years after it was adopted, owing to the die-hard stand of Tel Aviv, which relies on Washington's diplomatic and other support. There is no evading of this fact.

LE MONDE writes today that it is impossible to ignore the inter- connection between Middle East problems. The newspaper points to the need for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, at the same time calling for the earliest convocatin of a Middle East peace conference, emphasising that "further delays could only lead to war".

The threat of war is quite real. There are a large number of warships in the Gulf. The concentration of opposite forces is unprecedented. According to some estimates, there are about 600,000 troop ready for action.

There is talk in Washington that U.S. patience is running out. A spark will be enough for the powder keg in the Gulf to explode.

In order to resolve this dangerous conflict we need to show restraint and inexhaustible patience. The emphasis must be on the priority of political methods, as is provided for by the U.N. resolutions.

Bush Voices Criticism

PM1010174090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 7

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gan under the general heading: "East Jerusalem: Fierce Clashes"]

[Text] Washington, 10 Oct—Official Washington did not consider it possible to remain silent or hold its traditionally lenient position with regard to the latest outburst of violence perpetrated by Israel in the occupied territories. Speaking at a White House news conference today, President Bush subjected Tel Aviv's actions to criticism, albeit in carefully chosen terms.

Nonetheless, this criticism, coming from the lips of the White House incumbent himself, was received by observers here as, in effect, a further confirmation of the "perestroyka" in political thinking on the Potomac. As ABC Television noted, the President did, after all, "point the finger at Israel for unnecessary deaths." Furthermore, as your correspondent has learned from official American sources, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations was instructed not to hinder the adoption by the organization's Security Council of a resolution severely censuring the Israeli terror.

Of course, everyone associates this with the Persian Gulf crisis. They say that Bush does not want to antagonize those Arab states—and they seem to be in a majority—that support the world community's sanctions and especially the enormous U.S. military pressure on Iraq over its annexation of Kuwait. I think this view is justified. But in my view it is important to note something else too. How long ago was it when it would have been impossible for anyone in Washington to summon up the courage even to hint at censuring the cruelty practised by Israel in the occupied Arab territories? Yet today we heard from the highest platform in the United States—the President himself—if not direct criticism of Tel Aviv, at least words that can certainly be put in that category. Heralding new American approaches? That certainly cannot be ruled out.

Three Scenarios Outlined for Strike Against Iraq

PM1010132190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by special KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Shumilin: "To Arms? Three Possible Scenarios for the Start of Combat Operations Against Iraq"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi-Riyadh—By all accounts, an "Arab plan" to settle the crisis in the Persian Gulf will be announced very soon. This has been stated by PLO leader Y. 'Arafat. The principle of "linking the situation in the Persian Gulf with the settlement of all conflicts in the region" forms the basis of the plan, he explained. This idea was earlier put forward by Saddam Husayn.

When you are on the territory of a country which could become a zone of hostilities at any moment you automatically become a realist: You are clearly aware that the drafting of an Arab settlement plan acceptable to all sides is a very remote prospect and that the security of the Gulf countries must be ensured right now. Given the present political alignment and the Iraqi president's stubborn refusal to withdraw troops from Kuwait, a military solution is considered inevitable here. In what conditions could war break out? Citing informed military and diplomatic sources in Riyadh, the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT adduces, in particular, three basic scenarios.

1. Gripped in the stranglehold of the blockade, Iraq carries out a provocation against one of the states whose troops are on the territory of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates or carries out a direct strike against those Arab states.

2. The present sanctions and all manner of future sanction-toughening measures, including breaking diplomatic relations with Baghdad, do not yield results and Iraq continues to occcupy Kuwait. The UN Security Council adopts a resolution to exert pressure upon the aggressor by military means. Special UN forces are formed with the participation of all the countries which are permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If the present deadlock persists and no new resolution is adopted, the Security Council has the right to confirm its previous resolutions on the crisis in the Gulf, which opens up the opportunity for countries which have sent troops to the region to use force, if need be, on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

If hostilities start, a mass strike will be carried out against vital installations in Iraq—air bases, missile launchers, military enterprises, and plants producing chemical weapons. Iraq's fighting efficiency will thus be inevitably undermined in experts' opinion.

The second underlying element of all the specific plans for combat operations against Iraq is the mounting of a crushing strike against subunits of the "Republican Guard," the most combat-effective units, whose leadership contains quite a few of Saddam Husayn's relations and which mainly comprises men from the Iraqi president's native region. The "Guard" is presently split into two parts: The first is stationed in the Baghdad region to ensure the regime's security; the second—the strike force in the seizure of Kuwait—has been assigned to a second echelon of defense around the city of Basra. Specialists are agreed that the first strike will be launched against the grouping around Basra in order to avoid large civilian casualties. After the liberation of Kuwait, the newspaper writes, measures will be taken jointly with the Gulf countries to remove the possibility of any recurrence of Iraqi aggression.

Counterstrikes by the Iraqi Army, specialists consider, will not be fatal to the Gulf countries. The main Saudi oil pipeline could be restored in a few hours after being blown up. The restoration of high-tech refinery equipment in the event of its being blown up will take a few weeks.

Reports Note Consequences of Iraqi Aggression

Impact of Oil Embargo Assessed

91UF0009A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 38, Sep 90 p 20

[Article by A. Kondakov, candidate of economic sciences: "The Third 'Oil Shock'? Economic Consequences of the Iraqi Aggression in Assessments and Predictions by Specialists"]

[Text] The occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the imposition by the international community of an economic blockade on these countries, which are large suppliers of oil to the world market, immediately raised alarming questions throughout the entire world. Will there be another oil crisis? What will be its scope? How painful will be the consequences?

Foreign specialists gave numerous evaluations and predictions of possible economic consequences of the Iraqi aggression and its influence on the general economic situation in the world. They can conventionally be reduced to the following three basic variants.

The **first variant** arises from the assumption that the situation in the region will soon be regulated, Iraqi troops will be withdrawn from Kuwait, and the international community will remove its sanctions from Iraq. In this case one could expect a relatively rapid stabilization of the situation in the world oil market, normalization of the situation in the international currency and financial sphere, and minimum damage to the general economic situation in the world.

The **second variant** envisions escalation of the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf and the transfer of military operations to the territory of Saudi Arabia and the neighboring oil-producing countries. Such actions, which are dangerous for the entire world and jeopardize the extraction of about 20 percent of the world fuel production, could end up with another sharp jump in oil prices (to 40-50 dollars per barrel as against 17-18 dollars before the crisis), a wave of bankruptcies, rapid growth of unemployment, large upheavals in the financial markets of the West, and, ultimately, the onslaught of another world economic crisis. According to the prediction of the chief economic adviser of the Confederation of British Industry, Professor D. McWilliams, the decline of the gross production of the capitalist world during the nineties will be four percent (for comparison: As a result of the first two years of the "oil shocks" in the middle and at the end of the seventies, which were also caused by aggravation of the situation in the Near and Middle East, the reduction of the total GNP of countries of the West reached seven and five percent, respectively).

The **third variant,** which is the most probable under the current conditions, is based on the assumptions that the military and economic confrontation in the Persian Gulf will be prolonged, the occupation of Kuwait will continue, and the blockade of Iraq will remain in place. As distinct from the two preceding "oil shocks," the consequences of this development of events will apparently be accompanied by smaller upheavals, will have a narrower geographic framework, and on the whole will exert a less painful influence on the world economy.

In particular, one can hardly expect a prolonged physical shortage of oil. The approximately four million barrels of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil per day removed from the channels of international trade as a result of the sanctions (seven percent of the world consumption) could be fully replaced in the next few months by increasing deliveries from other OPEC countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (the unused capacities of these countries will enable them to increase their volumes by approximately 3.8 million barrels of oil per day). The corresponding decision in this regard was made at the end of August at the last OPEC conference. As a result, even a week later Saudi Arabia had already significantly increased its volume of exported oil.

If needed, the immense commercial supplies of oil accumulated in the West are another potential source for increasing energy supplies. Their present amounts—about three billion barrels—make it possible to fully satisfy the energy needs of the capitalist world for three months. The strategic reserve of the United States alone, which amounts to almost 0.6 billion barrels of oil, makes it possible to replace deliveries of fuel from Iraq and Kuwait for five months.

The scope of the negative effects from the events in the Persian Gulf on the world economy is also limited by the significantly smaller increase in oil prices (during the first two "oil shocks" they increased by a factor of three and four, respectively). According to existing estimates, in the next three or four years, if oil prices stay the same as they are now (about $30 per barrel), the growth rates of the world economy will slow up by 0.5-0.8 percent and inflation will grow by an equal amount "above the norm." Unemployment will increase somewhat, the foreign payment positions of fuel-importing countries will worsen, and instability will increase in international financial markets. Ultimately, such a development of events could "close" the eighth phase of the economic upsurge in the West and push the world economy toward the next recession, which would not be as deep as during the course of the preceding upheavals in oil prices.

The present development of events entails considerably greater outlays and losses for developing countries that import oil. Under the conditions of the continuing aggravation of the general economic situation of the majority of the Third World, the growth of oil prices entails a sharp retardation of the rates of economic growth, a decline in business activity, a deterioration of the condition of state finances, and increased social tension. A serious worsening of the positions of developing countries is also predicted. Thus, according to estimates of the World Bank, the net incomes from exports from this group of countries will decrease by 10 percent; the growth of its oil bill will cost Brazil alone an additional $1.8 billion. The result could be a further deterioration of the currency and financial position and an aggravation of the debt problem of the developing world.

The present increase in the price of oil can have serious consequences for the countries of Eastern Europe as well. In the opinion of the British consulting group, Energy Market Consultants, taking into account the expected outlays involved in the changeover within the CEMA to accounts in convertible currency and at world prices, "it is impossible to conceive of a worse time for them to have a crisis in the Gulf."

According to Western estimates, the overall losses for Eastern Europe will amount to about $12 million. To this sum one must add the considerable outlays involved with the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq. Suffice it to say that, according to data of East German economists, just from Iraqi payments on the debt, the GDR, for example, will lose about $700 million. The sanctions will cost Poland $300 million. Other countries of Eastern Europe are threatened with similar amounts of damage. These circumstances could significantly undermine their efforts to change the economy over to a market foundation and could sharply aggravate the financial and economic situation which is unfavorable to begin with and push them into the abyss of a crisis.

The events in the Persian Gulf could have various kinds of consequences for our country as well. In the one hand, the growth in price of oil and gold, according to estimates of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, could bring us an additional $7.5-10 billion dollars a year. "The future of Soviet finances is changing radically," stated Jan Vanyush, director of the American consulting firm "Planecon Incorporated," in this connection. According to his calculations, for each dollar of increase in the price of oil, the Soviet Union will receive an additional $1 billion.

On the other hand, the decline in the extraction of oil during the past two years and the difficulties in supplying the country's domestic market with petroleum products could reduce export capabilities even more.

To this one must add the direct Soviet losses resulting from the economic sanctions against Iraq (reduced deliveries of oil to repay credit, current payments, loss of property, failure to pay for deliveries to Kuwait, expenditures on evacuating Soviet citizens), which will amount to about $1 billion this year alone.

The indirect effects of the conflict could be manifested in a narrowing of the possibilities for attracting Western credit under advantageous conditions, increased payments on our foreign debt, and increased prices for foreign equipment. The situation with respect to the repayment of Soviet credit by developing countries could also be aggravated.

Price of Aggression Noted

PM0810135390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by L. Koryavin: "Price of Piracy. What the Iraqi Aggression Is Costing the World"]

[Text] The echo of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait is not subsiding. The stormclouds of war loom over the Near East. The aggression has not only provoked a fresh military and political crisis, but has also created the threat of economic crisis. Not just a regional but a global crisis, moreover. It is not just a matter of oil. The main reason being the violation of world economic ties, the encroachment on world economic stability.

The Near East constitutes the richest store of "black gold." It supplies the whole world. This is a known fact. Many developed countries depend on this source of energy. It is a lifeline for some countries, Japan, for instance. Its closure threatens Japanese industrial potential with a wide-ranging crisis. The "oil detonator" is also causing other countries highly serious consequences, upsetting their economic rhythm, raising prices, and reducing the standard of living. Hence the aggression is striking at states and peoples.

The aggression itself is profoundly amoral. Today this is a challenge to the new processes taking shape on the international arena. The aggression has received unanimous condemnation from the world community. But here is another question: Did Iraq have the right to create a threat to prevailing world economic relations with its wave of tanks across the defenseless desert? Can a single country encroach on world economic ties and the lives of many other states? The answer is unequivocal: Iraq has flagrantly violated international laws. The military aggression against Kuwait has become economic aggression against the entire world.

That is why international observers, in particular George Church in TIME magazine, are examining the consequences of the current Near East crisis from military, political, and economic positions. Moreover, the latter alarms them to an equal degree. The expansion of the military conflict in the Gulf may prove fatal to the Western economy if it affects the Saudi oilfields in the wake of the Kuwaiti fields.

Today it is worth recalling some fragments of history. Let us go a little deeper, so to speak.... The Near East deposits which are said to be the richest since the time of Croesus were discovered by Western countries. The following stereotype has developed in our country: Oil monopolies, these "sharks," forcibly seized Arab and Persian oil wells and began to ruthlessly exploit them. That is not quite the case. Could the patriarchal shaykhs with their medieval lifestyle have independently developed a contemporary industry without Western experience and technology? Of course not. Oil literally gushed out of the Middle and Near East owing to the exploratory work carried out by Western specialists—more than 100 years after the oil concerns had already developed in Europe and America.

At first the Netherlands' Royal Dutch and Britain's Shell, followed by America's Standard Oil, owned by Paul Getty and the Rockefellers, began to extensively extract the "black oil" in the oilfields of the new El Dorado. In harsh competition with one another, moreover. At first the West European concerns did not allow the Americans into their cartel and did not even invite their representatives to their "Last Supper"—a meeting in the Italian city of San Remo, where the plan for oil exploration in Persia and Mesopotamia was drawn up.

But a little later in the Belgian city of Ostend representatives of the American oil concerns were present on an "equal footing" during the development of the "red line" agreement, marking the areas of the Near and Middle East where exploration of these regions' oil resources was to begin. At the time the concession zone within the "red line" extended from Iran into the depths of Arabia.

The Americans soon seized victory in Arabia or, as France's PARIS MATCH wrote, "won the Battle of Austerlitz in the great oil war." Their companies first began to exploit the reserves (one-fourth of the world's reserves) in Saudi Arabia, and then in Kuwait. Moreover, they bought the right to a concession in Saudi Arabia and carried out the exploration work in Kuwait themselves. The well-known geologist Paul Walton was the first to discover oil in Kuwait and in the so-called "neutral zone" which has now been seized by Iraq. Hence the United States' particular interest in these oil-bearing areas whose present national oil infrastructures the United States was instrumental in developing and which are currently working a number of their oil wells in conjunction with American companies, deriving mutual benefit.

Now back to history. If we are talking about attempts to use flagrant force to seize oil sources in the Near and Middle East, this was wholly in keeping with Hitler's plans. It was the Third Reich that drew strategic arrows on maps aimed at Near East oil wells. One of the largest arrows pointed to Iraq. The German propaganda machine used the slogan "From Berlin to Baghdad...." The German military machine was to surge through the Libyan desert and the Nile Delta, reach Basra, and seize the oil of Mesopotamia and then the Iranian plateaus.

R. Sherwood's monograph "Roosevelt and Hopkins. Eyewitness Account" cites one of the U.S. President's conversations in which he stresses, focusing attention on fascist Germany's plans, that Hitler's ultimate aim in the Middle East theater of military operations was "to seize the oil in al-Mawsil and Kerkuk." Another source which reveals the methods of the Reich's ringleaders in preparing for the "oil campaign" against the East is also curious. In his book "Secrets of the British Secret Service," E.H. Cookridge wrote that "Hitler was preparing for the day when he could proclaim himself the 'defender of Islam.'"

Thus a great game was being played whereby they tried to play the Muslim peoples a false hand—they wanted to stun them with the "protection" and imaginary "defense" which the fascist tanks allegedly brought with them as they moved over the sands of Tobruk and El Alamein. It is no coincidence that Hitler's press then mentioned a historical episode (E.H. Cookridge also referred to it): "Before World War I the German Kaiser made a pilgrimage to Palestine. Arrayed in the theatrical costume of the ruler of Jerusalem the Kaiser rode into the Holy City on a thoroughbred Arabian steed."

History is revealing. But let us return to the present day. The clouds of war are once again looming over the oilfields of the Near and Middle East. Instead of the call "From Berlin to Baghdad" the slogan "From Baghdad to Kuwait and Riyadh" has been voiced today—paradoxical as this may seem. Iraq has committed aggression which has reverberated dangerously around the world. There is no corner of the world now that would remain unaffected by the oil problems and particularly, I repeat, the danger of disruption in world economic relations.

There are, of course, countries whose entrepreneurs are hoping to derive some benefit from the Persian Gulf conflict and the resulting rise in oil prices, for instance, Mexico and Venezuela. But they are in the minority. Moreover, entrepreneurs' hopes do not constitute the pledges of politicians and the states themselves. Both countries pledged to observe the OPEC rules of play which demand that there be no increase in the level of oil extraction without this organization's agreement. Thus, most countries of the world have lost out as a result of the crisis.

This may be summarized as follows: Western Europe: The main blow is to France, the FRG, Spain, and Italy. The latter two countries, for instance, produce less than 20 percent of the energy they consume. France and the FRG are beset by the inflationary process and the reduction in economic growth indicators. If the price of oil is $25 per barrel. But today it is approaching $40! Norway stands to gain, but France's LIBERATION describes Britain's gain as "apparent" since the positive consequences of an increase in the price of oil will be "secondary" for the country's foreign trade balance. This is attributed to the fact that oil only accounts for 6.4 percent of Britain's exports. Thus, it looks as though Western Europe stands to lose from "Baghdad to Berlin."

The loss is absolute for the countries of Eastern Europe. They supplied Iraq with arms. Arms were the main export for many of these countries and Iraq settled its accounts in oil. It owed Bulgaria alone $1.3 billion, which it should have covered with "black gold" supplies. There can be no question of that now. Take Czechoslovakia. It held sixth place among suppliers of heavy arms to Iraq. What is more, it helped develop its petrochemical industry and construct social facilities. Its trade with Baghdad was worth $50-60 million a year. Moreover, Czechoslovak specialists were working in Iraq, earning hard currency for themselves and their country. All these sources are now closed.

Asia. The picture is equally pessimistic here. Dozens of countries are suffering from oil famine. Even Asia's industrial giant—little Japan—has proved to be vulnerable. Energy resources are historically its sore point. I once discovered in the archives an article by the Soviet intelligence officer, Richard Sorge, who was working in Japan as a correspondent and writing in 1937 for DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT in 1937: "Oil supplies are one of the weakest points in Japan's economic structure. The country is virtually entirely dependent on imports of crude oil." The figure cited by R. Sorge—Japan at the time consumed six million tonnes of oil per year—is interesting. What about now? Even allowing for the 50-year time lapse the consumption figure has indeed soared astronomically. Today Japan needs 800-900 million tonnes a year!

Of course, the Asian industrial giant is in a particularly tight spot with energy resources. Japan is still dependent on foreign supplies. It meets 91 percent of its energy requirements from imports. But the fact that it is a industrial giant means that it has been able to prepare itself (it has, incidentally, learned from the bitter experience of the 1973 oil embargo) better than other countries in Asia for the possibility of a crisis situation in oil supplies.

Its nuclear electric power stations meet its electricity requirements 25 percent and it has enough oil reserves for 142 days. But facts are facts: It obtains 64 percent of the oil it imports from the Persian Gulf. If the crisis there spreads, Japan will not achieve five percent economic growth this year. Thus, Japan also stands to lose.

The Iraqi aggression has dealt developing countries, including Arab countries, a grave blow. A number of those who do not have their own oil resources are becoming dependent on the rise in prices and reduction in the level of production like many other countries. Those like Egypt, for instance, with scant oil reserves are also encountering problems. Oil represents only 22 percent of Egypt's exports. World price hikes for many industrial goods—and they now represent 70 percent of Egyptian imports—will invariably follow with the increase in the price of oil.

There is a common problem for many developing states: The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait has deprived a large number of their citizens of work in the oilfields and correspondingly of hard-currency earnings. Thus, these countries' total hard-currency revenue has dropped. This can be seen in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and a whole load of Arab states. Egypt now runs the risk of losing the $2 billion which its citizens annually brought in from Iraq and Kuwait. Impoverished Bangladesh has been deprived of $100 million owing to the fact that its workers were thrown out of the oilfields by Iraqi soldiers.

Now a word about the United States. It is equally alarmed by the economic consequences of the Iraqi aggression. It is particularly concerned about the fate of Saudi Arabia "to whose head," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, "Saddam Husayn is holding a loaded gun." The United States has an active interest in Near East oil. Its concerns are linked with it through their capital. But America itself has a wealth of oil resources although it prefers to use imported raw materials. Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil accounted for 8.7 percent of the nine million barrels which the United States imports every day.

The United States keeps strategic stocks of "black gold" in the Louisiana salt mines. It was assumed at first, Thomas Lipman wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST, that "they would remain untouched," but President Bush recently ordered the oil reserves to be unstopped and some of the crude to be put into circulation. Prices of gasoline and airline charges have soared and the stock exchange was in ferment at Saddam Husayn's threats of striking the Saudi oil fields. Economists have begun to talk seriously about the possibility of a slump, drawing attention to low economic growth indicators. However, many specialists considered the statements that "America would slide into economic decline" if prices rose to $40 a barrel to be a clear exaggeration although they agree with the analysis conducted by the leaders of the 500 largest companies which has been cited in FORTUNE: A slump is possible, a slump is imminent. There is also another viewpoint. Some people would like to maintain the position of "economic isolationism" by dramatizing the issue of a slump in order to deny other countries the financial aid they so need.

But there is no question: Iraq's aggression has also dealt the very wealthy United States a blow. They too have lost out—economically and strategically. The latter is of particular concern to the United States. Once again the danger resides in the fact that Iraq's aggression was an act of terrorism against the world economy and the ties that have taken shape within it. Moreover, the United States fears that, by remaining in Kuwait—and, particularly, encroaching on Saudi Arabia, Iraq may get hold of "levers for pressure" not only in the oil El Dorado but also in the international economic situation. Some 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves are concentrated in the Persian Gulf region. That is equivalent to one trillion barrels! If these riches, THE WASHINGTON POST writes, "come under Saddam Husayn's control, he will be able to regulate the entire oil process. He may ultimately decide economic growth in the industrial world. He may swap oil for anything he likes—modern arms or even for nuclear weapons components. He will be able to split the industrial world, giving preference to some countries and discriminating against others. That is why we are experiencing a crisis." This quotation demands special attention. It is, indeed, a terrifying prospect....

Lastly, a word about ourselves. The Soviet Union has condemned Iraq's aggression. It cannot remain indifferent to the fact that Iraqi aggression has posed a threat to world economic ties. Instability in the world does not benefit the USSR, much in the same way that it does not benefit from instability at home. Particularly today when we are transforming our state. This needs no proving. People in the West at first said that the USSR may "derive an advantage" from the Near East crisis: Oil prices will rise, hard-currency revenue will increase. But then they abandoned this "hypothesis" after analyzing the situation.

First, given its current new foreign policy course, the new thinking, the Soviet Union will never go against the interests of the world community in return for any "beneficial dividends" from oil sales. Our participation in the embargo speaks for itself. Realistic calculations reject the West's original conclusions. Its sources indicate that the USSR may gain $6-7 billion per year from oil price hikes. But this plus is multiplied by a minus. The money which Iraq owes the Soviet Union for weapons remains unpaid. According to Western calculations, these debts total $6-10 billion.

The Soviet Union does not benefit from the disruption of economic stability in Western Europe and Japan. We have no interest today in a slump in the United States. The USSR is endeavoring to broaden economic ties and trade relations with these countries. It is prepared to receive financial credit from them in order to promote the plans of perestroyka.

In forcing Kuwait's borders, Iraq did not only steal its riches. It is today robbing dozens of countries of the world, upsetting the normal working of its economic mechanisms. Pointing guns at another state's head is a thing of the past. The laws of coexistence and cooperation should prevail there today. No one has the right to violate these laws. No one should infringe the world's established economic ties.

Belonogov Receives New Iranian Ambassador

LD0810112290 Moscow TASS in English 1104 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 8 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Belonogov today received new Iranian ambassador to the Soviet Union Nematollah Izadi in connection with the forthcoming presentation of the latter's credentials.

Azerbaijan Foreign Minister, Iranian Envoy Confer

LD0910225390 Tehran IRNA in English 1754 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 9, IRNA—Foreign Minister of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan Sadykhov discussed with Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Nematollah Izadi ways of promoting cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran. During the meeting held at the Iranian Embassy here Tuesday, Sadykhov expressed satisfaction with the growing relations between Tehran and Baku and called on the two sides to further exploit their capabilities to upgrade bilateral ties. He also wished success for Iranian Minister of Roads and Transportation Mohammad Sayyed-Kia in his forthcoming visit to Baku, the capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Iran Commissions Squadron of Soviet-Built MiGs

LD0810154190 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT 8 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Ravil Musin]

[Text] Tehran October 8 TASS—Iran officially commissioned into service a squadron of Soviet-built MiG-29 aircraft.

After attending the squadron's exhibition flights, Iranian Defence Minister Akbar Torkan praised the plane's performance and the skills of pilots and maintenance personnel.

East Europe

Polish Foreign Minister Arrives 10 Oct

LD1110021390 Warsaw PAP in English 2308 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 10—Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski arrived in Moscow today for an official visit paid at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

During his stay in the Soviet Union, Minister Skubiszewski will hold talks with representatives of the supreme authorities of the USSR and will meet with members of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Skubiszewski will also visit the Ukraine and Belorussia at the invitation of the authorities of those republics.

The current visit is the first official visit paid by Minister Skubiszewski to the USSR. Earlier, Skubiszewski stayed in Moscow twice to take part in meetings of the Warsaw Treaty.

At the Moscow "Vnukovo-2" Airport, the Polish guest was greeted by Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Eduard Shevardnadze, awaiting the Polish guest at the airport, told PAP that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the visit of the Polish minister of foreign affairs. Minister Skubiszewski's visit is the first official visit paid by a minister of foreign affairs of another country following profound transformations that have taken place in Central Europe recently.

Processes taking place in entire Europe, signs of favourable prospects of the Vienna disarmament talks and the planned CSCE summit in Paris to be attended by 34 states, agur well for the creation of economic, political and humanitarian grounds for a new Europe, Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said.

The Soviet minister added that issues of European and international politics, matters relating to the creation of a joint European economic, legal, cultural and humanitarian sphere as well as bilateral relations will be among topics discussed with Minister Skubiszewski.

In relations between our countries and nations, there are specified problems which have accumulated over the years and which deal with economic, cultural and humanitarian issues, said Minister Shevardnadze.

Yazov Greets Czechoslovak Counterpart on Army Day

PM1010085990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Message from USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov to Czechoslovak Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek; date not given]

[Text] To Army General Miroslav Vacek, CSFR defense minister:

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and myself, I am sending you and Czechoslovak servicemen our congratulations and best wishes on the 46th anniversary of the Czechoslovak Army.

We are convinced that the collaboration and cooperation between our armies will continue to develop and improve in the interests of safeguarding peace and security in Europe.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

Czechoslovak Leaders Call for Summit on Oil Sales

PM0910134690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by E. Guseynov: "Liquid Fuel Shipments Cut"]

[Text] Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and the country's prime minister, Marian Calfa, have urged the USSR president and head of government to hold an urgent summit meeting to settle the question of Soviet oil shipments to Czechoslovakia.

These shipments were cut by 33 percent in October in comparison with the volumes agreed for 1990, and at present less than 30,000 tonnes of Soviet oil is being received every day—the minimum needed to ensure the maintenance of the normal technological cycle at Czechoslovak oil refineries. The country has enough crude oil stocks for no more than two days. Czechoslovakia's leaders proposed holding a summit meeting next weekend although that was the time scheduled for the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian finance ministers' conference aimed at elaborating a united stance at the trade talks with the USSR.

M. Swiecicki, Polish minister of foreign economic cooperation, announced Poland's oil supply problems at the same time. Poland also had 30 percent cuts in Soviet oil shipments at the end of September, which was aggravated by failure to receive these raw materials from Iraq.

Let us recall that the countries of Eastern Europe used to receive approximately 70 percent of the oil they require from the Soviet Union. These shipments were made at agreed prices which were considerably lower than world prices. According to Western experts' figures, this pricing meant that the USSR was providing Poland and Hungary alone with a voluntary annual subsidy of $3 billion. As of next January all transactions between Eastern Europe and the USSR will be carried out in convertible currency. In that case Czechoslovakia has to find an additional $2-3 billion for oil procurements.

At present our country is forced to sell oil to Eastern Europe despite a progressive reduction in liquid fuel extraction in the USSR (a five-percent reduction since the beginning of the year) amid a drastic—almost 70-percent—price hike for raw energy resources on the world market.

West Europe

Troop Withdrawal Agreement Signed With Germany

LD1010110190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1858 GMT 9 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Volnukhin]

[Text] Bonn, 9 Oct (TASS)—The state flags of the Soviet Union and the FRG today adorned the austere nine-story building housing the Federal Finance Ministry in Bonn. Agreements between the governments of the two countries on certain transitional measures pertaining to the temporary presence of Soviet troops in Germany were signed here in a solemn ceremony.

Under the agreement, which regulates financial aspects of this matter, a special fund is to be set up to pay for the upkeep and withdrawal of Soviet troops. The FRG Government will pay a total of three billion Deutsche marks [DM] into the fund between 1991 and 1994. The FRG will also provide the Soviet Union with a two-stage interest-free loan of DM3 billion in 1990-91 to cover the cost of maintaining Soviet troops in Germany. The USSR will receive the first stage amounting to DM2 billion in October this year. At the same time the FRG government is to set aside DM1 billion to cover transport costs of the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The agreement also envisages help being given by the German side to the Soviet Union in implementing a special program of civil housing construction in the European part of the USSR for the Soviet troops who are being withdrawn. The FRG is to allocate a total of DM7.8 billion in the years 1991-94 to finance the program. Various projects for building finished residential housing, setting up and modernizing enterprises for housing construction and supplying construction vehicles and machinery will be implemented. Among other things there are plans to commission four housing construction combines, each with capacity to provide 100,000 square meters per year.

The Federal Republic will support the USSR in implementing measures connected with training and instructing servicemen withdrawn from Germany to the USSR who are to be released into the reserve with the aim of involving them in labor. A sum of DM200 million is to be assigned to this purpose. Measures relating to this, notes the document, must further the introduction and development of the market economy and free enterprise, especially in priority areas of the national economy.

The agreement was signed by Theo Waigel, FRG minister of finance; Hans-Werner Lautenschlager, state secretary at the Foreign Ministry and V.P. Terekhov, USSR ambassador in the FRG.

Assessing the document, which is the first intergovernmental agreement between the Soviet Union and the united Germany, T. Waigel noted that it will bring a "new quality" to German-Soviet relations and indicates a "good spirit of cooperation" between our countries.

German Treaty Ratifies Berlin's Full Sovereignty

LD0610131290 Moscow TASS in English 1216 GMT 6 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Serov and Aleksandr Semenov]

[Text] Bonn Octoberm 6 TASS—The Bundestag overwhelmingly approved the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany signed by the foreign ministers of the four great powers and the two Germanys in Moscow on September 12.

The law on its ratification was approved by all deputies from the German Social Democratic Party and Free Democrats and the majority of lawmakers from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] and the party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).

Only several deputies from the CDU/CSU heading the union of the expelled voted against. Most Green Party lawmakers abstained.

The all-German parliament which came here from Berlin held its first session in Bonn on Friday [5 October]. It was attended by deputies from the two Germanys.

The treaty they ratified regulates outside aspects of German unification, stops the operation of special rights of the four great powers with respect to Berlin and all Germany, grants it full sovereignty and formalises its present borders, including Poland's western border.

Speaking in the Bundestag, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called the treaty the most important document adopted by the German parliament after the war.

It opened the road to unity and creates a new chance for Germany and all Europe. The Germans should justify the trust confided in them by the international community. The treaty's essence is a provision that only peace should come from German soil.

Genscher said that the united Germany does not have any territorial claims towards its neighbours. The Polish western border will be formalised by a German-Polish treaty.

Deputy Chairman of the SDP group Horst Ehmke stressed the need to expand cooperation with the Soviet Union. Germany, as a good neighbour, should help the USSR overcome economic difficulties, he said.

The united Germany owes the Soviet Union more than any other European state, he added.

In the opinion of PDS legislator Sylvia Kaufmann, the treaty which was ratified by Germany earlier than other participants in the "two-plus-four" negotiations, formalises the end of the Second World War in an international-legal form.

She called on Germany to renounce the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil and to cut the numerical strength of Armed Forces below the envisaged level of 370,000.

Later in the day, the Bundestag adopted a new law by a majority vote of the ruling CDU/CSU and Free Democrats parties as well as the opposition social democratic Party, providing for holding all-German elections on December 2.

The initial bill on elections was rejected by the federal constitutional court as contravening the constitution.

Under the bill, parties which will collect less than five percent of the vote throughout the country should not be represented in the all-German parliament.

Although the newly adopted law preserves the five percent barrier, it is calculated separately on the territories of the former German Democratic Republic and West Germany.

West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU) stressed during the debate that all parties which would collect five percent of the vote in one of the two electoral zones, would be represented in the Bundestag.

Representatives of the Green Party, the Union-90 and the PDS voted against the new law, since they believed it should not contain any restrictions infringing on the rights of small parties.

The new law grants the right to such parties and groups operating on the territory of the former GDR to slate joint lists of candidates at the elections.

Then, deputies began debating the first reading of the third West German additional budget for 1990. It was prompted by the unification of the two Germanys, which needs additional expenses.

Speaking during the debate, Finance Minister Theodor Waigel said that the third additional budget provides for about 20 billion marks.

New appropriations wil be used to meet the needs of cities and communities, to finance the construction of hospitals and houses for the aged and invalids. Nine billion marks has been appropriated for social insurance.

According to the minister, the additional budget also provides for West German expenses caused by the Gulf crisis as well as money to hbe used for the upkeep and withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former GDR.

Waigel also said that there would be no longer need to finance programmes caused by Germany's split.

West Germany spent about 400 billion marks over 40 years "to east the lot" of settlers from the GDR, to ransom prisoners and to finance West Berlin and areas bordering the GDR.

Social Democrats criticised the government's fiscal policy. Ingrid Matthaeus-Maier, SDP expert in the Bundestag, said that the Bonn cabinet made miscalculations, which resulted in new huge expenses and higher unemployment in the former GDR.

Military Experts Begin German Inspection

LD1110025690 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—It was reported here today that, under the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe, the Soviet Government requested the German Government for an inspection of military activities on its territory.

After a positive reply, a group of Soviet military inspectors arrived in Germany on October 10 and began the inspection.

Reports Continue on New Germany's Future, Ties

New Role Viewed

AU0610135990 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Text] According to Soviet Germany expert Portugalov, the united Germany will play the role of a great power and, in the long run, also that of a world power. On SAARLAENDISCHER RUNDFUNK radio network, the Moscow politician stated today that with its economic potential, with its almost perfect social system, and with its developed democracy Germany has a justified claim to the role of a great power in Europe.

The Soviet Union expects the united Germany to provide help on a very large scale, said Portugalov, who is an adviser of the International Department at the CPSU Central Committee. He considers such help as a basic element of the bridging function which Germany assumes between the East and the West, Portugalov stressed.

Prospects for Economic Ties Seen

LD0910162990 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 9 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Prospects for economic relations between the Soviet Union and the united Germany are favourable, despite present domestic difficulties in Germany and economic problems in the USSR, deputy director of the Europe Institute Vladimir Shenayev told TASS here today.

He believes that the USSR will prioritise economic relations with Germany, which accounts for about 15 percent of Soviet foreign trade.

Shenayev noted that no drastic changes would take place in the structure of foreign trade in the near future. Both sides are interested in preserving the present volume of trade turnover.

He believes that, when dealing with the United Germany, it is necessary to use both experience from Soviet-West German compensatory deals and relations between Soviet enterprises and East German companies, which developed under inter-governmental agreements.

As for Soviet joint ventures with foreign companies, 200 enterprises were set up with West Germany out of 2,000 joint venture agreements that have been concluded. However, only slightly over 20 enterprises are now operating.

Discussing credit relations, Shenayev said that the USSR is now experiencing some difficulties with payments for foreign deliveries. However, these are temporary difficulties that will soon be overcome, he stressed.

Soviet export possibilities are improving thanks to oil price hikes and the recent credits extended by West German banks. In addition, the USSR has considerable assets abroad and gold reserves.

Shanayev singled out the establishment of zones of free enterprise in the USSR as new promising forms of economic cooperation between the two countries.

Favourable conditions are being created in such zones to invite foreign investments and technology and to set up joint ventures and production facilities for export.

The scientist noted that a bill to promote and protect foreign investments, which has been drafted in the USSR, is very important to the development of free economic zones and other forms of economic relations.

Joint Cultural Festival Planned

LD0910220290 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 9 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Volnukhin and Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn October 9 TASS—A Soviet threatre festival in Germany, scheduled for 1992, will be a major show of Soviet culture abroad, Soviet Minister of culture Nikolay Gubenko said here today.

He has just ended a visit to Germany to plan preparations for the festival.

Under the festival programme, hundreds of events will be held in various German lands: plays, productions by music and ballet companies, a retrospective show of the best Soviet films, fine arts exhibitions, symposiums and meetings between cultural figures.

Gubenko described these plans at meetings with German and foreign reporters. The greater part of the festival will be held in the largest German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, in the cities of Duesseldorf, Dortmund, Bonn, and Aachen.

Later, the festival will move to other German states. Noting that the festival would feature the multinational culture of all Soviet republics, he said that the German side would have the chance to choose among various events.

Gubenko stressed that the forthcoming festival would be staged in a significant period for the German and Soviet peoples.

"Your and our countries are reorganising state structures. Germany is unifying and the USSR is drafting an all-Union treaty," he said. Germany may place first among Soviet partners in the cultural sphere, the minister noted.

"I am sure that the united Germany's economic, financial, and cultural potential will help raise our bilateral relations in culture to a high level."

The rich experience of cultural cooperation between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) may be beneficial in this respect.

"During our talks in Bonn and Munich, we discussed the extent to which the united Germany should uphold obligations made by the former GDR in cultural cooperation with the USSR," Gubenko noted.

The talks were encouraging. "Our German partners assured us that our cultural relations, including those with the former GDR's areas, will be both preserved and extended.

"The German side confirmed readiness to deepen German-Soviet cultural cooperation and to improve its financial basis."

Gubenko emphasised that his familiarisation with the structure of the united Germany's cultural bodies in the centre and localities, with the state policy in culture and its place in society's life was one of his aims during the trip.

He discussed this topic at talks in Bonn and at a meeting with state ministers of worships in Munich. "We are now speaking different languages, especially in questions of cultural policy," he noted.

"But the more we learn about each other, the better we understand each other," he added.

German partners were interesed in ethnic Germans living in the USSR, the development of their culture and the possibility of Germany assisting them.

Gubenko said that the German side promised aid in organising German language studies in areas where Soviet Germans live in large communities.

The German side also promised assistance in preparing TV programmes for Soviet Germans and in establishing printing facilities to publish literature in German.

Gubenko replied to numerous questions by journalists who were interested in perestroyka in the USSR, the situation in culture and how he pursues his artistic career.

Scrapping, Sale of GDR Warships Planned

PM1010135790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Oct 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "For Scrap"]

[Text] Berlin, 5 Oct—Just 12 ships of the former GDR People's Navy will remain in commission for a while. The rest will be scrapped or sold without delay. Fleet Admiral D. Horten, the new commander of the Rostock naval units, has reported this.

New Enlarged Bundestag Holds First Session

PM0910093590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Grigoryev under the rubric "Abroad": "Debut in Bundestag"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 Oct—The all-German Bundestag has met for a working session for the first time in Bonn's "water-pumping station," as Parliament President Rita Suessmuth herself called this temporary hall of plenary sessions. She suggested that the deputies try out the new seats, narrower than before, because otherwise it was impossible to accommodate a further 144 deputies representing voters in the former GDR.

All the former factions have "put on weight" thanks to new parliamentarians. The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union now has 305 deputies; the Free Democratic Party, in coalition with it, has 56; the Social Democrats have 225; and the "Greens" have 49. All this is more, but usual. The appearance of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] in the Bundestag is a kind of parliamentary sensation.

The government rostrum is also more crowded. Five ministers for special assignments (they could also be called ministers without portfolio) from among leading figures of the GDR's last government and parliament, who were here recently only in the visitors' gallery, have today taken their places in the ranks of ministerial seats.

The first all-German Bundestag, which has arisen in an unusual way, has not long to live. The 2 December elections are a stone's throw away. And the first act adopted today was the electoral law. The thing is that, following a complaint from the "Greens," the Federal Constitutional Court recently acknowledged as unconstitutional a number of the provisions of the earlier adopted law on the first all-German elections. Above all, the five-percent stipulation on an all-German scale was deemed inappropriate and inadmissible in such elections. The government had to submit a new draft urgently. The adopted law now provides for the application of the aforementioned stipulation separately for the previous part of the FRG's territory and for the territory of the former GDR. This opens up more favorable opportunities in the upcoming elections also for such parties as the "Greens" and the PDS. As a result, when the vote was taken, the electoral law was adopted by a considerable majority of votes. But it was not supported by the "Greens" and the PDS, who still had doubts about a number of the points enshrined in the law.

Another important item on the agenda today was a discussion of the Treaty on a Final Settlement in Respect of Germany, which was drawn up by the "two-plus-four" group and signed by the FRG, GDR, French, Soviet, British, and U.S. foreign ministers in Moscow 12 September this year. Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher spoke in substantiation of its ratification. The political treaty received the approval of all Bundestag factions. It was ratified by a huge majority of votes.

But let us return from lofty political skies to Bonn's not sinless soil. Today a new additional budget was also put to the deputies for a first reading. It has been occasioned by the need to cover the deficits which have arisen in the economic and social spheres on the territory of the former GDR. New billions are needed for this. And quite large sums relate to the prosaic side of life, so to speak, namely: There are articles in this draft law which define the salaries of the five new ministers. Each of them receives 32,000 marks a month. In connection with the expansion of the administration 10 new government limousines are being acquired at a total cost of 338,000 marks.

The first day of the all-German parliament in Bonn was very animated. The festivities have come to an end. Current work has begun, in the course of which many complex problems have to be resolved before the end of the life of this parliament.

Ryzhkov Receives French Businessmen

LD1010111790 Moscow TASS in English 1058 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov received on Tuesday Loic le Floch-Prigent, president of the French firm ELF Aquitaine, and its director-general Maurice Mallet, who are in the Soviet Union for talks on cooperation with Soviet organizations.

Ryzhkov thanked the firm, which is among the world's ten major oil companies, for starting work to implement several cooperation projects in the field of oil-extraction and the petrochemical industry, including at republican and regional levels. There are plans to use advanced, ecologically safe technologies to develop oil and gas deposits, which pose special problems.

It was proposed that the firm's skills also be used in other sectors of the economy dealing with consumer goods in particular.

Having stressed that French business circles welcome the extension of economic reforms in the USSR, Floc-Prigent and Mallet shared their plans of extending Franco-Soviet trade and economic ties. It was noted that cooperation of Soviet organisations with the firm ELF Aquitaine will help develop joint business projects on a mutually beneficial basis, including on the production of pharmaceuticals and consumers goods.

Ryzhkov and the French businessmen discussed a long-term programme of cooperation with the firm.

Latin America & Caribbean

Gorbachev, Brazilian President Exchange Cables

PM0810153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] On Brazilian Independence Day, the country's national holiday, President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR has sent President F. Collor a congratulatory telegram in which he wished the Brazilian people success and prosperity. The telegram notes that the mutually beneficial cooperation that has taken shape between the USSR and Brazil has real preconditions for further growth.

In a reply message, F. Collor expressed thanks for the congratulations and expressed the hope that Soviet-Brazilian relations will develop further.

Brazilian Aeronautics Minister Visits

Meets With Yazov

PM0910134090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel G. Starykh: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Today saw the end of the official visit to the Soviet Union of Brigadier General Socrates da Costa Monteiro, aeronautics minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil, who was in our country at the invitation of Colonel General of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy defense minister. Socrates da Costa Monteiro was received by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister.

The Brazilian aeronautics minister also had meetings with A.I. Dunayev, chief of the USSR Main Administration for the Creation and Utilization of Space Technology, and the leadership of the Ministries of the Aviation Industry and Civil Aviation.

The members of the delegation were highly interested by their visit to the Flight Control Center, the Yu.A. Gagarin Cosmonauts Training Center, and the Professor N.Ye. Zhukovskiy Air Military Engineering Academy. At the Kubinka Air Base Soviet military pilots demonstrated to the guests from Brazil their expertise in piloting modern combat aircraft.

The esteemed guest from Brazil laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin wall.

Holds News Conference

PM0910141890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by Yu. Stroyev under the rubric "Contacts": "Joint Launch"]

[Text] Brazilian Aeronautics Minister Brigadier General Socrates Da Costa Monteiro has highly appraised the results of talks held in Moscow and the prospects for cooperation. This is the first official visit to the Soviet Union by a Brazilian minister invited by the Soviet government in the history of bilateral relations.

"The visit was made possible by the changes that have taken place in Brazilian and Soviet economic and political life," Da Costa Monteiro stressed at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists at the Brazilian embassy in Moscow. "It is further evidence of our mutual desire to broaden and deepen ties with one another and the rest of the world."

Analysis of the state of bilateral relations has shown that they are still not at a sufficiently high level. According to the Brazilian minister, the main reason for this situation is that "we know very little about each other." More effort must be made to develop programs for cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and technological spheres. "We do not believe that implementation of the envisaged programs is a task for the immediate future," Da Costa Monteiro said. "But we must study priority areas of cooperation now, particularly with regard to the aviation industry and the development of outer space."

Answering a question by your PRAVDA correspondent, Minister Da Costa Monteiro said that Brazil is devoting a great deal of attention to the development of the nuclear power industry, as a long-term and environmentally clean option, and also to space research—an area in which the Soviet Union has achieved considerable results. Brazil is having some difficulties in implementing its program to launch communication satellites. "We do not have the necessary launch facilities or delivery vehicles." He expressed interest in the idea of launching two Brazilian satellites from the Baykonur Cosmodrome. "We appreciate that this is an expensive program," the minister said, "and we are prepared to make the appropriate outlays."

The possibility of beginning regular flights between Brazil and the Soviet Union in the future was also discussed during the visit.

Uruguayan Communist Party Congress Meets

CPSU Sends Greetings

91P50006A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[CPSU Central Committee Secretariat greetings message to Communist Party of Uruguay congress; "To the Twenty-Second Communist Party of Uruguay Congress"]

[Text] We cordially greet the delegates of the Twenty-Second Communist Party of Uruguay Congress.

Your party forum is taking place in an environment of profound positive changes which the world community is experiencing. Ridding itself of strata and deformations, the socialist concept is becoming firmly established as a powerful factor of universal progress.

We value your support for the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union directed at the revitalization of Soviet society and progress toward a humane, democratic socialism. We are confident that the friendship and solidarity between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Uruguay will be strengthened in the future.

We wish the congress successful work.

Girenko Addresses Congress

PM1010120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Oct 90 Single Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Montevideo, 8 Oct—At the 22d Congress of the Uruguayan Communist Party taking place in Montevideo, around 1,500 delegates are discussing the Central Committee report given by General Secretary Jaime Perez, in which he made an appeal for the renewal of the party, its democratization, and a more consistent struggle to strengthen unity between all the country's democratic and patriotic forces.

The delegates to the congress received the speech of A.N. Girenko, head of the CPSU delegation, with great interest. In his speech he dwelt on the basic aspects of the current policy of the CPSU which is restructuring its work in accordance with the 28th party congress decisions.

In conclusion, A.N. Girenko pointed out that, having put forward the task of building humane and democratic socialism at the 28th congress, the CPSU intends to carry on creatively developing the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and advocating cooperation with communist, socialist, and social democratic parties and with all organizations and movements occupying positions of peace, democracy, and social progress.

Venezuelan Party Leaders Hold Moscow Talks

PM0710184390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Talks Held"]

[Text] Leaders of the Venezuelan Christian Social Party "COPEI"—Senator Ilarion Cardoso, its chairman, and Jose Rodriguez Iturbe, chairman of the National Congress Chamber of Deputies International Affairs Commission—have been in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American Peoples. Talks were held with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet; and V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister.

Supreme Soviet

Deputies Debate Employment Bill 10 Oct

LD1010221890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1845 GMT on 10 October carries a 61-minute recorded report of the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 10 October. The announcer begins by summarizing the introductory remarks of Vladimir Shcherbakov, chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, on the draft bill on employment.

At 1849 GMT, Shcherbakov talks about the effect of unemployment on local budgets. He cites foreign experiences in funding unemployment benefits. He says they plan to follow International Labor Office recommendations. Redundancy will result in special measures, such as retraining. There must be provision for payments to be made only to those actively seeking work so as to avoid paying money to lazy people, of whom there are already very many.

At 1903 GMT, Shcherbakov continues on the subject of the size of unemployment benefits.

At 1906 GMT, Lukyanov explains why the issue is being dealt with by a joint session of the chambers.

Shcherbakov then continues going through the bill point by point. Only the minimum level is being established in this document; republics will be free to set a higher level if they wish. The level could be reduced depending on how long someone has been unemployed. There should be supplementary benefits for dependents.

At 1914 GMT, Shcherbakov says that time is short and the law should be adopted quickly to have it operating as soon as possible.

At 1916 GMT, Gritsenko of the Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy supports the government program in those areas where it differs from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions's, AUCCTU, program.

At 1924 GMT, Yakovlev, secretary of the AUCCTU, speaks on behalf of the trade unions. He draws attention to the points of the document where the trade unions disagree with the government's point of view. He calls for a centralized fund to provide payments, as the regions have very different economic capabilities. He calls for earnings-related benefits.

At 1930 GMT, Deputy Bogomolov reads out a statement by the Interregional Group of Deputies on the increase in agricultural procurement prices, complaining that it will have a harmful effect on local budgets, will be inflationary, and will cause further decline in confidence in money. A coordinated policy is needed, particularly between the Union and Russia.

At 1935 GMT, the announcer says the discussion of the employment law then resumed.

At 1936 GMT, Deputy Babchenko says it is the state's responsibility to provide employment for all.

At 1939 GMT, Deputy Katilevskiy tells of high levels of unemployment in Azerbaijan, which will get worse when a labor market is created.

At 1942 GMT, Krasilnik says the undeserving will benefit from the law as its stand at present. It needs much further work to improve it.

At 1946 GMT, the document is given a first reading—286 for; 36 against; 23 abstentions—and the report ends.

Shcherbakov Presents Bill

LD1010130990 Moscow TASS in English 1134 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS Parliamentary Correspondents Boriz Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—The Soviet parliament is today discussing the first reading of a bill on employment.

The document determines the legal, economic and organisational foundations of employment in conditions of a regulated market economy.

Presenting the bill, chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Labour and Social Issues Vladimir Shcherbakov noted that the bill secures the "exclusive right of a person to command his ability for work and does away with the administrative [words indistinct] for work".

He said the labour market gives advantages to those who have higher and more versatile qualifications and are notable for their diligence, honesty and hard work.

Shcherbakov said the bill envisages the creation of a ramified state employment system which will search for jobs, analyse the labour market, forecast the development of the job system, deal with vocational guidance, train and retrain people and employ them.

The bill was worked out by the government together with the country's central trade union council, but they failed to agree on a number of issues. The main difference lies in the size of unemployment allowance [words indistinct] the government suggests that the minimum allowance amount to 80 roubles a month, with Union republics empowered to increase them in accordance with a person's length of service.

The central trade union council insists on the introduction of a scale, according to which the allowance is cut depending on length of unemployment. According to the council, in the first four months the allowance should amount to 70 per cent of a person's average wages, in the next four months—60 per cent and in the following six months—40 per cent. Both the government and the council propose that the allowance be paid for a year.

Shcherbakov favoured the government's plan, saying that high allowances, proposed by trade unions, might lead to social parasitic attitude.

Chairman of the parliament's commission for labour, prices and social policy Nikolay Gritsenko disagreed. He said the regressive scale proposed by the trade unions takes fuller account of a person's labour contribution, and will become a serious incentive for an active search for work; it will allow the creation of a common mechanism for allowances in all Union republics, which is important for the formation of a common labour market, he said.

After the government and parliamentary commissions delivered their reports, parliament began a discussion of the document, which is expected to last until the end of today's sitting.

Bill Passes First Reading

LD1010175790 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—The Soviet Parliament passed the first reading of a new employment bill today.

The bill envisages the creation of a large state employment service, chairman of the State Committee on Labour and Social Issues Vladimir Shcherbakov told lawmakers.

The service will help people find jobs, analyse and forecast employment needs and supervise training programmes, he said.

Many deputies, however, expressed doubt over whether the bill contains a well-balanced mechanism to protect citizens.

The bill simply makes local councils responsible for social protection without specifying concrete measures to support the unemployed, Deputy Vladimir Desyatov from Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur said.

The draft is far-sighted, Deputy Aleksey Levashev of Leningrad said.

Several speakers said it failed to consider social consequencs of mass unemployment. During the transition to a market, up to 35 million Soviet citizens could become unemployed, they said.

If the bill is passed in its current form "both those who lost jobs and those who do not want to work at all will get unemployment benefits", Yuriy Krasilnikov of Kazan said.

"This is a very serious flaw," he stressed.

"The term 'unemployed' requires a very strict definition," Shcherbakov agreed.

Lawmakers will continue to work in committees and commissions on Thursday [11 October].

Lukyanov Says Market Reform Program 'On Time'

LD1010171190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 10 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenko in the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Oct (TASS)—The program for the transition to the market in the USSR will be presented on time, on 15 October, Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, reported here today in reference to a conversation with the USSR president which took place today.

If it still needs to be studied in committees—and this study will be needed, the head of the Soviet parliament noted—the Supreme Soviet could hold a meeting on 15 October according to plan, "and then work for a while in committees and, at the very end of the week, on Friday and if necessary also on Saturday, discuss the program so that the following week we could come out with it."

Interregional Deputies Urge Center-Republics Ties

LD1010210890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Statement from the Interregional Group read by Deputy Bogomolov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 10 October—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The coordinating council of the Interregional Group of deputies has instructed me to draw the Supreme Soviet's attention to the following:

The extraordinary nature of the situation makes the USSR president and the USSR Government adopt decisions on the most important economic issues without waiting for Supreme Soviet approval of a program for the transition to the market. One can understand that. As a result, however, the choice of a path becomes predetermined and a search for other alternatives becomes senseless. In essence, the government, which has not yet been given powers by the USSR Supreme Soviet, is beginning to implement its program de facto, so to speak. One cannot evaluate otherwise its decision on increasing purchase prices for grain, something which logically entailed a new decision on increasing purchase prices for cattle and poultry.

An enormous additional burden of subsidizing the difference between purchase and retail prices is falling on the central and local budgets. And it is not clear in which way this will affect consumer cooperatives. Inflation, which has already destroyed the market and ties between economies and doomed the population to new losses, has been given a powerful impetus. Given the enormous deficit of the state budget planned by the government, a considerable rise in retail prices becomes inevitable. The decree by the USSR president on priority measures for the transition to market relations also contains a great inflationary charge.

Thus, another alternative approach to the market has been buried; the approach which envisaged, as a precondition, improving the money situation, putting the country's finances in order, soaking up the spare money, and controlling jointly, by republics, the emission of money and the credit policy. When money ceases to be money, when the required goods cannot be bought with it, a paralysis of the whole economic life sets in. A center that is unable to restore confidence in money is also unable to withstand the desire of republics to introduce currencies of their own.

The presidential decree ordering strict observance of accords will not work, for in the absence of fully-operational money, barter becomes the base of economic ties. One cannot expect a return from people and enterprises if one pays them with money rapidly losing its value. Administrative coercion turns out to be increasingly less effective; producers and republican economic bodies ignore it more and more often.

Should one back administrative commands by the authority of the military and fear of repressions? Perhaps certain people would like such a solution. In our view, it will not save the situation.

Economic interest and effective material stimuli should start operating. The program prepared on the instruction of the USSR president and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet chairman and proposing to start an advance toward the market—not with rising prices but with stabilizing the money system—lays stress precisely on that. This program is the basis of the Russian government's work. But can Russia implement it on its own?

Today as never before concord between the center and republics is needed, and in the first place interaction with Russia. The agreement between Gorbachev and Yeltsin on joining efforts in preparing market reform was received with great hope. It is clear that without an alliance with Russia, any attempts by the center to stabilize the situation and secure the country's economic unity are doomed to failure.

In practice, however, the events have taken a different course. The center's acts and the position of the Russian parliament and government are increasingly diverging. The Interregional Group regards the elaboration of united approaches by the central and Russian leaderships for overcoming the crisis and for setting in motion market mechanisms as vital for the country and its future. Responsibility to the people, who are experiencing increasing hardships, requires that accords and mutually acceptable solutions be found. It requires not a tug-of-war and mutual recriminations, but cooperation based on realism. The Interregional Group calls on the Supreme Soviet to promote this in every possible way. [passage omitted]

Political & Social

Gorbachev Speech Concludes CPSU Plenum

LD1010203690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1312 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Closing speech by President Mikhail Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in Moscow on 10 October]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Oct (TASS)—Concluding the work of the Central Committee plenum, M.S. Gorbachev said that its results require examination.

This is what I would like to invite you to do. When you reflect on this, bear in mind that we need to change over more quickly to the stage of practical deeds. In addresses at the plenum, topics were aired which were already discussed at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Congress and resolved as a matter of principle at the 28th party congress. From this point of view we have, as it were, lost time. So our discussions should move increasingly into the plane of practical deeds to implement decisions. The situation has reached a state of extreme acuteness and requires urgent measures. Look how the people supported those party organizations and party committees which engaged in practical deeds. We need to come to an agreement for this to be the main conclusion from the discussion which has taken place.

Furthermore, the plenum is important from the point of view that it has provided information on the situation in the country today and this is very necessary for all of us. Therefore, no matter how acutely and even emotionally comrades spoke, we must regard this in a party manner. The fact that we have once again experienced everything that is happening in the country, I think, obliges all of us to act more resolutely and responsibly. The working class and working people expect words of truth and real actions from communists.

As a result of a sharp discussion, we have adopted a resolution which sets out the CPSU position on a very important question—the change to a market economy. The party's stance, the party's word has great importance, in the first instance for our working people, and second for those who are now working on the program for a change to the market and who will adopt it.

This does not mean that I, for example, can concur with everything that has been heard here. I resolutely reject attempts to declare that the movement toward the market is the restoration of capitalism. We clearly agreed when discussing destatification that the people themselves should take part in this process. What is needed is a mechanism which can be used to finally arrive at various forms of collective, leasehold, and joint stock property, but everything should be in the hands of the people. Therefore you can honestly say to people that this theme was at the centre of attention and that we should approach the market within the framework of the socialist choice, maintaining our adherence to the socialist idea. This is the main thing. This approach was already laid down in the programs which have been presented and which I stressed at the Supreme Soviet.

A lot of critical remarks were made here on matters concerning the activities of the party and Central Committee, the political and economic situation, the state of the legal sphere—things that concern people. I think that at least in party terms we have correctly expressed ourselves to the relevant bodies. Solutions to these vital issues must be found and laws—old and new—set to defend the interests of the working people. This, first and foremost, concerns intensifying the struggle with profiteering elements. After the government considers proposals on this issue, it will submit them to the USSR Supreme Soviet at the end of the week. Those will be tough measures which will place in the hands of law enforcement bodies and bodies of power a strong amd mighty means of waging a struggle. I think they will be supported by the people.

And other issues which have been raised here will be resolved one way or another. I state that even given the variety of viewpoints here, an understanding of the CPSU's responsibility for the fate of perestroyka and the country has been expressed here. It is very important for this understanding to be transformed now into a CPSU initiative directed at uniting the efforts of all patriotic forces in our society.

Today this is simply the challenge, the demand of the age, the main thing which we have to do. The CPSU should occupy a constructive position in this central issue which concerns people because they are rejecting confrontation and instability. They want difficulties to be overcome as rapidly as possible and this can be achieved only on the basis of consent, cooperation and, I repeat, the unification of all patriotic forces. We advocate this and I think that this CPSU position is very important for all of society.

In general, comrades, I hope after comprehending everything which happened here, we will draw the correct conclusions which won't drag us backward, but arm us with new knowledge in order to advance confidently on the course of perestroyka in all directions. I call on you for this and hope for your support in the future.

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Shenin Addresses Plenum

PM1010154590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by O.S. Shenin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "Report on the CPSU Central Committee Commissions and Apparatus"]

[Text] On the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat we set out a number of considerations concerning the organization and activity of the party Central Committee.

Paragraph 29 of the CPSU Statutes envisages the creation of standing commissions to cover the main avenues of the Central Committee's activity. They are set up at a CPSU Central Committee plenum and comprise Central Committee members as well as other Communists confirmed as advisers. These commissions are headed by Central Committee secretaries. The Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, having repeatedly discussed this question at its sessions, came to the conclusion that Central Committee commissions should be one of the main forms of organizing the work of Central Committee members, the main component in shaping a unified party policy, and a tool for really linking the center with the local level.

On the basis of the priority avenues corresponding with the realities of the current situation in the country and the party, and the tasks of fulfilling the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress, it is proposed to set up the following standing commissions: an Ideology Commission to focus on the entire range of ideological, political, propaganda, and information problems, which are of great importance for the party; a Sociopolitical Commission—this will be the first time that such a commission has been formed. Its mission will be to analyze the sociopolitical situation in the country and elaborate proposals on ties with sociopolitical organizations, to analyze the work of communists in the soviets, to analyze state building, and other issues. Under the conditions of the transition to market relations a great deal will have to be done by the Socioeconomic Commission and the Commission on CPSU Agrarian Policy. The work connected with the Union treaty already requires a detailed discussion of many problems by the Commission on CPSU Nationalities Policy. It is planned to set up a Central Committee standing commission on the problems of international policy.

Addressing the problems of the position of women and the family in society is eloquent testimony to party renewal. A Central Committee Commission on Women and Family Issues is being set up to that end. It is planned that one of the main avenues of the commission's work will be to elaborate a system of measures to help women get involved in the new economic circumstances, to develop their political activeness, and to mold leaders out of Communist women who have come to the fore in various spheres of activity.

A great deal of thought was given to a commission to handle the problems of party building. Bearing in mind that there is currently no task more important in this sphere than to radically restructure work in the party's primary level, a proposal was made to set up a Standing Commission on the Renewal of Primary Party Organizations' Activity. The commission will draw up proposals to develop and organize the work of a council of secretaries of CPSU party organizations. Apart from the aforesaid standing commissions, it is planned to set up commissions to cover issues reflected in the resolutions of the 28th party congress. These will be commissions on science, education, culture, and questions of CPSU youth policy. It is planned to set up a Central Committee Commission on CPSU Military Policy, taking account of the resolution adopted at the congress on the main avenues of the party's military policy at the present stage. These commissions could be headed by members of the Central Committee Politburo or the party Central Committee Secretariat.

Now to the formation of the commissions. The Central Committee Secretariat has carried out this work on a provisional basis. This was done with the help of party committees—in a number of cases Central Committee members were directly contacted, proposals were put to them, and their opinions were considered. This resulted in the composition of the commissions submitted to the plenum.

The commissions vary in size. For instance, there are 54 CPSU Central Committee members in the Socioeconomic Commission and 47 in the Commission on Agrarian Policy, whereas there are just 25 in the Commission for Youth Policy Issues and 24 in the Commission for Military Policy.

It was thought expedient to staff the commissions on a purely voluntary basis and not to retain the same composition for the entire term of the Central Committee's powers. It was also thought expedient to allow the commissions themselves to amend their composition, bearing in mind, of course, the wishes of CPSU Central Committee members.

Now to advisers. It is planned not to confirm advisers at this plenum. The commissions themselves should determine whom they need as advisers and make proposals to the plenum when they are ready.

There is one other question in this regard. As Comrade Boris Karlovich Pugo reported, the Central Control Commission is showing great interest in the work of the Central Committee commissions. It might be possible, in our view, to reach agreement today that Central Control Commission members can, if they so wish, be included in the commissions.

We need a provision on Central Committee commissions. I think it would be better if each commission submitted its own plan, and then we could choose the best version, enriching it with proposals from other commissions.

It is planned to task CPSU Central Committee departments with ensuring the work of the commissions. The departments' functions will also include the fulfillment of instructions from the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat and the preparation of enterprise materials and proposals in accordance with the tasks assigned by the CPSU Statutes to the party organs' working apparatus—Paragraph 14 of the party statutes.

The CPSU Central Committee apparatus is being reorganized. The Central Committee Politburo has made an appropriate decision on this score. An Organizational Department will be set up within the Central Committee apparatus on the basis of the Party Building and Cadre Work Department. It is planned that it will focus on work with party organizations, including party organizations in the Armed Forces, Border Guards, and Internal Troops, and on the elaboration of the problems of the renewal of party life. Its duties will include the coordination of links between the Central Committee apparatus and local party organs, and providing support services for partywide events.

An Ideological Department, which will handle questions of party propaganda, the mass media, and other questions of ideological work, is being set up, as is a Humanitarian Department, whose purview will cover ties with the creative and scientific intelligentsia, the elaboration of theoretical problems of societal development, and the training of party cadres. CPSU scientific and educational establishments will report to [vykhodit na] this department.

The CPSU Central Committee Press Center is to be retained.

The recently established Department for Ties with Sociopolitical Organizations is being expanded and will specialize entirely in the sphere of sociopolitical ties. Questions of the workers' and youth movement are being transferred to it.

Bearing in mind the exceptional importance of stepping up the party's legal protection [pravozashchita] and the need to galvanize its enterprising and lawmaking activity and to create an effective system for the party's activity in the soviets through Communist deputies, a Department for Legislative Initiative and Legal Matters is being set up within the Central Committee apparatus. The State and Law Department is to be abolished, but the National Relations Department will be retained and renamed the Nationalities Policy Department.

A Socioeconomic Policy Department is to be set up on the basis of the Socioeconomic Department. The Defense Department is to be abolished, the Data Processing Center is being retained, and an Agrarian Policy Department is to be set up in place of the Agrarian Department. One of the main avenues of its activity will be ties with the peasants' movement.

Bearing in mind that foreign policy problems and interstate relations are handled by the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and, lately, the Presidential Council too, the functions of the International Department—which will focus more on implementing ties with foreign parties and organizations—will be clarified.

The work of the Commission on Women and Family Issues will be ensured by an apparatus of 11 people. Moreover, it is planned to have workers or structures handling these issues present in all departments.

It is planned to retain the General Department and the Administration of Affairs in the Central Committee apparatus.

The current 1,493 senior Central Committee apparatus officials will be cut by 40.4 percent, or 603. I should report that this is the second major reduction to the Central Committee apparatus. Last year it was reduced by 536 senior officials. I think that this work will be continued in the future, but that we should stop for the moment. We all realize that an apparatus which is in a constant state of reorganization cannot work efficiently.

Now to move on to certain other questions.

Drafts of all CPSU normative and methodological documents, which had to be prepared in accordance with the decisions of the 28th party congress, have been submitted to Central Committee and Central Control Commission members. They were not drawn up in secret—party committee workers and specialists were involved. Certain documents—particularly the "Provision on Referendums"—were approved at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress. The documents take account of the demands of the party statutes and recent practice. On the whole they reflect a desire to resolve anew many questions of party life, and they simplify clerical work and accounting. Reports [otchetnost] have been cut by a factor of between two and two and one-half. The Central Committee Secretariat believes that these documents could be the basis for a further discussion. We are counting on the active participation in this work of party Central Committee and Central Control Commission members, as well as all the comrades attending the plenum.

Moreover, we would ask for permission to publish the draft instructions and provisions in the party press for extensive discussion among Communists. Some of these instructions—such as the draft instruction on clerical work, party accounting, and statistics—which require close attention from party workers and the secretaries of major party organizations, should be sent for party committees to study. It is planned to take account of the proposals and comments on these drafts in order to amend them and submit them for ratification at a subsequent joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. This work should be completed before the end of this year.

May I take this opportunity in addressing you to dwell, on the instructions of the Central Committee Politburo, on an issue which has already been mentioned and which is becoming more and more urgent with every passing day. I refer to the relationship between party organizations and the soviets, and to the procedure for implementing the statutory provision on the creation of party groups and factions of Communists in the soviets.

The Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat have specially examined this problem. The other day a note on the matter was sent to party committees. A meeting was held between Politburo members and Communists working in the USSR Supreme Soviet. It showed how difficult the relationship between Communists and party committees is, and how important it is now to thoroughly tackle the consolidation of party forces in the soviets. Communist deputies often lack openness and an ability to debate informally. Many of them, lacking experience in political speaking, get lost in the parliamentary polemics. The main thing is that we need a general line of behavior on fundamental questions. We must bear in mind that the idea of forming party groups or factions of Communists in the soviets is meeting with a cautious reception, particularly in the initial stages, from a number of deputies who are party members. I refer above all to those who were elected on the basis of blocs and often scored points by criticizing the CPSU. There are party members who currently prefer not to advertize their party membership. Some still distrust old-style party groups. The creation of factions makes some Communists fear an increase in confrontation in the soviets. There are also those who are scared of being accused of conservatism. All this is reality. The process of forming party groups will be difficult. But in no way should this work be delayed. Party committees should help Communist deputies to set up party groups and factions in the soviets and to find the correct style for collaborating with them.

I think that party groups should be set up on a voluntary basis, they should be independent, and they should not take the place of deputies' personal responsibility to the voters. At the same time, deputies are entitled to count on party committees' support, joint discussion of issues of a fundamental nature, and assistance in the form of consultation, information, and other aid. Ultimately, they should be able to count quite simply on comradely participation. We need to get party organizations involved in Communist deputies' concerns both at their place of work and in the electoral districts. We should realize that deputies, as party representatives, will be a real political force in the soviets if they start working enterprisingly in order to gain a headstart, raise the most acute questions for discussion, prepare their own draft resolutions, put questions, and insist on strict observance of the democratic principles of the soviets' activity; in short, if they get caught up in the combat of parliamentary life. If this work is done, internal discipline will follow, Communists will pull together in party groups, and party organizations' influence will increase. The CPSU remains the leading party in the country, and the preservation and strengthening of this position will largely depend on the extent to which party committees assimilate the entire arsenal of parliamentary methods and learn to use them in their everyday work under the conditions of competition with other parties and sociopolitical movements. Work in the soviets should be the main—nay, fundamental—component of party work. It must be conducted purposefully, with an eye to the future. And one last point. Deputies elected from the CPSU are still putting up a poor show at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. A definite share of the blame for this lies with the CPSU Central Committee, which still restricts itself, as a rule, to passive forms of work when it comes to these deputies. This situation must be changed. I would like to see deputies from the CPSU making up the core of the party group in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and they should be more active in general.

Kalinin Speaks on Leading Party

PM1110092790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by S.A. Kalinin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the party committee of the Rybinsk Engine Building Production Association, Yaroslavl Oblast]

[Text] Comrades! Over two months have passed since the hot July days of our party's 28th congress. It seems to me that many of us regarded the job as done, but we returned from protracted leave to a rainy fall that is a gloomy time for the party. For some reason the section of the Democratic Platform that had announced its withdrawal from the CPSU organized trips by its representatives to all corners of the country immediately after the congress. They also visited our city. But we, the 400-plus Central Committee members, were unable to do this. This shows that we, the new Central Committee members, failed to draw conclusions from the criticism of the Central Committee's passiveness voiced at the congress. It is not enough today to speak of the situation in the country and the party simply as a crisis. Allusions to the former administrative-bureaucratic system of the past party and state leaders are grating. Serious miscalculations and mistakes have also been made in the course of perestroyka. But, as before, no one has borne any responsibility for them. No one has found the strength to admit them and to ask forgiveness from the people. Although this is regarded as normal at the enterprise level, culprits always answer to the collective. It has to be admitted that over five years of perestroyka our people have grown tired of talk, and people's initial enthusiasm is being succeeded by bitter disillusionment and apathy. The whole country is holding meetings, but changes for the better have not even begun to emerge. People are asking: When are the chaos and anarchy in the country going to cease, when is the law going to operate, rather than talk of a rule-of-law state? Why are presidential decrees not fulfilled? Why do soviets at all levels not recognize USSR Supreme Soviet and government resolutions? And in general how are we going to preserve our Soviet state? Soviet people to a great extent correctly attribute the increased social tension and instability to the CPSU's past and present activity. There is mounting criticism of the Communist Party, and this often acquires anticommunist, antisocialist overtones.

Many sociopolitical groups and movements and newly created political parties are making political capital under the flag of attacks on the CPSU, but we are still waiting for something. Were the lessons of the Lithuanian Communist Party not enough for us?

There is mounting discontent among CPSU members. The activeness of many primary party organizations has decreased. Cases of departure from the party have become more frequent. All this is also reflected in the processes taking place in our oblast and in the city. Since the beginning of the year, 825 party members have left our organization, which numbers over 4,000 people, and 529 of them have left since the 28th congress. It is not only careerists and unworthy hangers-on to the party who are leaving. It is not only "people who have seen the light" who are leaving, but Communists who have believed in our ideals throughout their lives and who cannot explain, primarily for themselves, many processes taking place in society. They cannot explain to people the 500- gram groat ration and the absurd emptiness of store shelves, although all enterprises are working and producing output in the same quantities as before. They are leaving because they cannot stand the moral oppression weighing down upon Communists from all sides. These people cannot understand how they have offended in the eyes of the country and the people. By working harder and better than certain people? By devoting all their strength to their beloved plant and the country in any troubled times, at the front and in the rear? By leaving their small children with neighbors so they could carry out party assignments after work?

Now they are handing in their party cards with tears in their eyes and sorrow in their hearts.

And how can I, a Central Committee member, comfort them and tell them that they are not to blame for anything when there are already calls to bring all Communists to book and they are being threatened with the gallows and the firing squad. In what civilized country can this happen? What about legal protection of the country's citizens?

What can I tell them when they ask what we are building—humane socialism or democratic capitalism? When the program statement says one thing, but every effort is being made to push us into capitalism, as though it brings nothing but good for ordinary people.

We cannot rush from side to side.

Whereas before everything in our country was good and everything in the West was bad, now the contrary is the case.

Beneath the mighty squall of negative assessments of the past and present people are becoming alienated from socialist values and from the combat and labor traditions of their fathers and grandfathers.

Thank goodness at least sometimes sober-minded people from abroad try to bring us to our senses, but the people are waiting for the party to speak out. But we ourselves cannot see beyond the end of our own noses. We write one thing, we do another, we swerve from rut to rut, but we cannot give people a firm position and clear answers.

No one, not the newly organized party of democrats, not the anticommunist forces, will destroy our party. We are doing this ourselves far more successfully than anyone else. How else is it possible to assess the case of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA? Why are we city and rayon party organizations being left without our main weapon—newspapers?

Today I call on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee Secretary Comrade Dzasokhov to prevent this.

When I was leader of the delegation to the Eighth Venezuelan Communist Party Congress and met with party leaders, embassy officials in that country, and Cuban diplomats I felt how difficult it is to answer many questions and how hard it is to dispel the doubts felt by other countries' communists about our dedication to Marxism-Leninism. Especially when their only source of information is the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Spanish. From afar they see many processes taking place in our country in a different light. For instance, what sort of Leninism are we—the leading party and the party that won the elections—talking about if, by decision of the soviets, we are demolishing monuments to the great leader and to those who were in on the inception of those soviets and who devoted all their strength and lives to our people and our state? And we are practically silent. We are silent even when ARGUMENTY I FAKTY writes about mansions constructed with party money. I marvel at the way during all cataclysms we pretend that nothing is happening and that everything is normal. Just what does it take to get a reaction out of our party's leading organ? How long are those who have built their career on their party card going to defile the party and wreck it from within? Why are we so cautious when it comes to any assessments, why do we shrink from calling things by their proper names? From publicly naming the leaders of the antisocialist movements in the country and publishing their programs? The people themselves will see what is what.

Where is our ideology? People are always impressed by a clear position. And the people will never follow a party that is all talk and little specific action. For people are no longer satisfied with vague, high-flown talk. In that case we Communists will be unable to find a common language with the people. And in describing the results of the congress, we write as a great plus that at the congress the "right-wingers" took a step to the left and the "left-wingers" took a step to the right. We are dancing to the left and to the right rather than marching forward, as the situation demands. In my view, we have become so obsessed with internal party problems that we have forgotten the purpose for which we were created and we are doing nothing to improve the people's life. Thus the debarring of party organizations in production units from economic matters prompts the rightful question: What then is the need for them at all in industrial enterprises and organizations?

Another point. A great deal can be said about the privileges of officials of the apparatus of obkoms [party oblast committees] and the CPSU Central Committee when it comes to obtaining warrants for sanatoriums and Central Committee rest homes. Let us ensure that not only party functionaries go there, but all party members. There has been a lot of talk about this—but no progress. The same goes for many issues. We have been transformed from a leading party into a talking party. Take today's plenum. In my view, once again, as is now the norm, we are late in discussing the question of the market. We should have done this considerably earlier. What, were there no scientific thinkers in the party whose proposals we could have discussed at a plenum and then implemented via the Communists working in organs of Soviet power? But what is the situation now? We already proclaimed and approved the switch to the market back at the 28th congress. I think we are going to repeat yet again that we are still not opposed to a multiplicity of forms of economic management and pluralism of opinions. But for some reason so-called pluralism is becoming increasingly one-sided. But one thing is left. Without rejecting in principle the idea of the market, the party must clearly say what additional price the people are going to have to pay this time.

For, to be blunt, most of our people are neither psychologically nor organizationally prepared for such social storms. But we cannot continue along the road of impoverishment. However, we Communists must be sure that the economic reform will not bring impoverishment to the working people, especially to low-paid and needy people. The starting conditions must be identical, or else, to be honest, it is sometimes difficult for me, as party committee secretary, to answer working people in the shop if I myself have doubts. How am I to explain to the head of a family, to a mother of three children that, for instance, the restoration of private ownership or the inevitable rise in prices when the market is introduced is a good thing and will benefit them, but monetary reform would harm them. If that is so, there is a need for proof and for serious explanations to people. Perhaps the question of a market economy should be referred for a nationwide referendum? Otherwise there will be confusion in people's minds and they will presume: Things will get worse, the rich will get richer and the poor poorer. Only after this proof is adopted should all party organizations work to explain this difficult transition for the country's economy. A clear, concise document is needed for this. And the most important thing is to ensure that, when the time comes—whether it is a program for 500 days or 400—a new, even more impressive plan is not elaborated while people try not to recall the old one, as has happened before.

I am perfectly well aware that it is easiest of all to criticize the upper echelons of our party, there is plenty of ammunition, but, believe me, this really hurts primary organizations, which are in the front line and are ideologically disarmed. We feel hurt and pained, but lately we often hear criticism from the obkom and the CPSU Central Committee of primary organizations and claims that we have lost our heads and are continuing to wait for instructions from above. I venture to assure you that this is not so. Moreover, we often hear superior party organs say: "Extricate yourselves from any situation right there in the primary organizations." But we have had and continue to have no feedback with the CPSU Central Committee. Yet this is the main thing in transferring power to the party masses.

A great deal also depends on senior Central Committee officials. But nothing is changing in their work. Also there is no clarity regarding people's deputies who are members of the CPSU. It is paradoxical: Various deputies' groups, factions, and associations are being created under all sorts of signboards and are loudly proclaiming their existence, but we very rarely hear the Communist deputies. And this is worsening our position and causing a still greater exodus from the CPSU. And if this rate of departure from the party persists, we will cease to exist. We are also being pushed toward this by the critical financial state of the apparatus of primary organizations—the foundation of our party—especially as work on a voluntary basis is becoming a rarity.

In conclusion, here in a nutshell are my proposals to transfer party power from the apparatus to the party masses.

One. The people to blame for the collapse of the country's economy should be named and party proceedings should be taken against them. Any failing must be condemned. A program for the social protection of working people in conditions of the transition to the market must be elaborated and submitted.

Two. We should create under the CPSU Central Committee and from members of it a commission to convey the truth to the people or instruct one of the commissions we are going to examine today [accordingly], giving it the duties of reacting swiftly and clearly to facts and statements of a malevolent, slanderous character regarding the party as a whole.

Three. The necessary funds and material resources should be allocated for the publication of rayon and city party organization newspapers, and all CPSU Central Committee plenums without exception—and where possible stenographic accounts of them—should be published.

Four. An entire section should be created in the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS to publish opinions, proposals, and questions from primary organizations and individual members, analyze and generalize them, and provide clear answers from the Central Committee Secretariat in the pages of the journal. The apparatus of all party committees should be registered in a primary party organization so that they know matters and have a better knowledge of them at local level. Places in rest homes and sanatoriums should be evenly and equally distributed among all Communists according to oblast party organization.

One last point. The CPSU's structure and multiplicity of tiers should be simplified. Just party gorkoms [city committees] or, if Communists so decide, CPSU raykoms [rayon committees] should be left in large rayon cities and oblast centers. Wages for the primary party organization apparatus should be paid over and above the 50 percent of the organization's own dues allocated to it.

I think that all this will help our party, no matter how much it comes under fire for past mistakes, to remain the main stabilizing force in society in conditions of economic and political instability and when the future is disturbingly uncertain. To remain the force that has rescued the country in the most difficult and seemingly hopelessly hard of times. The force that will not betray the working class and will not waive the interests of working people.

Melnikov Addresses Plenum

PM1010151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by I.I. Melnikov, secretary of Moscow M.V. Lomonosov State University party committee]

[Text] Comrades! I should not like to look too great an optimist but it seems to me that the party is beginning to emerge from the crisis. And this is natural inasmuch as both in the center and locally the Communists are prepared for specific deeds. It is all the more important that all party structures—from the Central Committee to the primary organization—should start to work actively so that vertical and horizontal ties and information flow in the party are enlivened.

Now, when we are all concerned with the problem of the transition to the market, we have a particular need for the party's view of the most specific questions of life: What should the price of bread be; how to preserve culture and moral values?

The Communists' position on questions which perturb people should be clearly revealed and only then will it influence social life. The Central Committee should set an example.

I propose that a procedure whereby the Central Committee should issue a statement "on the current moment" at least once every six months be approved as one point of our resolution. In these statements we could record topical problems and the disposition of political forces and announce the Central Committee viewpoint on questions perturbing the population. That does not rule out documents adopted by Central Committee commissions, the Secretariat, and the Politburo.

Inasmuch as the subject of the Central Committee's activity has already been touched upon, I want to express some anxiety. We saw in the recent past that the Central Committee's role was belittled, the Politburo was under the Central Committee, adopted resolutions on behalf of the Central Committee, and failed to ensure the Central Committee commissions' real participation even in the preparation of plenums. We know the distortions to which this led and we must draw serious conclusions for ourselves. We must demand of the Central Committee apparatus that it so organize work that each Central Committee member is promptly and fully provided with the necessary information and that he is rendered all necessary technical support. The Central Committee commissions which we ourselves are forming should start working at full strength, reacting promptly and in depth to changes in the sociopolitical and economic situation. But not only the danger of the underestimation of the Central Committee as a collective organ but also the underestimation of its role as the organizer of the fulfillment of the party congress decisions lie in wait for us. And those Communists who work in state organs, those who sit in soviets of various levels, should not forget this statutory norm and should render assistance to the Central Committee and its commissions.

If we want the party to act as a single organizational force in a period of great complexity for the country, then each Communist must make efforts to ensure this. But what can we see right now? Have ties been worked out between the Central Committee and the communists who are people's deputies or between the city committee and the Communists who are city soviet deputies? Efforts are needed here from both sides. But in my view the main efforts should be made by the party organs. The same can be said of mutual relations between party committees of various levels and Communists who are economic leaders.

We in the Central Committee must level a very serious rebuke against ourselves: Why has the party been unprepared in terms of information and ideology for the moment when radical changes are being accomplished in the country's economy. Here, in my view, the underestimation of the role of the intellectual potential at our party's disposal was again displayed. We must create promptly, in six to eight weeks, a party-wide system of response to the rapidly changing economic and political situation.

The party committees of plants, institutes, and state farms and the raykoms [rayon committees] and gorkoms [city committees] could create analytic forecast groups, rely on specialists and scientists, avoid acting blindly or intuitively, and refuse to trust the dictates of meetings. After all as soon as tomorrow the plant party committee will have to voice its opinion on privatization not in general but of its own plant while the higher educational establishment party committee must be able to answer the question of what specifically market relations will bring to the teachers and students of that establishment.

One of the party organizations' tasks now is indeed to help their collectives to understand the situation, to select the best ideas, and to choose the most sensible path for resolving the problems which arise.

Comrades! It is becoming increasingly clear that a real threat has now arisen to all our native culture. Events are developing in such a way that we will not only be unable to speak in the immediate future of the priority development of culture, science, and education. The question is like this: Will we be able to save our culture and our science and to avoid squandering and destroying at any rate what we have?

The point is that the efforts of the government and organs of power in the center and locally utterly fail to accord with the dimensions of the advancing calamity, the dimensions of destruction of material culture, and the dimensions of the loss of cadres and the drain of brains and talent.

Agencies offering our scientists and cultural workers work abroad are already expanding in our country. The losses here will be irreplaceable.

From the materials of the meeting between cultural figures and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary we learn that appropriations from the union budget for culture are not planned for 1991. If that is so, then we are destroying the basis of our state's very existence.

We in the university have examined the programs for the transition to the market. Not one of them gives a specific answer to the question: How will science, education, and culture survive in the transitional period?

It is essential on behalf of the Plenum to instruct the ideological and socioeconomic commissions and relevant departments of the Central Committee to elaborate before February 1991 a specific system of measures and protective mechanisms which will make it possible in the forthcoming two years at least to ease the difficulties of the transitional period.

Of course, this work must be done with the extensive enlistment of scientists, figures of culture and education, and Communist deputies. The primary party organizations could make a big contribution. It is here that specific problems are best known.

The package of measures which has been elaborated must be published so that the soviets of all levels and the executive organs can rely on it in their activity.

Before the congress we all spent a lot of time discussing the most general questions. And that was natural, inasmuch as we had to elaborate new Statutes and program documents. We should not slacken our attention toward these questions. But it seems to me that life is now forcing every Communist and every party organization to investigate an enormous number of specific questions. Primarily those of an economic order. And we must engage in this on a priority basis. Even if someone wants to accuse the party of "interfering" in economic affairs. As long as these specific issues perturb people, the party organizations simply must investigate them thoroughly and have a clear position on them.

Yu.A. Prokoyev's Speech

PM1110094590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee]

[Text] Comrades! In my speech I would like to focus attention on one problem—the transition to the market. I am convinced that precisely this and no other questions will determine once and for all in the very near future our society's attitude toward the CPSU. There is evidently no need to add color to the dramatic description of the situation in the country. I could be lavish with epithets, but they would hardly add to our assessment and understanding of the current moment as an all-embracing crisis in society. To understand this, it is enough to walk through Moscow stores, stand in lines, listen to what people are saying there, and listen to what people are saying in labor collectives.

However, we are far from identifying perestroyka with the current disturbances in society. It is necessary, finally, to separate the wheat from the chaff and determine what in our life stems from genuine perestroyka and renewal and what stems from the ordinary inability to manage the complex state economic mechanism—something of which the shadow economy takes full advantage.

People are increasingly getting the impression that it is absolutely necessary to have purposeful strategy of tension for the purposes of undermining perestroyka. That is how people feel, and this must not be disregarded.

The question of the transition to market relations is being resolved under these very complex conditions. The people are faced with an extremely crucial choice, and the state's future depends on the considered nature of the decisions adopted. And literally the entire country awaits them on tenterhooks.

On the eve of the Central Committee plenum a Moscow city party committee plenum was held with an analogous agenda. Summing up the opinions expressed by Communists, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

First. The introduction of market relations is a constituent part of the comprehensive economic reform. No more efficient mechanism for producing sufficient public wealth is known in world practice, and so to a certain extent we have no alternative to the market in our attempts to lend dynamism to our sick economy.

But we must not deify the market in the way that we once idealized the planned management of the economy.

Second. Any program of fundamental transformations in the economic sphere must answer at least the following questions: On which targeted guidelines and criteria was its formulation based, and whose interests does it regard as of paramount importance? What must society do and what costs must it incur for the sake of realizing it, and what compensation will people receive as a result? What will be the specific results of realizing the program, which, again, can be felt by everyone? And, finally, which specific ways are proposed in order to achieve these results?

Unfortunately, the proposed versions of the programs of the country's transition to market relations do not give convincing replies to these questions. Each of them, to a greater or lesser degree, absolutizes the market as a panacea for our ills, as something that can resolve all problems at a stroke, feed and clothe everyone, and make everyone happy.

We must do away with the dangerous myth that unlimited market freedom will in itself lead to the desired results in the transformation of the centralized economy. We cannot dispense with state protectionism in the structural changes to the economy, in the modernization of production, or in scientific and technical progress. We simply do not have time for this. For, according to the experience of countries such as the United States and Britain, such "self-regulation" takes centuries.

At the same time it took the market 10-15 years to achieve "maturity" in Japan, where the market in fact took shape in the postwar period under the influence of the state and with its vigorous intervention.

A lot of emotion is introduced to the market argument by the question: In whose interests will state control over the means of production be reduced? For there is a perfectly real danger that they will end up in the hands of those who have assembled considerable capital in far from irreproachable ways.

In our opinion, it is necessary to carry out a people's privatization and really hand over state property to those whose labor created it and who really have both an economic and a moral right to it.

Joint-stock and cooperative forms of ownership must evidently be developed further. At the same time the labor collective must have the controlling holding of shares, so that precisely the labor collective feels that it is the master of production.

Further. People are alarmed by a sense of real danger in the face of the social unknown quantity of the market. They are concerned at the unusual flippancy in the approaches of the document's compilers to those problems which for many people will turn out to be virtually the most terrible.

Meanwhile, world experience shows that we will inevitably encounter a high degree of inflation, the stoppage and closure of a number of enterprises and organizations, and unemployment. Specialists believe that in Moscow, for example, the latter will affect to a greater degree intellectual workers and the intelligentsia. But approximately 1 million people are employed just in the sphere of science and its services in the city. It can be expected that inventions and interesting developments which have proved unneeded by the country will go abroad for mere peanuts. Their talented authors will become a commodity, and the growing process of the brain drain is already a reality. At present 46 ultra-highly qualified mathematicians and 154 physicists from our country are working under contracts in U.S. universities. And an ever-increasing number of young scientists is looking for work in the West.

Finally, it has to be recognized that the clumsy way the defense industry is being converted is resulting in the degradation of scientific-technical industrial production. Under conditions of the market's operation, as the author of the well-known projects suggests to us, this process snowballs. In the market even highly qualified specialists will end up as cheap manpower. People must at last be told the whole truth about the social payment which will have to be offered up on the altar of the market. The state must embark without delay on creating a system to protect all sections of the population from the inevitable costs of market relations.

And the party cannot remain aloof from this. The corresponding action program of the Moscow city party organization is now being drawn up.

There are many other questions that arise in connection with the plans to transfer the economy to a system of market relations—in particular, the degree of reliability in realizing the programs. They are all, in point of fact, single-option programs. They offer just one route with a narrow lane of traffic. There is no freedom to maneuver when life might at any moment introduce the most unexpected turns into the plans. This means that there must also be a safeguard system which would operate in case of a malfunction.

Knowing the strength of the design of our state and economy—and they are what they are—it is possible to assume that distress signals will come very soon after the introduction of the regime of transition to the market.

The laws of the market are brutal, and this has to be realized. And you could choke in their elemental forces if you were unprepared. Therefore, having outlined the transition to the market as the long-term aim of the economic reform, it is now important to concentrate on stabilizing the economy and improving the state of affairs. It must be a question, above all, of instilling order in the country's finances, maybe also with the implementation of a monetary reform. It is important that the working person's interests are not infringed here. What is needed is emergency measures to balance the market and saturate it with a mass of goods and an efficient mechanism to implement these measures. The disintegrating ties among republics must be restored. It is simply impossible to make the transition to the market before the law on the Union Treaty is adopted, for otherwise the measures proposed in the programs to create and implement a unified tax and customs policy and for a USSR currency fund will not only end in failure but lead to the total collapse of the national economy. Without a unified state each one on his own cannot create a genuine market or survive in the world system of market relations. It is only by bringing society to a state of normality that it will be possible to conduct the economic reform efficiently. Without this, without the creation of the necessary starting conditions, there can be no question of successful transformations in the economy. But nothing is preventing us from embarking right today on the stabilization of the economy. Reform is also impossible without the presence in the country of strong executive power. This is what is missing today, and there were many examples of this in the speeches of the previous speakers.

People who have become tired and lost faith in the promises of perestroyka expect decisive actions from the country's president and government—actions capable in the present situation of extricating the country from the crisis, ensuring legality and law and order, protecting citizens' safety, and curbing crime. What is needed for the transition to market relations is political stability in society and civic concord, but today the country has become an arena of confrontation among opposing groups. A polarization of political forces is under way, and the center is being pulled asunder. On one flank are supporters of preperestroyka usages, and on the other adherents of the capitalist way. Exacerbation of the crisis and delays over giving the political center shape as a real and influential force in society will lead to still greater chaos and the possible emergence of power structures far removed from democratic ideals.

The CPSU must take the initiative in forming a centrist bloc, but for this it is necessary to surmount the contradictions within the party itself. A clear and distinct stand is needed, and, Mikhail Sergeyevich, it is your right to have a weighty say in this if you want to have the party's support.

It is perfectly obvious that perestroyka is being provided with two mutually exclusive concepts of our society's development. One of them implies the renewal of socialism freed from totalitarianism; it implies glasnost and openness to the world. What is meant by the other is the establishment of a different social system. It is not enough to declare one's allegiance to the first concept, it is necessary to reinforce it with corresponding actions against "pseudoperestroyka." Passiveness merely inspires destructive forces. You do not appear to see this, Mikhail Sergeyevich! Today, probably for the first time, different notes were heard in your introductory speech. It is no coincidence that Moscow's Communists have asked me to remind you that you are the general secretary of our party's Central Committee. Its affairs must not be eclipsed by great presidential concerns.

Gurenko Warns of Anarchy

PM1010131590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by S.I. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! We are probably all unanimous in thinking that ever since the 28th CPSU Congress individual trends have been aggravated to the limit in the country's political life. New phenomena have appeared demanding thoughtful analysis and conclusions, and most important in my view, resolute and specific actions. We cannot fail to see that extremist forces, manipulating democratic slogans of perestroyka, are fuelling mass psychosis, demoralizing the public, and seeking come what may to put a stop to civilized forms of the development of the political process. A fierce attack has been launched against the people's socialist choice and the aim is essentially being set of returning society to the forms of life that existed before October 1917. To persuade people of the need to rewrite history and to change its course, an open struggle is under way to eliminate everything that does not fit into the new "populist" schemes, and above all a struggle is under way to remove the CPSU from the political arena.

Today all means have been put into play. They include pickets outside the buildings of party organs, the withdrawal of party committees from enterprises, and appeals, including even in the USSR Supreme Soviet, to ban the economic activity of party committees. They also include the anticonstitutional decisions of the so-called democratic soviets on nationalizing party property.

The program documents of some new political parties openly put forward illegal aims—seeking a ban on the CPSU and its dissolution. At meetings and in their newspapers the newfound politicians call for the seizure of power by all means, not excluding violent means, and the physical annihilation of the communists, and not just the communists. To corroborate this, I will cite a few lines from an item in a newspaper of the Ukrainian republican party. I think you will understand it even without translation:

Trumpets are sounding over the Dnestr,
Like a river human blood is flowing.
The glorious Sich [Cossack settlement on lower Dnepr] riflemen
Are destroying the enemy.
Hey, hey, hey—they are massacring the Muscovites!
The thunder roars over Volyn,
Free Halich [represents western Ukraine] seethes.
Hey! When will Kiev answer the call?
When will the Dnepr foam with blood?
And so forth.

All this is taking place if not with the connivance then with the inaction of the central organs, of which I should particularly like to single out the law enforcement organs. The point is that the law enforcement organs in the eyes of millions of people largely embody power as such. Now people are asking us: Who needs this power? Who needs a power that apathetically views the destruction of monuments to Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the open glorification and resurrection of Bandera's [Ukrainian nationalist] traditions in the Western oblasts of our republic? I think we have the right to put this question to Comrade Sukharev and Comrade Bakatin. No one heeds the resolutions and statements on this question. It is a case of fulfilling the law. Behind this fulfillment today stands the question of preserving civil peace in the country and people's right to life.

An analysis of recent events in the republic leads to the conclusion that people have already grown tired of political intrigues and demagoguery. We have succeeded, in collaboration with constructive forces, in thwarting the anticommunists' attempt to hold a republic-wide strike on the day of the opening of the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet and to launch a campaign of mass disobedience under the slogans "Down with the union treaty," "Down with the government," "Communists out of the soviets," and so forth. Obviously this course of events, aimed at stabilizing the situation, does not suit everyone. For instance, how else can we interpret the IZVESTIYA item informing the all-union reader that dozens of the biggest enterprises allegedly went on strike in Kiev 1 October? The enterprises are named, but in reality only a few dozen people failed to come to work.

I believe that the Central Committee plenum, using its constitutional right, could instruct the Central Committee Secretariat and the communists who are USSR Supreme Soviet deputies to immediately elaborate and submit draft laws aimed at defending law and order and stabilizing the situation in the country. I think that provisions on the protection of the individual, the protection of rights to political convictions as long as they do not conflict with general human values, should resound powerfully in these drafts.

I am profoundly convinced, comrades, that we will succeed in stabilizing the situation only if the party at every moment and at every turn of the political process (and there are obviously still a great many turns to come) clearly determines and specifies its position, and most important, acts resolutely.

That is why we support the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision to grant additional powers to the president. The main thing now is to use them as the situation requires. Resolute, firm, albeit perhaps unpopular, steps are needed to stabilize the situation.

It is, I stress once again, a question of the fate of our country of many millions, of many nationalities.

I particularly want to stress that I am not calling for anything other than the strict observance of the laws and the implementation of the principle of responsibility for violation of the laws, and especially for violation of the Constitution, irrespective of the post or mandate of any of us. Everyone is worried by the rise in tension in interethnic relations and the growth of separatist sentiments. In fact this has already led us to economic and political chaos in the country. In this situation it is particularly intolerable to intensify separatist trends locally by what are, to put it mildly, politically unconsidered actions by central departments.

I will cite just two examples. The Ukraine, like a number of other republics, has declared a five-year moratorium on the construction of nuclear power stations. Having experienced the Chernobyl tragedy, we do not have the moral right to act otherwise. Naturally, funds for the construction of new capacities for nuclear electric power stations have been reduced—that is understandable. It is hard to explain something else: Why have the funds channeled into social development been halved? After all there are no schools or hospitals in the "atomic" townships now. About 10,000 people are waiting for housing and not even all workers of the Chernobyl nuclear power station have apartments at present.

Another example. Today about 70 percent of young Ukrainian men are sent outside the republic for their military service. This could not fail to influence the position of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, including the position of the communist deputies, who advocated a change in this situation. Back in August the republic's Council of Ministers addressed the district commanders and then the country's government on this question. We believe that an acceptable solution can be found, but so far there has been no reply. The people in the government who are responsible for the country's defense must know and understand that unless the Ukrainian SSR's declaration on sovereignty is taken into account, the draft into the Soviet Army may be disrupted in the republic. I want to say most clearly on behalf of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee that we advocate the union treaty, a fair, equitable, and mutually advantageous treaty, but we believe that time is being lost with the publication of proposals on the concept of the treaty. This must be put right and broad, daily explanatory work on agitation for the union treaty must be launched. It should not be thought that sentiments in favor of the speediest conclusion of the union treaty will strengthen in society "automatically." Under the conditions of the shameless campaign being conducted in our republic against the union treaty there are grounds for doubting that.

Comrades! Full certainty is needed on ideological and theoretical questions. The program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress sketches the outlines of the society we want to build, but a comprehensively substantiated concept for the immediate future, capable of shedding the light of theory on the road along which we are traveling, is of the utmost necessity.

At the 28th CPSU Congress we stated our choice in favor of the market but the insufficient study that the programs now under discussion have made of many questions of the transition to market relations gives rise to great fears among the republic's working class and working people. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is receiving many letters and resolutions and decisions from meetings, plenums, and conferences. Communists and nonparty people rightly believe that we cannot mechanically shift to our country, with a consideration for its historical traditions and people's mentality, the infrastructure of the market relations that have formed in the West over the course of centuries. People believe that the state should assume the brunt of the transition to the market. We are far from thinking of retaining dependence and leveling down. That is not at issue. It is a case of it being the state that should create conditions in which every person, relying on his own efforts and potential, can ensure a fitting living standard for himself and his family.

Now more than ever it is important to ensure intensive, rich intraparty communication. I want to support Comrade S.A. Kalinin who spoke here. At the recent Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum many people also spoke about how important it is today to give the party organizations prompt guidance on topical issues, to give them prompt, daily guidance using all the opportunities the party has, primarily the newspaper PRAVDA. It is designed to become a true party organ, with a clear position. I want to note that PRAVDA is restructuring itself and has in our view become more interesting and attractive, but I do not understand why additional opportunities cannot be sought to subsidize it and reduce the cost of subscription to the newspaper.

I think PRAVDA should be cheap and accessible to every communist, and most important, should answer the most acute questions perturbing the party organizations and working people.

In conclusion, there is one more thing. If we want to keep for the CPSU the position of the ruling party, and I cannot imagine it otherwise, we should think today and give more specific aid to the communists elected to soviets of all levels. They need our support. We must cover their work extensively. We must help them methodologically, help them theoretically. We must also raise the standard of their responsibility, because some of them have forgotten that they were supported by the party organizations, that they acted on the party platform, and this helped them win the elections.

The party committees must seek right now and train people capable of winning future elections and operating effectively in the organs of power. We should make full use of the existing potential of the party's educational establishments to train them.

Esteemed comrades! We have entered a very complex stage of our country's life and we cannot allow society, irritated by the present shortages, deficits, and political quarrels, to make concessions to populist impatience. That is why it is primarily from the CPSU Central Committee and from our entire party that certainty, clarity, and resolute actions are now required.

Kamay Expresses Urgency

PM1110081090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by A.S. Kamay, second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! An analysis of the situation in Belorussia and an assessment of the state of affairs in our Union give grounds for stating that the process of sociopolitical destabilization is coming to a head.

Extremely alarming, critical assessments are being made everywhere: from primary party organizations and labor collectives to this very platform, to the platforms of state government. The bitterness of many people over the shortage of everyday things is already bubbling to the surface. There are no clothes or shoes for children going to school, there are no medicines, footwear, or cigarettes, and the authorities are unable to protect public order and citizens' honor and dignity.

In this respect I want to fully back what Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko said. The aftermath of the Chernobyl tragedy and the delay in tackling a whole series of problems are putting relentless pressure on the minds of the Belorussian population.

In conditions of ever increasing extremism and parochialism, a crime industry, to all intents and purposes, and a currency racket, in order to maintain the work efficiency of a number of labor collectives, we in the republic have been forced to supply in excess of allocations tens of thousands of television sets, refrigerators, watches, and other industrial and food products, which even the people who make them never see in the stores.

I must be honest and say that implementation of the president's decrees and government decisions is nowhere near even the minimum level.

Beneath the banner of perestroyka subversive forces are obviously managing step by step, with the tacit consent and passive activity of the country's supreme state political leadership, to land blows on the party of Communists and to come close to dismantling the foundations of the socialist system.

Judging by the information provided by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the report by Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko at the present CPSU Central Committee plenum, the country's supreme political and state leadership is thoroughly au fait with the ultracomplex situation in society.

But, unfortunately, these documents propose no specific, systematic action, but only contain general arguments and appeals.

But a way out must be found. And it must be found at this CPSU Central Committee plenum. The party's top echelon, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, must tell us clearly what is going to be done in the country to halt the slide toward chaos and anarchy.

Now the market. The transition to the market is greatly exercising people's minds. What worries them is the question: What will the chosen path be? Who will own all the things that have been created over the decades? There is persistent propaganda at the moment for private ownership and unlimited privatization, right down to the sale of land. Indeed, the destatization of property is necessary, just as it is necessary to define the point where working people's interests are threatened. We are in favor of establishing the priority of collective forms of ownership that are inherent in socialism, of setting limits on private enterprise, and we want it to be monitored by the state and social organizations rather than take its course.

We advocate the free transfer of the means of production to the actual labor collectives. If private forms predominate, the social and material base of our ideology and the humanitarian aims and tasks of perestroyka will inevitably be weakened. Our party must not be allowed to be alienated from its own basic social forces. By setting realistic tasks and aligning our positions precisely we have to increase the understanding that the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, who have a vital stake in the building of a humanitarian, democratic socialist society, have of how the political course of introducing regulated market relations will be introduced, what forces the CPSU intends to support, and whose interests it intends to protect.

Are we going to have private ownership of land or not? This key question must be decided by the people and, above all, at kolkhoz and sovkhoz level, by the peasants themselves. They are the only ones entitled to make the final choice regarding a radical change in our entire way of life. Sociological research conducted by the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute on republican farms at various levels of development has shown that 56 percent of those questioned do not want to switch to individual management, while the rest have no clear stance at all.

In view of the actual situation in respect of the development of productive forces in the Belorussian countryside, we are proposing to assimilate the practice of market relations without adopting the principle of private ownership of land. If someone wants to work on the land he can do so via the lease system; those who do not want to work, but just want to own land are obviously pursuing their own interests, which are by no means innocuous as far as society is concerned.

In our view, more serious approaches are needed to the solution of questions of fundamentally changing agrarian relations both by strengthening effective kolkhozes and sovkhozes and by creating new farms worked by owners or tenants. Land reform is clearly not enough; an entire system of state measures is required. Not, of course, the same measures that were proposed recently, whereby, given an increase in wholesale prices that is not matched by rising purchase prices for agricultural products, kolkhozes and sovkhozes will be brought to their knees and then the question of their inability to manage and solve food tasks will be considered. I believe it is necessary, on the one hand, to ensure the extensive development of contract arrangements between spheres and sectors of the agroindustrial copmplex and the extensive utilization of the potential for agroindustrial integration on the basis of contract prices and tariffs, and, on the other hand, to conduct a firm state policy of maintaining in the city and countryside common, constant retail prices for foodstuffs with flexible state regulation of the equal relationship between city and countryside by means of economic levers, such as taxes, credits, subsidies, and administrative measures on the social and ecological protection of society's interests.

As you appreciate, the question is straightforward. The decision to switch to market relations is dictated by life itself. At the same time, we cannot blindly copy other countries' experience. It needs a balanced, thoroughly considered approach that takes into account the socioeconomic features and the entire mode of life, not only in the country as a whole, but in its individual regions.

It should be noted that on occasions the casual approach to destatization poses a risk to the future of central, vitally important sectors, the foundation of our economy, such as machine building, the power industry, transport, and communications. One must also go along with the scientists' warning that an obsession with privatization poses the danger of the disintegration of noncommercial social structures, in particular education and fundamental research, which are essential to scientific-technical progress.

The economic role of the state and the multifaceted process of structural perestroyka and regulation of the national economy must not melt away as market functions take over.

We advocate a stage-by-stage, gradual entry into the market, countrywide, of course, and on the basis of the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. We favor the idea of a market in which guaranteed conditions would be created for improving living standards and increasing the intellectual and moral and spiritual potential of the people. And this must not take the form of a myth or fantasy, as was the case, unfortunately, in a number of ideas put forward at the Supreme Soviet session, but must be based on a proper economic foundation, be widely discussed by the working people themselves, and not be decided for them. It must be provided by a really strong and stable state power and legal norms and laws.

Comrades! The question of the future of the party of Communists must be faced now. Are we fully aware that the CPSU's role and place in society will be determined to a decisive extent not only by our efforts in the sphere of reforming intraparty life, but also by active provision for the solution of all socioeconomic and political tasks?

The reality is that forces who, by their actions, intensify the moral terrorization of Communists and the destabilization of the situation, sow a lack of faith in and fear of the future, and seek power, with the aim of changing the socialist choice, are uniting on a platform of discrediting the CPSU. Communists are seriously worried about this.

The report and election campaign is in full swing in Belorussia. I must say there has not been one party meeting where this has not been discussed in a frank, highly party-minded, and responsible manner. Similarly, it has been pointed out that in the period since the 28th party congress the Central Committee Politburo has not been assertive enough in the implementation of decisions made at the congress.

Primary party organizations are working in very complex conditions at the moment. Their status as the foundation of the party is being jeopardized by destructive forces in a number of spheres of activity. All this has an extremely adverse effect on the moral and political climate in labor collectives and undermines faith in the state's ability to guarantee public organizations' legitimate rights.

Communists and nonparty people have plainly stated that they are prepared to support real, constructive action by the country's president and the government to maintain civil peace and calm, establish public order and discipline, and strengthen economic links and cooperation.

We felt this very strongly again during the meetings and conversations with secretaries of primary party organizations immediately after the 28th CPSU Congress—nine of these were held at the republic Communist Party Central Committee, each attended by 120 comrades—and in many labor collectives at local level. The hasty, ill-considered retreat and the declaration of noninterference in many important matters too soon destroyed the unity of party political work and the solution of economic tasks.

The conclusion is perfectly clear to us: Party committees and organizations must deal with the things that are worrying people and collectives, the things that shape conscious discipline, organization, and order and ensure progress toward a better life. In this way we have long been open to dialogue and cooperation and consolidation with those who are building their programs on the values of socialism and want perestroyka to progress in that direction. The Leninist "left-wing bloc" principles are perfectly acceptable here. But one should resolutely rebuff all those who are exceedingly intolerant of our party, of Communists, of adherence to our social choice.

We often complain that there is no authority and no government. Sessions failed to achieve a quorum. In our view, the authorities should not carp and complain. It makes people embittered, you see. The authorities should act and make decisions in all areas, and not just stifle any situation that might suddenly arise.

The republic's Communists have persistently suggested that it should be openly stated at this Central Committee plenum that the government and the party Central Committee general secretary and president are expected to adopt real, effective measures. Belorussian party committees are persistently seeking new approaches to the solution of the unusual tasks and will seek to implement them.

Lipitsky Addresses Plenum

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10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by V.S. Lipitskiy, sector chief at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism and member of the organizational bureau of the reformist-Communist section of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU]

[Text] [V.S. Lipitskiy] Esteemed Comrades: I would like to associate myself with those speakers who draw a distinction between questions about the movement toward the market as the strategic route—since this question was resolved by the 28th congress and is already being implemented in state policy—and questions about how precisely this movement will be carried out and which precisely of the numerous existing programs we will try to implement at this historical point. And here it has to be noted that our party does not hold the initiative in solving this very important question and is being simply swept along.

We have not in actual fact put forward our own independent program for the transition to the market, since it is scarcely appropriate to identify the party position with the government program. We now have no real channels for influencing the choice made by parliamentarians, since, because of the particular features of our historical situation, in many places, including the center, the soviets are not so much multiparty now as nonparty. Deputies there do not represent political parties, but are elected onto soviets thanks to their personal qualities and feel responsible only to the voters.

In choosing our tactics now, at this crucial juncture, we must see that any resistance to the soviets or resistance to the programs adopted by them is far from being the best way out of the situation. But another way out, namely, giving them full support, is no better either. I am not going to speak of their merits and shortcomings now or compare them, I merely want to express an idea, one which has already been voiced here in a number of speeches, particularly in the speech of Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev. In present conditions even the best and most carefully prepared program has no chance of being carried out exactly to the schedule specified by its drafters. However, the Supreme Soviet and Boris Nikoloyevich Yeltsin can take the risk and subscribe to such a program since they possess the people's vote of confidence, while the CPSU no longer does. It cannot permit itself a single unsubstantiated promise or a single decision which will not be carried out fully in accordance with what is written in it.

I think that our party already effectively finds itself in the position of the constructive opposition. And the question of recognizing this situation as the reality must be discussed. What does this mean? It means that the party can support or reject not programs but specific steps and specific measures, assessing them in relation to how they meet working people's interests. All-around support for soviets must be given wherever they operate in those interests, and all decisions and measures violating those interests must be opposed by every legitimate means.

This, incidentally, enables us to cross a hitherto forbidden threshold and become a party capable of criticizing the government. Since the tradition of loyalty toward power elaborated by the party, which itself formed part of that power, is completely inappropriate now. If it wants to enjoy authority among the people the party must not be directly connected with executive power.

[M.S. Gorbachev] The most surprising thing is that it follows from this that the president, as part of this power, simultanously heads the opposition to himself.

[V.S. Lipitskiy] There are historical precedents for this, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Mitterrand, for example, is president of France and at the same time the leader of a party which does not form the majority and is in opposition in parliament.

[M.S. Gorbachev] There was such a period. But they soon got rid of it. (Commotion in the hall).

[V.S. Lipitskiy] Many other examples could be cited here where political parties have gone through a difficult period in their existence and had to regroup their forces, restructure themselves organizationally, and elaborate a completely new program of activity in order to make further progress and change the state of affairs. What claim can we have, then, to offer programs to society as a whole?

We have to completely restructure our work at all levels, particularly in the primary components and in labor collectives. Those collectives' decisions will determine whether the party has a future in them or not. Consequently it is essential to demonstrate very quickly that Communists are necessary to those collectives. And that means at the present stage helping labor collectives adapt to the new economic conditions and make use of their opportunities and expertise, the system of political education, for example, to train people in economics and develop entrepreneurship and initiative so that they themselves can put forward initiatives that enable new jobs to be created, which will be a very urgent concern in the near future.

It is essential to start preparing for the next elections right now. This idea has already been expressed and I would like to support it. Dialogue must be started with voters' associations and other political forces and structures created which can work in electoral districts on a permanent basis. This work will directly determine the party's political future. And undoubtedly the most important condition is the program. A program which in effect we have not yet begun to draft. If elections are held earlier than planned, the lack of a program could be a fatal factor for the party. I consider it essential that the timetable for drafting the program be immediately revised and that all the party's intellectual potential be directed at ensuring that we are provided with firm theoretical groundwork for the future.

RSFSR Leader Addresses Plenum

PM1010155790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I think that many of those present here realize that they are participants in an unusual session. We have to discuss how to get out of the impasse that we are in, what our future direction is, and what our party's role is in this movement. And whether we will overcome the crisis on the path of perestroyka that the 28th CPSU Congress endorsed or whether we will move toward the radical revision of the basic principles of our sociostate system. We face a dilemma, no matter how we try to avoid a direct discussion of the fact.

Many people in the party and the country are convinced that the more rational, more promising, and shorter path is to continue socialist development on the basis of economic and political stabilization and the strengthening of legality and law and order. Only on this basis can there be radical and effective transformations of the structure of our national economy, the successful introduction of regulated market relations, and the improvement of the people's living standards. That is why I believe that the party must resolutely support the president in his actions to stabilize the situation. The working people and communists of Russia (as I know from personal meetings, local reports, and letters and telegrams addressed to our Communist Party Central Committee) hope that the president will be able to make effective use of the powers given to him and will give the USSR Government the conditions for normal work and for cooperation between the center and the union republics. If the authorities are weak, there can be no consolidation of society or transition to the market. The history of the development of many of the world's countries teaches us that.

Russia's party organizations are ready to comprehensively support the measures being taken by the president to consolidate society and above all, the preservation of the USSR's unity as the main precondition of all positive solutions. The collapse of the state and its transformation into an amorphous confederation will render pointless even the best programs for economic, sociopolitical, and cultural progress. Communists must support the kind of union treaty which will make it possible to revive our country as a strong and renewed federative state where sovereignty belongs both to the republics and to the Union, itself in which the republics are closely interlinked economically, politically, and spiritually.

Soviet people are also clearly aware that only a strong and indivisible Russia can help preserve and develop a united USSR. It has always been the nucleus and the cementing foundation of our common state. I believe that even at this present difficult hour, the Russian Federation must have its well considered say.

Of course Russians do not want the Union to be built to the detriment or at the expense of Russia's interests, as happened before. The republic must remain a home for all the peoples inhabiting it, whose histories are closely interwoven. The Russian Communist Party sees this as one of its main tasks.

But we are also interested in the fate of those Russians outside their native land and the grief of those scorched by the flames of inter-ethnic conflicts. Information reaching our party Central Committee and the descriptions by refugees demonstrate that in some republics, nationalists are launching a campaign against the Russian population while in others, extensive campaigns have already begun. Life has become tragic for tens and hundreds of thousands of people. Let us honestly recognize this present-day reality of ours, comrades.

The CPSU and the USSR people's deputies from the party must urgently produce a law on the comprehensive protection of the rights of the indigenous population. The RSFSR Communist Party proposes to the communist parties of other union republics that they begin immediate consultations on this question. Together we can do a lot here. Unless we solve this problem, the Union Treaty and all the economic measures will ultimately remain on paper.

Comrades! As has already been noted, political stabilization is the main precondition of the transition to the market. Before assuming responsibility for the choice, we must discuss everything soberly and calmly. Let us ask ourselves: Has our party, with its rich scientific potential, done all it can to develop different forms of a market economy? And have we produced the form which would not actually change the state and social system? I have to tell you that what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has talked about precisely and clearly on many occasions, including today, as has keynote speaker Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, and what is written in the programs that you have are not the same thing. You do not have to convince anyone today that the market is not just an attribute of capitalism. But people are asking: How can one combine the socialist option and the communist perspective, proclaimed by the 28th CPSU Congress, with the formation of a class which is presently called a class of entrepreneurs? And into whose ownership is it intended to transfer the property which belongs to all the people?

The private ownership of land is a separate discussion. Marx wrote about the impermissibility of the private ownership of land and Lenin spoke about it numerous times. I would remind you that both Lev Tolstoy and the outstanding agrarian scientist Chayanov held the same view. Let us recall that even the Socialist Revolutionaries were opponents of the private ownership of land. And the overwhelming majority of today's peasants are far from ecstatic about this idea.

The point here is not about the market as a means of efficient economic organization nor the variety of forms ownership, which no one denies. The point is that the essence of the reforms is known to only a quite narrow range of specialists who cannot even agree among themselves at the moment. But we are trying to persuade the people to take us at our word again. Furthermore we, the party, still have something to say. To this it should be added that we have virtually been deprived of the means of expression in the mass media. And, you will agree, it is hard for the ordinary man to make sense of the babble that is emanating from the mass media. But here is what the WASHINGTON POST has to say about the "500-Days" Program, and I quote: "This is the end of perestroyka; capitalism is coming to the USSR. This is a plan for the biggest selloff of a bankrupt state's property in history." Quite a few of our scientists and publicists also hold similar views and opinions. Such views must be debunked, but in order to do that, you need to know what you are saying in a clear and well-defined way. We often compare the present period with that of the New Economic Policy [NEP]. But, comrades, I would venture to say that the plans of our perestroyka are not like those of the NEP period. Let us think back. Vladimir Ilich Lenin in a report to the Fourth Communist International Congress, wrote: "So then? The 'New Economic Policy' means 1) the **commanding heights** in our hands; 2) the land belonging to the state; 3) freedom of economic activity for the peasants; 4) large-scale industry (and large-scale agriculture) **in our hands**; 5) private capitalism—it may compete with **state capitalism**; 6) state capitalism of such a kind that we can attract private capital together with **our** capital." (Complete Collected Works, vol 45, p 437).

Will the commanding heights remain in the state's hands according to the programs we are now studying? I am not sure, because the state will control 20 or 30 percent of the main means of production of the leading sectors, whereas members of labor collectives "for the sake of people's power" will be able to acquire only around 10 percent of the shares in their own enterprises.

It is perfectly obvious that it is impossible to resolve the questions on which the country's fate depends without telling the people the truth or consulting with the people. Whether there is to be private ownership of the land or not must be decided by those who work on it or who, at any rate, intend to work on it. The limits and mechanism of the denationalization and sale of state enterprises to private individuals must also be decided by nationwide referendum.

Comrades! As has already been said here, preserving the party is our paramount task. We have spent an unconscionably long time in the assimilation of its new role and its ideological and organizational formation in conditions of renewal and the multiparty system. We announced the course of humane, democratic socialism, but did not bother to give that thesis actual content. We announced that we remain committed to the socialist option and the communist perspective, but did not clearly say which ideological values we uphold and which we renounce. Further comment could be made in this respect, because quite a lot of other questions have built up which must be resolved more quickly, accurately, and flexibly by the Central Committee first of all and by the Central Committees of the republics' Communist Parties.

Thus, despite five appeals to the CPSU Central Committee, the Russian Communist Party still does not have a single newspaper or journal. I would like to believe that after today's resolute instruction on that score from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, tomorrow or, at least, the day after tomorrow, the Russian Communist Party will have both a newspaper and a journal. I very much want to believe that, because how else can a party exist without its own means of mass information. The subscription campaign is ending in a week or two—it will be pointless talking about that. We are in fact giving no answer to those who are attacking the CPSU and its values and who are casting doubt on the very fact of our party's existence.

Let us face the truth. The blackmail, incredible by any society's criteria, to which the Communist chairman of the Council of Ministers is being subjected, the undermining of the positions of the Communist president, the unbridled defamation of Communists in the army and the law enforcement organs, the insulting of the memory of Vladimir Ilich Lenin—all this is merely the first wave of an unfolding frontal attack. People no longer treat communists with respect but, with the authorities' knowledge, are beginning to persecute them while we all just wait and hope that someone will protect us. It must be time to declare to society that we are alive and working and do not intend to stop our activity.

The speaker from this rostrum who said that it is time for us all to shake ourselves, stop being lethargic, and really struggle for influence among the masses was right. But for that it is necessary to urgently resolve a great many questions which at first glance may seem trivial, beginning with the primary party organization and ending with the party Central Committee. I do not want to list them here. There are many of them. For example, what is to happen to the budgets of primary party organizations or party rayon and city committees, what to do with rayon newspapers, and so forth. These and many other questions must be answered quickly and constructively. Time is not on our side, and, unless we act quickly, we will destroy ourselves as a party. There are examples of that all around; do they really not teach us anything?

TASS Director Addresses Plenum

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["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee plenum by TASS General Director L.P. Kravchenko]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Whatever highly bold, highly radical economic programs we discuss today, their success and future depend to a considerable degree on political processes. An acute political struggle has unfolded in the country during which destructive opposition forces have generally given priority to political ambition at the expense of society's economic and social interests. Intoxicated by certain successes, they show no shame in their methods and act according to the exclusively destructive principle: the worse things are, the better we like it. The mass media are the most important of instruments in this worsening confrontation. It is, after all, well known that whoever controls the press, television, and radio also holds power.

It has become customary for the press to be subjected to sharp criticism at Central Committee plenums. This is right in many respects. However, today I think that we simply need to have a somewhat deeper understanding of what is happening to our press. The truth is that complex, painful processes are taking place within editorial collectives. Political demarcation is increasing among journalists, along with the demarcation of newspapers, journals, television and radio programs, amid the political polarization of society. Journalists are increasingly becoming the mouthpieces of very diverse forces, centers of consolidation for social groups, and emergent parties.

This is happening at a time when the CPSU's relationship with the press is undergoing fundamental change. Monopoly of the press, ideological pressure, and political censorship are becoming things of the past, never to return.

However, history has proved that there never has been and never will be a totally free press anywhere in the world. But under the new conditions, with increasing pressure being exerted by various opposition forces, the latter's influence on press workers is also increasing.

It would be a great error to fail to mention that some journalists are moving over to the opposition. We can already see that some central and local newspapers and journals, along with a number of television and radio programs, have begun to blatantly serve the opposition and voice and uphold its interests. And I am not talking about the fact that dozens of new publications have emerged of late, intended by their founders to operate in opposition to the CPSU and the USSR Government.

We have witnessed the unfolding of a well-coordinated antisocialist campaign. It has clear aims, an extensive set of arguments, and its own attractive phraseology.

The opposition is making skillful use of various populist and other methods, buoyed up by people's growing dissatisfaction with the economic and social situation in the country, Taking up the criticism of Stalinism, the administrative-edict system, and the totally outmoded economic mechanism begun by the party, destructive forces are persecuting and bad-mouthing all Soviet history, the party, socialist ideals, and Lenin's legacy.

Calls for self-confession have become most fashionable. Society and the party are being drawn into a continuous process of self-denunciation, self-reproach, self-abasement, and a strange kind of self-inflicted injury. Political masochism is being inculcated, whereby you want to bite off your ear in ecstasy but, since you cannot reach, you are prepared to bite off your neighbor's instead.

This is a kind of social drug addiction. There are political drug traffickers who supply large fixes every day. A considerable number of dangerous healers of society have now appeared who are endeavoring to maliciously exploit the processes of glasnost and democratization and transform them, to use Lenin's words, into "the everlasting abasement and self-humiliation of socialism in the face of the whole world... the corruption of the socialist consciousness of the working masses."

Why all this? In order to ensure that we go completely crazy, lose our heads, lose our faith and sense of patriotism, lose heart, and cease to respect ourselves, our dignity, and our multiethnic fatherland.

What is to be done then? Should we continue to complain about "naughty things" breeding among press organs? It must be clear that they are not going to improve. Prohibitory measures have now become a thing of the past, particularly with the adoption of the Law on the Press. There is another approach. The party has an extensive mass media network of its own at its disposal. There is nothing for it but to rapidly master the art of democratic government and skillful influence over the work of its press organs. In order to achieve this, all its forms and methods of working with the party press must be resolutely restructured. Without violating the Law on the Press, party committees have a broad range of rights and opportunities here, above all in cadre policy, in work with Communist journalists. I would remind you that the founder, that is, the party committee, has the right to appoint the editor, form the collegium, and determine the publication's program. It should in its daily work have regular dialogues with journalists, brief them on the party committee's work, hold more frequent meetings and press conferences, and publish more vigorously in the press. The main thing is not to stand on the sidelines and not to complain about awkward editors. I want to ask when the editors of party newspapers and journals were last gathered here in Moscow for training and to collate their positions. I just do not remember, for some reason. I learned that the Russian leadership is about to meet with all newspaper editors—kray, oblast, and rayon. So, it is taking action and understands the nature of the press today—the independent press, moreover—whether it be the party press or the soviet press. We are being passive.

The picture is the same in the localities. However, party publications' editorial offices need both advice, urgent aid, and resolute support at this difficult moment. For instance, the opposition is now trying to impose its opinion about the CPSU's alleged illegal ownership of the material base, publishing houses, and printing facilities. It has been demanded that this base be divided up and nationalized. Collectives at party editorial offices, publishing houses, and printing houses are extremely concerned by the increase in populist claims of this kind. They advocate radical steps to ensure legal and economic protection of CPSU property. Party journalists are tensely following, for instance, the struggle revolving around the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA—a CPSU Central Committee organ. I am sure that if we yield, if we do not defend this newspaper in the current situation, there will be grave consequences not only for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the editorial office's party collective, but also for the whole party press, especially since thousands and thousands of the newspaper's readers have reacted very sharply to attempts to change the newspaper's status and complexion.

We have somehow become shy, we are sometimes afraid even to telephone our party press organ. There is, certainly, no need to issue edicts, but things are simply impossible without timely advice and coordination in the work of the mass media, our own mass media. The opposition press is, after all, skillfully coordinating itself. Note: A central party newspaper should voice bold criticism of the opposition, just as the gang of "hawks" will go for it right away. This newspaper will often be isolated in that situation. I also know this from recent TASS commentaries.

The following also prompts sober evaluation. Party journalism, which has played an outstanding role in perestroyka and the development of glasnost and democratization, is today experiencing major material difficulties and losing readers. The substantial increase in the flow of information and the readers' opportunity to choose have, of course, taken their toll, but a better-founded reason resides in the fact that perestroyka within the press is not proceeding fast enough in terms of either content or the technical and economic base.

This results in qualified journalists' leaving to go into the alternative press, where their work often attracts appreciably higher pay than in party publications. A particularly complex situation has developed today in rayon newspapers, which are losing the tug-of-war with so-called democratic soviets.

I think that the struggle for the press at all levels, from rayon to central level, requires urgent steps from the CPSU Central Committee. I am one of those people who believe that the success of perestroyka on socialist principles will depend wholly on sensible, flexible work via Communists in the soviets of people's deputies and the mass media. That is why the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo should specially examine the issue of the party press.

A new system for party work within the mass media, above all within the party press, should be be elaborated urgently. It must be recommended that this issue be considered by all party committees—from rayon committees to republic communist party central committees. Sluggishness and passivity in these matters at the stage when a real multiparty system is taking shape could have grave consequences. We need a militant party press to firmly defend socialist ideals, consistently uphold the interests of the party and people, and sternly oppose those people advocating anti-Sovietism, nationalism, and extremism and striving to erase everything of value that links the generations of Soviet people.

We need the kind of press now that not only answers the question of who is to blame but also suggests what to do about it. While not abandoning critical analysis under any circumstances, the party press is simply obliged to master public opinion and gear it to practical actions and constructive work. Party journalists must be competent enough to provide in-depth coverage of the complex problems of a market economy and the actions of the new economic mechanisms.

It is time to transfer journalists' creative efforts to developing positive processes, revealing valuable experience, and reinforcing discipline and respect for the laws. The priority of labor and the priority of the working man are what I believe to be important for the press today,

Last, patience, mutual trust, principle, and readiness to help and support editorial collectives are what is needed today in the work of the party press. Party committees will then acquire a reliable support and reliable allies in the current critical situation.

Speakers Listed on Closing Day of CPSU Plenum

PM1010105190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

["Information Report on CPSU Central Committee Plenum"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Discussion of the question of the situation in the country and the CPSU's tasks in connection with the economy's transition to market relations continued at the CPSU Central Committee plenum 9 October 1990.

The following spoke in the debate: V.T. Chuykov, stone mason at the Poltavskiy Rayon Road Repair and Construction Unit, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]; A.A. Prigarin, director of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems' All-Union Scientific Labor Organization Center; S.A. Osminin, first secretary of Kirov party obkom [oblast party committee]; Kh.A. Akhmedov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers; S.V. Kolpakov, USSR minister of metallurgy; A.V. Buzgalin, senior lecturer at the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University Economic Faculty's Political Economics Department; E.-A.A. Sillari, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee; Yu.I. Mkrtumyan, faculty chief at Yerevan State University; A.A. Pomorov, first secretary of Tomsk party obkom; and I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

A.S. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke on behalf of the editorial commission set up at the plenum.

A resolution on this issue was adopted after a comprehensive examination of proposals and comments that had been received, and following a discussion.

The plenum also adopted the resolutions "On CPSU Central Committee Commissions" and "On CPSU Normative-Methodological Documents."

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke in conclusion at the plenum.

This marked the end of the plenum.

Ivashko, Dzasokhov Hold News Conference

LD1010130790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] We are going over to the press center of the CPSU Central Committee. Our special correspondent Yuliy Semenov is on the line.

[Semenov] I will say hello to the radio listeners again, although they have possibly already heard me this morning on the Mayak program. I want to start with the fact that the press conference at the party's Central Committee has just ended. Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee, replied to questions put by journalists.

Naturally, the topic of conversation was the results of the party's Central Committee plenum which ended yesterday, as you know. Comrade Ivashko said three main directions determined the character and content of discussion and the decision of the plenum. The first is the forthcoming transition of our economy to market relations. [The second is] the fate of our union federation, and the third is the political role of the party in all these revolutionary transformations. Well, and correspondingly, if one is to talk about the main results of the plenum under the same classification, then the first issue is that the plenum upheld and made more specific the positions of the party congress on the transition to the market. It expressed itself as being in favor of strengthening the union federation and, thirdly [as heard] in favor of the renewal of the party's activity in keeping with the actual tasks of the present day.

But as you know, or as you know from the press, at the plenum there was an extremely wide variety of speeches. Approaches, assessments, and views naturally differed. But the deputy general secretary of the Central Committee and Central Committee secretary asked the journalists and readers and listeners to pay attention above all to the decision of the plenum, which will apparently be published the day after tomorrow, in which the predominant opinions at the plenum will be summarized, that is, the point of view of the plenum will itself be expressed as that of the corporate body of the party.

To the question regarding the different variations of the transition to the market, Comrade Ivashko said that the plenum of the Central Committee is not a branch of the country's Supreme Soviet. It should determine the political aspects of the transition and start it more quickly in order to bring about the stabilization of the economy, to ensure social protection for the working people. But in the first place we have before us the task of making comparative appraisals of different variations of the programs proposed for the transition of the economy. At the same time, if one is to talk about it from a political point of view, answering questions at the press conference, the comrades on behalf of the Central Committee said that the Central Committee has confirmed yet again the party's striving for a coalition with everyone, with all political organizations, with all parties in which there are positive points of contact and a possibiity of cooperation.

There were many questions here relating to the position of the party regarding a coalition. But the word "coalition" can be interpreted in different ways. At issue first and foremost is a coalition of the two political movements, parties, and of all those who are in favor of perestroyka and an improvement in our lives. But as far as a coalition government is concerned, an idea that was brought up by some representatives of small political parties, this issue was not discussed here.

It was said that the Central Committee is in favor of a government consisting of clever people devoted to the causes of perestroyka and the policy of perestroyka. The following phrase was uttered: As far as we have been informed, the composition of the cabinet will be improved.

There were many other questions relating to foreign policy and to some individual elements, as is always the case at press conferences. It was held in a fairly lively atmosphere, and I think that the general impression that was expressed is sufficient to indicate what the conversation today was like.

On that note, Semenov of the press corps is leaving you now. All the best.

More on News Conference

LD1010223590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Today a news conference was held at the CPSU Central Committee press center on the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

[Correspondent S. Milyanchikov] Answering journalists' questions, Comrade Ivashko, CPSU Central Committee deputy general secretary, defined in the following way the main results of the plenum which just ended:

[Ivashko] This is support for the line taken by the 28th congress—making the line of the 28th CPSU Congress more specific - on the transfer of the country's economy to market relations, on strengthening the union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, and on further renewing the party in its specific and practical activities in absolutely new social conditions.

[Milyanchikov] But Comrade Ivashko did not say which of the alternative programs for a transfer to the market is supported by the CPSU. He stated that he is against turning the CPSU plenum into a branch of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The party's task is rather to define the political aspects of such a transfer.

Many questions were also asked on members resigning from the CPSU. Answering them, comrade Dzasokhov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, said that alongside the resignations, admissions to the party are taking place.

[Dzasokhov] Though there are fewer joining the party, nevertheless, quite a lot of people—about 20,000 if I am not mistaken, excuse me—have joined this year. To join the party now is a deliberate choice of our compatriots—to become a part of it in this responsible period of the party's renewal.

[Milyanchikov] In reply to a request to formulate the CPSU attitude to the present union government comrade Ivashko said that in cases when the party agrees with the government, it will support it; in the rest of the cases it will be in opposition.

Comrade Dzasokhov also admitted that in the course of the plenum's work the question of the expediency of ocntinuing to combine the posts of the CPSU leader and the president was also touched on. He stated that in the opinion the CPSU Central Committee this combination is necessary at the present stage. [Video shows the audience, Ivashko and Dzasokhov are shown speaking at a platform]

Prokofyev Discusses 'Pre-Crisis Situation'

91UN0006A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Yu.A. Prokofyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Moscow party committee, by TASS correspondents B. Grishchenko and B. Shestakov: "The Crisis: Register It or Act?"]

[Text]**An alarming and harsh evaluation of the sociopolitical situation that has developed in the capital was heard on 26 September at a meeting of the bureau of the Moscow city CPSU committee. Immediately after the meeting TASS correspondents B. Grishchenko and B. Shestakov spoke with CPSU Politburo Central Committee member Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow city party committee.**

[TASS] Yuriy Anatolyevich, how would you personally characterize today's situation in the country?

[Prokofyev] I regard the situation in both Moscow and in the country as a whole as an emergency. It is called precrisis but I would call it an emergency, and in all areas.

The political situation is no less complex. There are already about 20 parties operating in the country that have declared themselves to be unionwide structures. In Russia I think there are already about 50 of them. But the majority of these parties and movements are not carrying out any constructive activity at all; their actions are more frequently destructive in nature. It is on this basis that they are now trying to gain social support in society and to take advantage of the tense socioeconomic situation, the decline of the standard of living, and the growth of the people's dissatisfaction.

[TASS] You speak about a multiparty system as one of the factors in development but still, for example, the program "Russian Democratic Forum" is a prepared plan for seizing power.

[Prokofyev] "Seize" is perhaps the right term here since this program talks about appropriation of land and premises of social organizations by force and forced privatization. All this goes beyond the Constitution.

[TASS] But, however you put it, are we faced with a relinquishment of positions?

[Prokofyev] No, the economic and political structure of our society is changing. We have become accustomed to having all reforms be simply sprucing up and beautifying facades and rearranging furniture. But in this case all the structures, the foundation, and the fundamental principles are changing. That is the way it was conceived, but since people did not accept this from the very beginning, they are now perceiving everything that is taking place as a relinquishment of positions. This idea is reinforced even more because the party is conducting reform activity while changing the political and economic structure democratically and humanely within the framework of the Constitution. But a considerable proportion of the opposing forces, while calling for democracy, themselves frequently act like proponents of rigid centralism and violent actions, and in their struggle adhere to the principle that "all means are good."

[TASS] So does it turn out that we have exchanged the notorious "right-wing terror" for "left-wing."

[Prokofyev] No matter what you call it, I do not see any essential difference. Terror and pressure from any side are unacceptable in a democratic society. A deputy of the Moscow soviet, V. Fadeyev, writing in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA against a rally on 16 September, explained that he is opposed to Bolshevism and therefore does not support radicals who try to act through methods that they say the Bolsheviks used in their day. This is a typical position, although I do not agree with the comparison.

[TASS] Yuriy Anatolyevich, rallies, unfortunately, have become the monopoly of the so-called "democratic forces." Why do communists of the capital not go to rallies? The more so since today there are slogans to which the majority of Muscovite subscribe—fight the mafia, for example.

[Prokofyev] Or, rather, destroy it. At a meeting of the bureau of the Moscow city committee I heard this assessment: More than 80 percent of the Muscovites questioned think that the power in the capital now belongs not to the soviets and not to the CPSU but to the mafia leaders. Frequently they think of the mafia as a group of scoundrels and bandits, but still we are now coming up against cases of hidden sabotage. Incidentally, your colleague, TASS observer Vladimir Petrunya, wrote about this in PRAVDA recently. There is also a certain group of people who cannot be included in the mafia but who think: "The worse, the better."

[TASS] Which is greater? Evil intentions or ineptitude?

[Prokofyev] I would say that there is still more ineptitude. The evil intentions came later. First, promises were made, since it seemed that everything could be corrected in a short period of time. But when they came up against the huge amount of work, and against the background of the general deterioration of things in the country, when things did not work out, they began to look for an escape valve.

[TASS] At the bureau meeting we got the impression that many economic leaders are not simply out of control but even helpless under the new conditions. Is this true?

[Prokofyev] I would not say that the soviets do not control them but, unfortunately, they do not do this competently enough, in my opinion, and sometimes they do not even delve into the essence of the problem.

The city party committee [gorkom] bureau has tried to find new ways of exerting political influence on the solutions to socioeconomic problems. And it seems to me that to a certain degree we have fumbled through. For example, many speakers expressed this opinion: We must reliably inform Muscovites so that they will know the real state of affairs in the city. In the second place, we must work more actively in the soviets through deputies who are members of the CPSU, make suggestions and recommendations, and suggest alternative solutions to social problems. And, finally, the third thing is that many city services are headed by party members. We shall be stricter in demanding that they work conscientiously. Therefore we are now trying to reorient communists to practical work as much as possible.

[TASS] Yuriy Antolyevich, the largest shortage now is a shortage of work. What are the organizations of the capital engaged in? Are they remaining or are they leaving production?

[Prokofyev] In my view, the lack of authority is having an effect. In this vacuum many local party organizations are still unable to find new methods of completing specific jobs and the former ones do not work. We should probably develop and introduce the corresponding documents and proposals to the soviets and create various funds and conduct our own activity in the interests of communists and all Muscovites.

The soviets have grown up in the same society as the CPSU. And, unfortunately, they are now trying to occupy the same ecological niche: to be in charge of everyone and everything.

An example. We heard that the Moscow soviet and its executive committee [ispolkom] are totally incapable of deciding who should approve the price increase for fruits and vegetables that is needed now so that trade in them will become profitable. Nobody wants to take responsibility but, as a result, Muscovites are going without fruits and vegetables and the prices in the markets are so high that you can only look at them with your eyes closed.

[TASS] Are there examples of the opposite and what is the role of the local organizations in them?

[Prokofyev] There undoubtedly are. While trying to render maximum assistance in solving the problems facing the labor collectives, the communists and trade unions first try to provide for the social protection of the people and to support them emotionally and morally. For example, the party committee of the Scientific Research Institute of Technology of the Automotive

Industry, which is headed by V. Lyakishev, enjoys authority because it does not back away from difficult problems. The vegetable situation is poor now, and this bothers the collective. On the initiative of the party committee, trucks are being sent to the Belorusskiy state farm as part of a rayon convoy in order to deliver potatoes for Proletarskiy Rayon and the collective itself. It plans to turn the premises of the political education office in the institute into a kind of club. In addition to political work, it intends to conduct exhibit-sales of folk craft items, and the earnings from leasing the premises will be used for subscriptions to newspapers and magazines that are becoming more and more expensive. I emphasize that all this is being done without any instructions or anything else "from above."

[TASS] Yuriy Anatolyevich, how many have actually left?

[Prokofyev] According to the last figures, about 70,000. During that time 9,000 have entered the party. Incidentally, the people who are entering are mainly youth, and there are more representatives of the intelligentsia than the workers.

[TASS] How do you view the condition and prospects for cooperation between the gorkom and the Moscow soviet?

[Prokofyev] I am convinced that if the soviets and the party organizations were to take advantage of all possibilities of interacting, the situation in the city would be quite different. But since many soviets were formed on a wave of criticism of the party and its apparatus, it is now extremely difficult for them to establish contacts because of political considerations. In a number of cases they are continuing to sustain themselves on negative attitudes and criticism and not on positive deeds. Of course, the leadership of the Moscow soviet knows about the problems that are bothering Moscow and Muscovites. To some extent we have tried to coordinate these actions, for example, with respect to harvesting the crops. I suggested that the mayor conclude an agreement similar to the one signed between the Soviet and all the political parties, for example, in Volgograd.

We are prepared to sit down at the table and draw up the necessary measures. But, unfortunately, political ambitions are still taking the upper hand over common sense. Thus far our joint activity is half-hearted and somehow waning.

[TASS] But that is immoral in the situation that exists now.

[Prokofyev] I agree and that is why I am in favor of putting aside all political ambitions and differences now. For we have even more difficult times ahead of us. I am critical both of the government market program and S. Shatalin's program since I do not believe in a painless transition to the market. I have met with our Polish comrades. They are struck by the fact that our mass media, frequently with input from scholars, are misinforming people by promising them a painless or not very painful transition to the market. The experience of Poland itself has shown that this is simply impossible.

[TASS] What can the party do to help?

[Prokofyev] Form public opinion and exert influence when determining the boundaries of the sectors of various forms of ownership. We can and should protect people who are in need of retraining and new jobs. We are now thinking about organizing courses for retraining engineering and technical personnel on the basis of the polytechnical institute of the Moscow city committee, which is especially important for Moscow. We must rapidly improve the skills of the management level. What kind of market can there be without intelligent managers and financial experts?

Incidentally, the city committee has begun to participate in the fund for helping the unemployed, which was created on the initiative of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. They intend to use their money to support a quarter of a million Moscow communist pensioners. The structure of party work looks quite different in the place of residence. But that is a subject for a separate discussion.

[TASS] And the last question that will be allowed by our time constraints: This time slot on your schedule is for "receiving the people." The party no longer has any management or authority functions so why do people come to it and to you as the leader of the capital's party organization?

[Prokofyev] The number of people who come now has almost doubled. People come to the reception room of the Moscow city CPSU committee with political questions and questions about business within the party. And I hold a second reception as a deputy of the Moscow soviet. Understandably, that is a different range of problems—everything that bothers people in their daily life and beyond. Last time, representatives of a church community came for help in restoring a temple that had been returned to them. I was glad that I was able to help them with this. For the party now regards giving all kinds of help to people as its main task.

Prokofyev Urges Gorbachev To Define Policy

LD1010215890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report on 10 October Moscow news conference with Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Moscow City CPSU Committee first secretary, by commentator Boris Simonov]

[Text] [Simonov] As is already traditional at news conferences, Yuriy Anatolyevich opened the proceedings. In his foreword he conveyed his impressions and singled out the most important points of the plenum. It seems to me he clearly emphasized matters which obviated the need for numerous journalists' questions. It is possible to reach market relations only in the conditions of civil peace, this is the first and most likely the main position of the plenum.

Then the Moscow City party committee secretary noted that plenum participants categorically rejected the sale of land to individuals.

Prokofyev noted one more important point about the plenum: in supporting people striving for republic sovereignty it is important to preserve the single union. National chauvinistic and separate actions are being condemned in every way. The plenum singled out the main thesis of a new economic reform—a transition to the market is being carried out within the framework of the socialist choice and in order to improve the life of the simple people. Frankly, one wonders why the term simple people resurfaced. But I think that it is just a tribute to the past.

Many journalists touched on the positions of the Moscow party organization. The city party committee first secretary was asked about details on the formation of a centrist block, about a canard on an attempted coup d'etat which recently caused a stir, and about the situation within the party staff.

But the main issues certainly focused on economic reform. As you know the plenum supported none of the programs for a transition to the market, neither Abalkin's, nor Shatalin's. And this was discussed in details at the plenum.

Concluding my commentary I would like to ask you to listen to a small excerpt from an answer Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev gave. You can easily imagine the question.

[Begin Prokofyev recording] In order to stabilize the situation in our society I think, and in the party as well, a more clear-cut position of the leadership is needed now. It is difficult to find our own place when policy is fluctuating to the right and to the left. That's why I criticized Mikhail Sergeyevich. He should define his policy more clearly, express his opinions more frequently. I realize that he is the president, he defends the interests not just of the communist party, but of the whole country. But at the same time, as far as the events in our country are concerned, Ryzhkov is expressing his opinion every week. Whether we like his speeches or not, the country knows his position now. I think that Mikhail Sergeyevich should speak more clearly about the events which are happening in our society. [end recording]

Yakovlev Interviewed on Economic Reform Plans

AU0810185090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Oct 90 pp 180-181

[Interview with Presidential Council Member Aleksandr Yakovlev by Dieter Wild in Paris; date not given: "Perestroyka Has Only Just Begun"]

[Text] [Wild] Mr. Yakovlev, how is your president now that he has gotten all the special rights he wanted?

[Yakovlev] The issue was not that he personally wanted more rights, but that the situation in the country made this step necessary and the legislature understood this. By the way, Gorbachev has received the special rights only for the time of the economic reform to be able to take the necessary steps quickly.

[Wild] But is this a question of rights? Is the issue not much more that the president's orders to the grassroots are no longer fulfilled by the party and the state? Even before, the president's legal position was not weak.

[Yakovlev] No, from a strictly legal point of view, the president does not have so many powers. When the Congress of People's Deputies decided on the corresponding amendment to the Constitution, its legislators struggled to expand their own rights because, in comparison to the privileged Supreme Soviet deputies, they are practically powerless.

[Wild] What has improved?

[Yakovlev] We are faced with the objective need to strictly separate the powers of our institutions, not only those of the president and the legislature, but also those of the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judiciary, as well as those of the central power and the individual republics. Everything must now find its correct place.

[Wild] Again and again Gorbachev is harshly opposed during debates in the legislautre or in the CPSU Central Committee. But when the vote is taken, he receives surprising majorities. Is this still part of the old way of thinking that one does not vote against the chief?

[Yakovlev] No, the majority of the people's representatives have realized that certain decisions were necessary and therefore they were made. In addition, the president is not able to push through all his motions; for instance he was not able to do so with his decree that demonstrations within Moscow have to be approved by the Council of Ministers and not by the Moscow mayor. The constitutional committee declared this decree null and void. Of course, this was very unpleasant for the president, but one cannot do anything about it.

[Wild] Now the economic reform is to be implemented within 500 days. Do you believe this?

[Yakovlev] Yes.

[Wild] Even though you said that exhaustion is gaining ground in the country?

[Yakovlev] I believe in the 500 days only if they are the basis for a program which has been revised by the Shatalin group and the president. If the program of the government is accepted, for instance, I do not think that the 500 days would be realistic. By the way, public opinion in the country has not quite understood the problems.

[Wild] Is this still important? The entire world has the impression that the Soviet Union has already reached a state of far-reaching disintegration.

[Yakovlev] I do not want to speak of disintegration.

[Wild] What else? Can you imagine a system in which the president is only responsible for foreign policy and defense and leaves the rest of the state business to the republics?

[Yakovlev] The republics are now beginning to exercise those rights that they have according to the Constitution. This is why there is no disintegration but integration. As a result, the Union will be even stronger than today, but it will be a different union, which is based on the sovereignty and independence of the republics. The president will be the symbol of unity.

[Wild] Could it be that this symbol will then be only a puppet in the hands of the president of the largest republic, Russia?

[Yakovlev] Impossible.

[Wild] Russia's President Boris Yeltsin recently rejected the theory that Gorbachev and he are engaged in some sort of division of labor. He insisted on pointing out that he is not part of Gorbachev's team....

[Yakovlev] There is a problem there, but the solution does not lie in the point that is now constantly discussed. On the one hand it is said: Laws of the Union generally go before the laws of the republics. This is nonsense. On the other hand, Russia has stated that its own laws generally go before those of the Union. This is also nonsense. The issue is the delineation of the spheres of competence. Higher and lower laws exist only in the respective sphere.

[Wild] What does one actually feel as an ethnic Russian in view of the new Russian chauvinism of, for instance, the Pamyat movement?

[Yakovlev] Disgust.

[Wild] In Moscow a procession of Orthodox believers marched through the streets bearing a picture of the last tsar. Could Russia's monarchists become an important movement?

[Yakovlev] No. There are some crazy people everywhere.

[Wild] You said that perestroyka has only just started. However, it has been going on for five years. Is this not very long for a beginning?

[Yakovlev] I said that perestroyka has only just started in a certain sense. With this I meant that these five years were necessary for the preparatory stage of the reform, in which critical decisions had to be made which aim at first, changing the political system, and, second, changing the economic structure.

[Wild] Many of your compatriots say, however, that perestroyka is good for the intellectuals because it has brought them such nice things as freedom of thought and the press. But for the common man it has brought less and less—less to eat, less to drink, less to smoke. What do you say in response to this?

[Yakovlev] That these people are absolutely right.

[Wild] I beg your pardon?

[Yakovlev] These people are right.

[Wild] But these people do not want to wait anymore.

[Yakovlev] In this I also agree with them. Of course, we have to understand that we do not have much more time. Nevertheless, despite all obvious supply problems, you must not forget that more than half of the foodstuffs are delivered by the enterprises. Some enterprises are so good at that that they even sell their foodstuffs to others.

[Wild] Why are the people then lining up in front of the shops?

[Yakovlev] In particular retirees are suffering because of the empty shops; then come the doctors, officials, and journalists, and they are angry, of course. Therefore, I recently proposed to supply them with the same quota as the enterprises.

[Wild] What is the reason for the disastrous problems with supply? One hears much about sabotage by the trading apparatus.

[Yakovlev] Yes, this is exactly it.

[Wild] Is this done on a large scale?

[Yakovlev] If we knew the exact scale we would have long acted against it. But we do not know the real scale and we do not know exactly who is at work there.

[Wild] The red conservatives are also a problem for you. What do you tell an orthodox Communist who says: If Gorbachev and Yakovlev take over Shatalin's program, they are abolishing Communism?

[Yakovlev] I tell him: If we are able to implement Shatalin's program, it will strengthen Communism. But this kind of terminology actually does not interest me. It is much more important that the people live better. If they live better, it is a moot point for them whether this is Communism or something else.

[Wild] Still, selling state enterprises to private citizens, as you are planning now, is not specifically communist.

[Yakovlev] Why not?

[Wild] Because then markets that are characterized by capitalist values develops.

[Yakovlev] Who says so?

[Wild] The theoreticians of socialism as well as the theoreticians of the market economy.

[Yakovlev] A market already existed in the slave society and at the time of feudalism.

[Wild] Do you think that a social market economy supervised by the state, as it exists in the FRG, is worth imitating?

[Yakovlev] If we learn to control the market and do it with the same efficiency as you, this would be a very good thing.

[Wild] Could the good German-Soviet relations deteriorate again if, for instance, many Soviet soldiers in Germany desert and ask for asylum in the future?

[Yakovlev] I do not think that there will be many—a few perhaps.

[Wild] We believe that we know that, unfortunately, there are a great number.

[Yakovlev] These people would be guilty of a serious violation of military discipline, and I do not think that Germany would give such elements political asylum. This would be a scandal.

[Wild] In the past you were a Politburo member, now you are a member of the Presidential Council. What is better?

[Yakovlev] The best is retirement.

[Wild] But your boss is not yet thinking of that?

[Yakovlev] Oh, no. He is very well.

Political Parties Meet To Discuss Issues

LD0310214590 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 3 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow October 3 TASS—A regular meeting of the centrist bloc of political parties and movements, held here today, discussed an action programme of future coalition government of national confidence, preparations for a forum of democratic forces of the Soviet Union and some other matters.

The centrist bloc was set up last June 8 and now unites 18 parties and public organisations.

Opening the meeting, chairman of the organising committee Vladimir Voronin stated that the bloc is drafting the list of a future all-union government to be headed by Anatoliy Sobchak.

Then, he read out the minutes of the meeting of centrist bloc leaders of September 29, saying that meeting participants agreed on the formation of a coalition government.

Today's meeting recommended that all parties and movements should compile their lists. At the same time, understanding the difficult political and economic situation in the country, meeting participants agreed that it is necessary to work to strengthen presidential powers.

Therefore, they favoured the earliest possible round table between centrist bloc leaders and president Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov to draft proposals on how to pull the country out of the crisis.

Deputies View New Presidential Powers

91UN0001B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Sep 90 p 1

[A. Kozhakhmetova report: "What Can the President Do?"]

[Text] As is known, in accordance with the USSR Constitution the USSR president has been granted the right through 31 March 1992 to promulgate ukases of a prescriptive nature on an operational basis and to issue instructions on matters pertaining to the relationships of ownership, organization of the management of the national economy and the budget-and-financial system, wages and prices, and strengthening law and order. It is proposed that the president will be able to issue these ukases under the control of the country's Supreme Soviet.

This important document is being interpreted ambiguously. Here are the opinions of two members of the USSR Supreme Soviet reflecting the essential nature of the disagreements.

A. YEMELYANOV, academician of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences:

I still do not understand what additional powers the president needs if the Constitution affords him so many rights. And why precisely now has such a decision been demanded from the parliament? I can see no objective basis for making economic matters such as ownership, prices, and wages some kind of special mandate of the country's president. It is perfectly feasible to submit them for discussion in the Supreme Soviet, as we are in session virtually year round. It seems to me that we have made a mistake in granting these powers. In this way a step has been taken toward the establishment of presidential rule. And this cannot be done until democracy has been strengthened, whereas the parliament does not have real power and there are no normal organs of control. Although in and of itself a strong executive power is needed—there is no question about that—it is still too soon. I fear it may turn out that we have substituted a lever of authoritarian rule.

F. BURLATSKIY, chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA:

First of all I would like to say that up to now the president has not made use of the powers granted him by the Constitution. This is the picture now: Feeling that the economic mechanism in the country is out of adjustment, the president is issuing orders, but in the republics they are simply ignoring them. And so we must do everything necessary to make his existing powers real rather than imaginary.

But the main point is this. It is strange why not everyone is paying attention to the second and third clauses of our resolution. For in accordance with those clauses the president for the first time has the right to create organizational executive structures and mechanisms so as to ensure compliance with all previous ukases. That is what is important.

Democratic Party Expels Party Leader Ubozhko

LD1010221290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Now let us return to our life again. The second Democratic Party congress was held on 6-7 October this year. Regarding this the "Vremya" program aired an interview with (Ubozhko), one of this party's leaders. He reported on the supposedly forthcoming renaming of the Democratic Party as Conservative, and on it joining the centrist bloc. Today we have been addressed by (Anatoliy Borisovich Cherepanov) who was elected party co-chairman at the congress. He asked us to inform viewers that the Democratic Party congress expelled (Ubozhko) from its ranks. The party's name, program and rules have been preserved and the governing bodies have been re-elected.

Socialist Party's Lack of Consensus Viewed

91UN0001A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 11 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by V. Davydov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Socialists: A Guard Without an Army?"]

[Text] The Constituent Congress of the Socialist Party of the USSR was long and hard in coming. As far back as June of last year the Moscow committee of the "new socialists" was set up and established contacts with the strike committees in the Kuzbass, Karaganda, and Vorkuta. Then a conference of socialist groups and organizations was held in Moscow, at which the All-Russian Committee of the Socialist Party was formed. It also included the representatives of a number of strike committees, socialist groups from the people's fronts in Irkutsk, Kuybyshev, and Tolyatti, and activists who at that time were forming the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." Contacts were established with the Federation of Democratic Socialist Youth that had been formed along the lines of the Surgut initiative. However, the constituent conference planned for March did not take place because it was still necessary to hold a series of meetings for the supporters of the socialists in cities of Russia—Irkutsk, Novgorod, Angarsk, and Moscow, and a "precongress" in Leningrad.

And finally on 21 June the Constituent Congress of the Socialist Party took place in the building of the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Soviet. The socialist congress was attended by 55 delegates with right of casting vote from 10 cities and regions in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], and more than 50 guests, including from abroad.

The atmosphere was businesslike, but that did not exclude heated discussion. There were differences of opinion about when the party should be set up... A number of delegates believed that it was still premature because the quite powerful Socialist Party aktiv still does not have base organizations, and remains a "guard without an army." This aktiv operates through the soviets. In the Moscow Soviet, for example, there are 10 socialists, in the Irkutsk Soviet nine, and they are also present in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and in the city organ of the Union of Workers of the Kuzbass.

There were reports and speeches, and seven sections were conducted, including sections on political strategy, public movements, and parliamentary activity. Following a stormy debate, the Socialist Party Program and Rules were adopted and a Socialist Party Executive Committee elected, which will be located in Leningrad. In his report on the current position B. Kagarlitskiy, one of the leaders of the party, sharply criticized not only the actions of the government and CPSU leadership but also the liberals for the half-measures in their decisions and actions. In his opinion, attempts to turn state capital into joint-stock capital "do not break the bureaucratic distribution system in general, and the market scenario for modernization is incapable of extricating the country from crisis." The conclusion was that the Socialist Party should assume the free "niche" on the left flank and become an "opposition to the opposition." And it is primarily those who make up the bloc of workers employed in skilled labor who should move into that niche after it. The Socialist Party sees allies in the Confederation of Labor and the free trade unions, and among the anarchosyndicalists and some of the Christian Democrats. It is also possible to count on cooperation with the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU" if it evolves in the right direction.

There were many disputes about what kind of party it should be. The chairman of the congress organizing committee, V. Lepekhin, advocated not a parliamentary party but one operating among the mass formation of the laborite type. He favored a socialist movement within whose framework the Socialist Party should operate. But sharp objections were raised to this position. A majority was inclined toward now making the party a mass party as quickly as possible.

It was, perhaps, M. Malyutkin who defined most clearly the goals of the fledgling party: not social philanthropy, as many think, but a transfer of the means of production to the control of the soviets at all levels, and finding solutions for the social problems that now face the various strata of workers. The path to this is through making property municipal and developing self-management. And the calculation is for quite a long period of "maturation" of the worker, who with the aid of the market should grow to cope with the demands of self-management.

It remains only to note one not unimportant factor to which attention was resonantly drawn by one of the speakers at the congress, A. Bogatov, member of the Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." The documents of the various emerging parties, he remarked, often largely coincide, but there is no general desire for consolidation. And this is because of political ambition and lack of skill, and sometimes a reluctance to compromise—the bane of the entire bloc of democratic forces that is still dooming them to a peripheral position in the country's political life.

Block of Leftist Parties Formed

91UN0006B Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by V. Zenkovich (TASS): "A Block of Left-Wing Forces Has Been Created"]

[Text]**The creation in Moscow of a movement of left-wing forces, "Popular Self-Government," was announced at a press conference held yesterday in the capital's Palace of Youth by representatives of various political parties and organizations.**

The association included some of the proponents of Russian social democracy, socialist parties, the Moscow organization of the "Green" party, and a confederation of the anarchosyndicalists and the Marxist and democratic (communist-reformers) platforms in the CPSU.

Representatives of these organizations hold various political views. But they are unified in the idea that "it is necessary to overcome the false alternatives of totalitarianism and monopolized market capitalism and to proceed along their path." In the opinion of proponents of "Popular Self-Government," "in the country it is necessary to give local soviets the right to dispose of their land and natural resources under the supervision of social organizations and to reject the institution of presidential power."

Opposition Center-Left Bloc Formed

LD0510122690 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 5 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow October 5 TASS—A meeting of several political parties and movements in Moscow on Thursday [4 October] was crowned with the formation of a (?radical) centre-left opposition bloc of political (?parties and) movements.

Bloc leader Aleksey Brumel said it incorporated a group of radicals of the Moscow Popular Front, the Russian Democratic Forum, the Association of Soviet-U.S. Integration and several other political parties and movements.

"Our principal goals are to build a free, democratic and humane society, pool efforts in re-organising the state and struggle against the ultra-right and ultra-left groups in the country," Brumel told TASS.

Brumel said that participants in the meeting developed principles of their organisation's political activity. They include attaining goals within the framework of the law and "preventing the fanning up of national and religious strife".

On the new bloc's cooperation with the Soviet Communist Party and other political parties, Brumel said that "to prevent further confrontation in society, we are willing to cooperate with any ideological movements."

State Trade Workers Union Holds Congress

PM0210155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by Ye. Sorokin: "Minister Not a Member of the Trade Union?"]

[Text] The 11th Congress of the State Trade and Consumer Cooperative Workers Union opened in Moscow yesterday.

As the market approaches, trade has been given the role of catalyst of new commercial relations. However, the trade workers themselves are extremely poorly protected in the social sphere. De-statization of property could lead to mass unemployment and the loss, as far as trade is concerned, of capital investments in the development of basic facilities.

In this situation, Union Central Committee Chairman G. Zamytskaya said in her report, separatist sentiments and the desire to split the trade union are particularly damaging. They have been in evidence particularly in the Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Potrebsoyuz [Union of Consumer Cooperatives] chairman decided to set up... his own trade union. A pocket trade union, really, one serving the administration's interests. In fact, it is necessary to consider whether it is advisable for employees and employers, vendor and minister to be members of the same trade union.

The congress intends to adopt a declaration on the formation of a USSR Federation of Trade and Consumer Cooperative Workers Union Organizations. Abandoning the principle of democratic centralism, it would unite autonomous, independent, and self-governing trade unions, associations, and organizations of trade, public catering, and consumer cooperative workers on a voluntary basis.

Yazov To Take Part in Moscow GOSR Parade

LD1010145490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, has issued a decree on holding military parades to commemorate the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution [GOSR]. On 7 November military parades will be held in Red Square in Moscow, in the capitals of Union republics, and other cities where the headquarters of military districts and fleets are situated. Also naval reviews will be held in Leningrad and cities where the naval fleet headquarters are situated. USSR Defense Minister Yazov will take part in the parade in Moscow.

Deputy Interior Minister on Paramilitary

LD0410053690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1645 GMT on 3 October carries an eight-minute topical interview with N.I. Demidov, USSR deputy minister of internal affairs, by Konstantin Abayev.

Abayev starts by asking whether the extending for a further two months of the presidential decree of 25 July, which ordered all illegal paramilitary formations to disband themselves, has been justified.

Demidov says: "I can say unequivocally that the president's decision to extend the time limits of the decree has proven correct. And figures are the most eloquent in this case. If before the time limits were extended, during the first phase, about 1,000 units of illegally kept firearms had been surrendered or confiscated, since the decision to extend the time limits of this decree was adopted, about 19,000 firearms have been surrendered or confiscated from the population to date." This work is not over yet, Demidov says.

When asked what further measures should be taken to ensure security, Demidov complains that republican supreme bodies of power disregard the decree. He says that, in fact, the decision adopted in Armenia on disbanding paramilitary groups is not being implemented; there are quite a few paramilitary formations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and other areas. He continues: "Since the decree was adopted, Armenian armed groups have opened fire and carried out more than 80 attacks. As a result, 20 Azeris died and 39 were injured; three staffers died and 15 people were injured—I am speaking about staffers of our law-enforcement bodies. Over the same period, from the territory of Azerbaijan, 67 attacks have been carried out, 13 Armenians and three staffers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have died and 53 civilians and 15 staffers of law enforcement bodies and our Army comrades were injured." Demidov deplores the civil war betweenh Armenia and Azerbaijan, and goes on to generalize about the need to join efforts in implementing the presidential decree throughout the country.

Legal Official on Kalugin Investigation

PM0510161390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Major General of Justice A. Boriskin, chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Directorate for Supervision of KGB Preliminary Investigation Organs' Execution of the Law and Rehabilitation, by V. Litovkin, under the rubric: "Details for IZVESTIYA"; place and date not given: "Who Is Conducting the Kalugin Case and How"]

[Text] As has already been reported, on 2 October the Moscow City Court, which is hearing USSR People's Deputy O. Kalugin's action claiming unlawful actions by USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, has postponed hearing the case until 23 October. The court has asked the Main Military Prosecutor's Office for additional documents relating to the progress of the investigation in this "criminal case relating to the divulgence in the press and public statements by former KGB staffer O.D. Kalugin of information constituting state and military secrets."

How is the investigation going? Major General of Justice A. Boriskin, chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Directorate for Supervision of KGB Preliminary Investigation Organs' Execution of the Law and Rehabilitation, told our correspondent about this.

[Boriskin] "I learned about the Moscow City Court's request from a Central Television broadcast," Anatoliy Yefimovich said. "It has yet to reach us. As for the progress of the investigation in the Kalugin case, the situation is as follows. The investigating group is headed by Colonel of Justice Vladimir Matus, senior investigator for particularly important cases under the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. Its task is to establish who authored the press items and study Kalugin's personality."

[Litovkin] But surely there are no doubts about authorship? After all, each item carries a journalist's signature, and his interviewee is also known....

[Boriskin] That's true. But for the investigation it is important to know precisely what Kalugin said, what he did not say, and what may have been added in the way of, if you will excuse the terms, fantasy, conjecture, or journalistic logic.... That is, we have to make a consistent study of all the manuscripts, galley proofs, editors' notes, amendments, and authorizations from Glavlit [Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press] and other organizations and individuals who could in principle have been involved in preparing the material for the press.

No less important—or rather the main thing—is for us to obtain an expert assessment: Was this information a state secret, did it correspond to reality, and, if so, what specific damage did it cause to state security.

We scheduled this expert analysis, entrusted it to specialists in various fields, including representatives of the USSR Council of Ministers concerned with the elaboration of normative acts relating to state secrets, the Main Intelligence Directorate and other directorates of the General Staff, the Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets (formerly Glavlit), academics and diplomats, and KGB representatives.

[Litovkin] But might the presence of interested KGB officials influence the results of the investigation?

[Boriskin] The fact that someone works for the KGB in no way means that he has any interest in influencing the Kalugin case. The findings are signed by all the experts—and this is considered a guarantee of their objectivity. In the final analysis the experts' objectivity and reliability will be assessed by the investigation and then by the court, if a trial takes place.

[Litovkin] Excuse me, it already started 2 October....

[Boriskin] This court is concerned with a civil action by Kalugin. It has nothing in common with the case with which the Main Military Prosecutor's Office is concerned.

[Litovkin] When can we expect the investigation to be completed?

[Boriskin] I think that the experts will present their findings within one and a half or two months. It has to be borne in mind that as yet expert analysis is being made of only five published items. In KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, SOBESEDNIK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, and KOMMERSANT. Video and audio material and also other items published in the Soviet and foreign press and mass media still have to be assessed. So by 23 October we will hardly be able to meet the request from the Moscow City Court examining O.D. Kalugin's complaint.

Gorbachev Asked To Protect Culture Funding

PM0310092390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Undated letter "To Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR," published under common headline with TASS report on Gorbachev's 29 September Kremlin "Meeting With Cultural Figures"]

[Text] Most Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich!

Recognizing the fact that a decline in culture would unpredictably and inevitably influence the life of all peoples and all individuals in our country; that the danger of a total commercialization of culture genuinely threatens our society in market conditions; and that the free development of all national cultures and the maintenance of diverse cultural and historical traditions is the basis for the spiritual development of our multiethnic country, representatives of the Soviet Union's culture, literature, and art appeal to you at a historic time for us all.

A new understanding of the role of culture in the contemporary spiritual and sociopolitical life of the country and the world was the underlining accent of the NEW THINKING which defined the philosophy of PERESTROYKA.

But the "philosophy" of the practical life of recent times has, essentially speaking, demonstrated a neglect of the interests of culture, a deadly failure to understand its salutary, healing, and regenerating mission in the life of people both today and tomorrow in the multiethnic Union of sovereign soviet republics.

Culture is capable of uniting peoples.

The national culture of each republic acquires its true significance and greatness by growing and miraculously transforming itself in the mirror of panhuman culture—both native and world culture. Failure to accept this community within cultures and across cultures may turn out to be a unique historical mistake, and will lead to national insularity and, in the final analysis, cultural ruin.

We are very well aware of the USSR president's attitude to the problems of cultural development and consequently draw the president's attention to the fact that certain laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet have virtually excluded culture from the sphere of concern of the Union government and the prerogatives of the Union state.

As a result, according to information which has reached us, the draft USSR state budget for 1991 prepared by the USSR Ministry of Finance makes no provision at all for allocations for the development of culture. This is incomprehensible both from a political and from a legal point of view. It is not only deplorable and foolish. It is uncivilized.

We appeal to you, most esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, to take under your direct protection the needs of Soviet culture and concern for its representatives. Action by the USSR president to change the existing situation decisively is essential. Development of all USSR culture is a pledge of the viability and development of our state.

Those who suggest that everything will take shape of its own accord in culture after the economic situation improves and the political situation stabilizes are tragically mistaken.

An all-union state cultural policy has nothing in common with standardization of national cultures. Such a policy is vital for the preservation of the USSR's integrity. By constituting the Union budget as primarily a defense budget we would be giving the republics and the entire world grounds to suppose that the USSR, from being a state which took responsibility for all aspects of society's life, is turning into a military-political bloc. It may happen that this bloc will have nothing to defend, since a united economic space presupposes the cultural compatibility of peoples and the mutual enrichment of national cultures. The EEC countries, for example, which at the present time are applying significant efforts to form a single cultural space, are well aware of this.

The USSR president's concern for culture does not place in doubt the republics' sovereignty in the sphere of cultural organization. But the president's authority personifies the authority of the whole country, and it is he who can be the guarantee of the freedom of creativity and the preservation of the cultural heritage.

We sincerely hope, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that you will make a decisive contribution to the creation of a new, fruitful situation for culture in the Soviet Union.

Culture remains for Soviet people the hope and consolation without which life is impossible.

[Signed] Ch.T. Aytmatov, I.A. Antonova, A.A. Belyaev, Yu.V. Bondarev, R.A. Bykov, A.V. Vasnetsov, R.G. Gamzatov, A.A. Goncharov, N.N. Gubenko, S.L. Zalygin, M.A. Zakharov, A.I. Kamshalov, V.V. Karpov, K.Yu. Lavrov, D.S. Likhachev, S.V. Mikhalkov, I.A. Naumenko, Yu.V. Nikulin, B.I. Oleynik, V.G. Rasputin, S.T. Rikhter, G.V. Sviridov, Yu.B. Solovyev, Yu.M. Solyumin, B.S. Ugarov, M.A. Ulyanov, T.N. Khrennikov, D. Khudonazarov, M.F. Shatrov.

Major General Calls for KGB, MVD Cooperation

91UF0018A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by O. Galustyan, internal service major general, candidate of legal sciences: "Prejudicial Evidence: Cooperation Between the KGB and the MVD, Rather Than Their Rivalry, Will Help To Control Crime"]

[Text] Several days ago, I read the article "Your Phone Bugged?—Turn to Alex" in one of the weeklies. In the article, a private agency offered its services to protect private phones against bugging. I read this and became even more convinced that the people still have the syndrome of fear of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and KGB organs. Is this not paradoxical: Our society fears institutions it created and maintains for its own protection?

This topic is probably inexhaustible. For my part, I would like to touch within its confines on issues that somehow it is not the custom to discuss even in our frank times.

For example, look at the system of all kinds of secret records, the conducting of special verifications, and the issuance of official and unofficial character profiles with conclusions such as "foreign travel is not expedient due to operational considerations," "prejudicial evidence is available," and so on, without explaining the heart of the matter and without too many words.

In almost all of our establishments, a questionnaire system is also in operation that provides for digging into the biographies of people for any reason (a trip abroad, hiring, transfer, promotion), searching for prejudicial evidence, determining the details of one's ethnicity and the entire genealogical tree. At times, a broad circle of people are drawn into such examinations—neighbors, co-workers, and even old ladies who are on a permanent watch in front of doorways.

The so-called first special departments with impressive staffs, headed as a rule by KGB retirees, and deputy directors (chiefs) for security regimen are present in offices. There is a lot in the operation of these departments that is unknown to common people. One thing is clear—supposedly they are designed to ensure "the secrecy regimen." However, this begs the following question: What secrets of state significance are there in, say, the student community, and why should the positions of pro rectors and deputy deans be filled with KGB employees in some civilian colleges? And what about KGB inspectors accompanying almost every tourist group traveling abroad?

It would be ludicrous to deny the need for measures ensuring the security of our country. However, they should not result in indiscriminate checks and the compilation of all kinds of files for millions of people.

There is one more sensitive topic that involves relations between the internal affairs organs and the KGB. As is known, at one point Yu.V. Andropov made a decision on the operational control and servicing of the internal affairs organs by KGB apparatuses, giving them special powers, with a view to protection against foreign intelligence services and to fighting against corruption. These powers included carrying out agent and operational measures and conducting investigations of the employees of internal affairs organs. To this end, a large apparatus within the structure of the KGB was created (and exists to this day) with subdivisions in all republics, cities, and rayons. Space was allotted to the "servicing" operatives of state security within the organs of internal affairs. Incidentally, they still continue without particular enthusiasm to perform their mission, which is not envisaged by any law. Tremendous resources and funds are diverted. To be sure, a most significant state institution, which is what the MVD is, needs to be protected against corruption; I doubt from foreign intelligence services. However, as far as methods go... The longstanding rivalry of the two establishments, the KGB and the MVD, was quite a factor in this matter. To be sure, the state security organs had the advantage; the general secretary himself, the Central Committee, and the Politburo stood by them.

Suspicions, mistrust, and comprehensive surveillance flourished as this campaign began in the internal affairs organs. In addition, several hundred KGB employees headed by V. Fedorchuk, who was in charge of the campaign, were assigned to the MVD for five years. There is no denying that many of them were intelligent, trained people with integrity. However, there were also those who displayed self-conceit and contempt of professionals in the militia, their attitude being "all of them are crooks." This is how a tremendous army of professionals was scattered. During the same years, rumors were spread purposefully and methodically, anonymous letters were printed with a view to compromising leading functionaries, and telephones and offices were bugged. Those who displayed adherence to principles and disagreed with the arbitrarily imposed rule were expelled from the organs and threatened. Deputy Minister V. Lezhepekov (who also arrived from the KGB) called the leaders of establishments personally, with special relish, and demanded that they not hire the MVD personnel expelled by him. Hundreds of such cases were initiated. For example, the deputy chief of the Moscow Oblast Main Administration of Internal Affairs was arrested on the basis of a denunciation concerning a bribe he had supposedly taken. He was imprisoned for two years. He was acquitted and released after Fedorchuk was dismissed from his job. In the process, the "ideologists" and "practitioners" of such arbitrariness have gone virtually unpunished. To be sure, the USSR MVD party committee expelled Chief of the Operations Service A. Khrushchev from the CPSU for the immediate organization of surveillance of MVD employees. However, the Moscow City Committee of the party spared him right away, being "charitable" and retaining him in the CPSU.

The readers should not get the impression that I am against purging the internal affairs organs of rogues, random individuals, and bribe-takers. Unfortunately, there are still many of those in the MVD. It is necessary to fight them, particularly at present. However, this should be done on a legal basis, without humiliating the people and undermining authority, without suspecting indiscriminately the bulk of employees who honestly perform their duty to the people.

Let us also look at the following issue, which is still considered to be extremely delicate. State security employees frequently carry out their "measures" under the guise of militia employees. They conduct searches and seizures and make arrests using the credentials and uniforms of militia employees. All of this is done in the name of the militia, but without its knowledge and participation.

Besides, the KGB organs frequently use the visa and foreigner registration service as a screen. Hence complaints about the MVD, despite the fact that it has nothing to do with it.

Please do not get me wrong. Along with many of my professional colleagues, I am in favor of cooperating with the KGB organs on a healthy and absolutely legitimate basis. I believe that the employees of both the KGB and MVD would win due to such cooperation, and most importantly, people would turn to us and begin to trust us more.

We cannot count on ruling out the recurrence of lawlessness until the issue of complete legal regulation of the activities of the KGB and the MVD, primarily their operational activities, is resolved clearly and the strictest parliamentary and procurator supervision of them is established. Apparently, it makes sense to give some thought to a strict delineation of the functions of state and public security and to the possible merger of KGB and MVD services and subdivisions performing homogeneous functions. This will make it possible for them to interact better, will facilitate more effective supervision of their activities by the procuracy, and—this is important—will cost the taxpayer less.

EDITORIAL NOTE: We invite all those who can state their considerations on the issues touched upon, including state security employees who were assigned to work in the militia at that time, to take part in this conversation.

PRAVDA Denies No-Confidence in Frolov

PM1110095190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Second Edition p 8

[Unattributed "Necessary Clarification"]

[Text] The other day KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, citing the Television News Service, reported that at a three-day party meeting at the PRAVDA editorial office "speakers expressed no-confidence in Chief Editor Ivan Frolov over the failure of the subscription campaign." The meeting appealed to the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which it supposedly expects to resolve this question. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI also reported that the participants in the party meeting allegedly "demanded the resignation" of the chief editor.

What actually happened? An open party meeting was indeed held at the editorial office 2 and 4 October. Its topic: What should PRAVDA be like in 1991? A sharp, sometimes harsh debate flared up about the newspaper's problems in connection with the course of the subscription campaign, and there was criticism of the newspaper's leadership. The meeting did not adopt a resolution of no-confidence in the chief editor. The Communists of the editorial office asked the Central Committee plenum to expedite the resolution of a number of most important questions of the newspaper's life, including questions earlier placed before party organs by PRAVDA's leadership. In particular, it is a matter of creating an autonomous, self-financing PRAVDA association. As announced at the plenum, these questions will be examined in the CPSU Central Committee.

Ryzhkov Seeks Referendum on Land Transfers

LD1110014490 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet premier, Nikolay Ryzhkov, has said the prospect of transferring land to private interests should be decided by a nationwide referendum.

Speaking to the congress of the Agroindustrial Workers' Union, in Moscow on Wednesday, he said a combination of various economic forms, including state-run agrofirms, cooperatives, and family farms, would be the most appropriate option. The premier warned against admitting of mass-scale bankruptcy of collective and state farms during the transitional period since that would inevitably undermine production and cause major social shocks.

Newspapers Not Published; Staffs Help in Harvest

LD0610112990 Moscow Television Service in Russan 2252 GMT 5 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA were not published today. The newspapers' editorial offices tell us that the entire staffs are acquiring a new profession: they are struggling outside Moscow with an unprecedented carrot harvest.

Author Protests Article's Unauthorized Publication

PM0910163990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Letter by Sergey Zalygin: "Culture Newspaper?"]

[Text] A friend said to me when we met:

"I read your article in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. I did not really understand what the article was about..."

"What article? Where from? I haven't given SOVETSKAYA KULTURA anything. Anything! And I don't intend to."

"What do you mean? There are pictures, lots of pictures, accompanying your article! Issue No 39."

I get a copy of issue No 39. On page four there is indeed my name and "my" article entitled "Sheltering Nature in Our Own Home." I have never written an article under that heading. In the editorial insert I read: "...we offer for readers' attention the speech by writer S. Zalygin at the 12th congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature. The text is published in slightly abridged form."

I must say that in my whole literary life of over 50 years I have never encountered such a thing: Violations of author's rights follow one after another here.

One: The item is published without the author's consent.

Two: Arbitrary abridgements have been made.

Three: There has been arbitrary editing (as a result of which some paragraphs become incomprehensible).

Four: The heading has been arbitrarily changed. (In reality it is quite different: "Literature and Nature").

Five: The article is accompanied by an insert (from the editorial office) and illustrations, once again without the author's consent.

Thus, a fivefold violation of the author's rights, not to mention the moral aspect of the matter.

The newspaper which allows this is called SOVETSKAYA KULTURA?

Is that not strange?

[Signed] Sergey Zalygin.

Butenko Argues His Concept of Union Treaty

PM0510142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Dr. of Philosophical Sciences A. Butenko under the rubric "Union Treaty: What It Is to Be Like": "Inalienable Sovereignty"]

[Text] I read attentively Academician V. Kudryavtsev's PRAVDA article "Declarations of Sovereignty and the Union Treaty," which speaks of the complex questions that arise in a multinational country when there is a desire to link the republics' sovereignty with the creation of a democratic union state and its legal foundations. I will say at once: I take a different stand to that set forth in V. Kudryavtsev's article, but, treating the first opinion with respect, I wish to expound my own understanding of the matter without direct polemics.

Aytmatov Doubts Wisdom of Union Fragmentation

PM0410083590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Chingiz Aytmatov conducted by TASS correspondent L. Shvedova: "Chingiz Aytmatov: 'Only Together with Russia'"]

[Text] A meeting between the USSR president and cultural figures has been held in the Kremlin. One of the participants, Chingiz Aytmatov, writer and member of the Presidential Council, shares his impressions of it with your TASS correspondent.

"Today's meeting reminds me of a combined plenum of the creative unions, but in a new capacity and with new problems. While previously at such plenums we were dealing with ideologically ostentatious support for shaky ideas, today's discussion has been concerned with the most vital reality. About that which encourages us all and that which worries us.

"The destruction of links and those factors which are shattering the foundations of our culture are particularly frightening. When addressing the meeting I deliberately spoke a good deal about Russia, its enormous responsibility, its role as a link, and its integrating force. I see it as an island with an adjoining archipelago of islands. After all, Russia has always been the center, and that is particularly important today.

"The situation prevailing in the country reminds me of a situation at sea: The ship has sprung a leak, and the crew instead of quickly plugging the hole is rushing for the lifeboats and rowing to shore.

eople," juridical and actual

"I, for example, cannot imagine the Central Asian region's future without Russia. It is my conviction that our links with Russia, unity, and community form the platform for the further development of the nation. Recently many people have become intoxicated by a sense of absolute sovereignty. But absolute sovereignty also means borders and one's own economy, diplomacy, and monetary system. Is that sensible? I regard it as an unfruitful phenomenon.

"Many people spoke at the meeting about the need to set up a special body under the Presidential Council to take charge of cultural questions. The idea is a good one, but it is necessary to find a form which does not duplicate already existing ones.

"One of the acute questions submitted for today's discussion was, of course, the market and culture, the commercialization of art. With the transition to a market economy this has become a reality. But the market is harsh and selfish, and the task is to help culture weather these difficult conditions."

Thunder From the Wrong Storm Cloud

In discussing questions of national sovereignty and the principles of interethnic and interstate associations, certain theoreticians and practical experts believe that, when resolving the problems of the new Union Treaty, we should rely on our own, i.e. domestic, experience—more than 70 years of development, after all! It is hardly possible to agree with this. As distinct from those who rely only on experience of the Soviet Union's development, which is largely negative, my experience is also associated with a study of the practice of other multinational states—the SFRY and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic—and a study of such interstate alliances and associations as the Warsaw Pact and NATO, CEMA and the "Common Market." This enables me to assert that two fundamentally different approaches and, accordingly, theoretical concepts of national sovereignty exist.

The first approach proceeds from the voluntary divisibility and alienability of national sovereignty (or part of it) from its conduit—the nation. It proceeds from the possibility, in this connection, of the existence of nations with "limited sovereignty" if a given nation or a given (national) republic alienates from itself part of its sovereign rights and transfers them to the central organs of the Union, the union state, the federation, the confederation, or a particular interstate association. In other words, with regard to our set of problems—the restructuring of the Union—this is a question of the powers of national state organs and the powers of "supranational" union organs, in which a certain volume of the rights and powers voluntarily delegated by republics to the Union's jurisdiction is concentrated.

With this approach the problem arises today of national sovereignty and state power, "limited sovereignty" and the "full power of the

sovereignty, voluntary and compulsory, overt and covert limitation of the nation's sovereign rights, and the correlation of its rights and duties both within the framework of its own republic and on a union scale. Given the restructuring of the Union, in this case the chief question boils down to haggling between the center (the Union) and the republic over what to leave to whom and what to take from whom.

I think that hardly anyone will contradict me if I say that just such an approach and just such a concept of national sovereignty and of the interdependence of the republics and the Union, of the nation and the center, held sway in our country under I. Stalin and later and holds sway even today. Everyone is used to just such an approach, forgetting that the truth is not as wholesome as its semblance is harmful. For decades our journals and newspapers were full of articles about the voluntary "limitation of national sovereignty" by republics, about their "transfer" and "delegation" of some of their sovereign rights to the Union's jurisdiction, about the fact that wherever it is a question of multinational state associations (be it the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or CEMA), it is impossible to imagine their successful functioning without the "limitation of national sovereignty."

No one wanted to notice either the erroneous or the reactionary nature of that approach. For it turned out that, with each step of progress and the more profound the republics' ties and interdependence, the fewer sovereign rights a particular nation is left with and the more limited the republics' sovereignty becomes. Under the protection of this concept and supposedly in the name of the Union's highest interests, national autonomies were eliminated and abolished and entire national republics and oblasts, nations and national groups were wiped off the Soviet map.

The second approach—and I consider it the only correct one—proceeds from the indivisibility of the nation and the inalienability of its national sovereignty from it. It proceeds from the impossibility of the existence of free nations with voluntarily limited sovereignty. This is regardless of whether a given nation develops in isolation from others—in its own national state—or whether it is part of the Union of states, a federation or a confederation, participates in close cooperation, or is involved in a process of integration. The point is that a nation's sovereignty, its full rights and full power, and the supremacy of its rights are a product of historical development and one of mankind's most important gains. At the same time any alienation of the nation's rights or limitation of its sovereignty, whatever good intentions are used to conceal this, is an antidemocratic phenomenon incompatible not only with socialism but also with consistent democratism.

With this approach the most important problem is certainly not to ascertain how national sovereignty is limited and in what proportions it is divided and alienated in favor of the Union (the center) but how to ensure the indivisibility of sovereignty and the inalienability of national rights and powers from the people under changing conditions—with the growth in the republics' specialization and collaboration and with the growing coordination of ties. Equally, given the restructuring of the Union and relying on such an approach, the chief thing is certainly not haggling between the center (the Union) and the national republic over the question of what to leave to whom and what to take from whom but, having restored to all the nations their full power and reinstated their indivisible and inalienable sovereignty, to decide **how, in what forms, and in what way to ensure this inalienable sovereignty under the conditions of the ties, collaboration, and cooperation which have taken shape and are expanding.**

It is hard to deny that the first approach and the concept associated with it and, even more so, the practice of the actual limitation of nations' sovereignty and of "the center's diktat" have caused tremendous harm to the development both of the entire Soviet Union and of its individual republics. Precisely this adverse practice was the prime cause of the explosion of national feelings and emotions and of the growth of national self-awareness—which is the key to explaining why republic after republic is now adopting declarations of sovereignty and laws on power and on the supremacy of its own laws with such sincere enthusiasm and genuine gusto.

The heads of those who imbibed the first approach with their mother's milk are really spinning because "the republics now do not ask for permission but assume this independence, declaring their sovereign rights," and they are thrown into a fever by such "disobedience" and "revisionism." Let us reassure those of a nervous disposition: This is "thunder from the wrong storm cloud," and a natural restoration of the sovereignty of nations, the full power of peoples, and the independence of republics is taking place.

Stumbling Block

It is said that all complex questions must have a simple solution. I do not think that this applies to the new Union Treaty as well. It seems to me that the theoretical and practical resolution of the basic problems of the restructuring of the Union and the conclusion of the new Union Treaty is possible only given correct understanding of the actual correlation between the inalienability of national sovereignty and the diversity of the state forms of its practical realization.

What am I saying? That every nation (people) has its own aggregate of both fundamental and specific interests whose realization constitutes the implementation of the sovereign right of the nation (people). But this entire aggregate of interests can be realized with the help of diverse means—state forms. At the same time both the actual choice of these forms and the distribution of the entire volume of the nation's rights and powers among them are also a very important element of its sovereignty. For example, the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation or, more widely, the entire volume of sovereign rights and powers of the Ukrainian people, being inalienable from the nation (people), can be realized with the help of several state forms: For example, the main volume of these rights and powers is realized through republican state structures—through the organs of power of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; a certain part of these rights and powers is realized through an inter-republican association or state formation—the Soviet Union and its central organs; and a certain part of them through an interstate association—the United Nations.

Therefore the entire question under discussion consists not only and not so much in correctly distributing the realization of the total sovereignty of a nation (people) and of its entire volume of rights and powers through these different forms (republic-center) but in **not handing these rights and powers over to some alien forces in every case** (it is in precisely this case that a real limitation of the nation's rights and a truncation of its sovereignty ensue).

It is precisely the fear of such alienation and limitation of the nation's sovereign rights—a fear confirmed by the whole practice of the Soviet Uion's previous development—that is the chief stumbling block today in drawing up the new Union Treaty. All Soviet nations—starting with the Russians, who are frequently unjustly regarded as the nation with the fullest rights, and ending with national minorities and groups illegally deprived of their national-state autonomy—believe that any implementation of part of their sovereign rights and powers by the Union (center) is an indirect, if not a direct, limitation of their sovereignty. And the republics' desire to "give nothing away to the center," to leave everything in their hands, and not to allow the "diktat of the center" is connected precisely with this.

However, people's mentalities differ, but the principles of the Union Treaty must proceed from objective processes, real contradictions, and interdependences between the republics and the center. For, if we yield to this mentality and obey emotions, we will want to break down into national parts something that cannot be broken down—unified production—or to duplicate something for which funds are lacking. For example, to break up inter-nation productive forces and such components of all-union production as railroad, water, road, and air transport, communications systems, all-union oil pipelines and pipes, the energy system, etc. Without increasing the number of examples, I wish to emphasize that the related desire of individual republics to break down all-union productive forces into national-republican forces so as to become the sole masters of those parts of all-union production which are located on the republic's territory, although understandable, runs counter to the general objective trend toward the internationalization of production and counter to money-saving specialization and collaboration.

Where is the way out? The thing is that, speaking abstractly, the center's implementation of part of the managerial functions of the nation (people) is by no means necessarily a limitation of their sovereignty. Only with a superficial approach does it seem that, with any fulfillment of managerial functions by the center (the Union) rather than by republican organs, there is a transfer to it of part of the sovereign rights of a given nation (people) and a limitation of the sovereign rights of the nation and the republic on the part of this activity by the center. But this is a prejudice. And, as is known, a prejudice is further from the truth than an error, since it stems from and is consolidated by actual experience. The essence of this prejudice lies **in the combination** of the actual **transfer** of the nation's rights and powers, i.e. the actual limitation of its sovereignty, **with a change in the state form** of the nation's realization of its full power and its inalienable sovereignty.

Only when part of the managerial and authoritative functions affecting the interests of a given nation (people) is implemented by the Union (center) without the knowledge and consent of representatives of the nation (people) or when a given nation (people) does not have at its disposal legitimate constitutional possibilities of preventing national injustice and upholding its national interests (for example, the right of veto)—absolutely only in this case does the transfer of the nation's sovereign rights to the Union (center) or the infringement or limitation of national sovereignty take place. If a nation (people) participates in one form or another in union organs and has a constitutional possibility of preventing a decision that the nation regards as undesirable, then such implementation of the corresponding functions by the Union (center) certainly does not signify a transfer or limitation of the nation's sovereign rights.

The problem is resolved by no means in the spirit that it is necessary to fragment inter-nation productive forces, break down international economic ties, divide production—which has already become joint production—into its national-state parts separated from each other by state borders, and thereby satisfy with the help of border markers the national ambitions of those who are prepared to run counter to the general trend of the socialization and internationalization of production, but in quite the other direction. It is necessar not to adapt production to the traditional forms of realizing the inalienable sovereignty of the nation (people) by fragmenting this production and thereby stopping its development, but, on the contrary, it is necessary to improve state-legal forms of realizing the full power of the nations, their inalienable sovereignty, and their direct participation in the functioning of central power.

Coup Rumors, Need for Consensus Discussed

PM0910144990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Shevtsova: "Anyone Who Is Not Against Us Is With Us. Alliance of Democratic Forces With the President Can Lead to Social Consensus"]

[Text] Coup... Like a squall, this word suddenly came raining down on us from newspaper pages and television screens, entered parliamentary debates, and became the subject of arguments in the streets. Is there a real threat, and from whom? Or is it a question of yet another trump card in the political game? While we were investigating, the word itself, dropped into a harassed, sick society with frazzled nerves, began its destructive work, deepening the already dangerous confrontation.

Leaf through certain central newspapers, above all PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, for the last two weeks. Even someone unversed in politics cannot fail to notice the massive, well organized, and purposeful offensive. Its scenario is simple to the point of being primitive. Just as the goals are perfectly clear—to demonstrate the sheer horror of Soviet society's present situation: the "threat of famine," the "approaching catastrophe," "what are we going to eat," and so forth. Yes, the country's economic situation is indeed extremely grave. But what can be achieved merely by inflaming passions? Only increased hysteria and social tension. The authors of such articles propose nothing constructive. They see their task as lying elsewhere—identifying the culprit, the person who has brought society to disaster. And they present an answer: the democrats. And, as though by command, the very word "democrats" is only ever used in inverted commas in certain news media. Apparently they, the democrats, are also to blame for the fact that the people may have to go hungry during the winter. Everyone comes under fire—the Democratic Platform, the Russian parliament, the Moscow Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet. And their transgressions are listed: They have failed to send messengers to the republics, they have not organized visits by collectives to the countryside, they have not fixed things up, they have not mobilized efforts, and so forth.

Certainly the new forces that have come to power in a number of cities cannot be idealized. They are inexperienced, they have made many mistakes, and initially they were carried away with debates.... But on the other hand was it possible to rectify the situation in individual regions without having the resources and when encountering obstruction at every step? And are matters vastly better in the places where "yesterday's men" still call the shots? But even that is not the point. The offensive that is under way against the new authorities, especially in Moscow and Leningrad, has a very definite aim: to pin on the democrats, who have been at the helm for just six months, responsibility for the results of 70 years of the bureaucratic system. And thereby to whitewash at a stroke both the Stalin-Brezhnev rule and those who reduced society to degradation. Kunayev, Grishin, Promyslov, Romanov, Medunov, and others are enjoying a leisured and very affluent retirement. And Popov and Sobchak are having to take the rap for their transgressions. Meanwhile we are being told that things were far better before. And the man in the street is prepared to agree: There used to be groats in the stores at least, but now there is not even that. "The loss of the former administrative mainsprings... at a stroke has thrown national economic relations back to the level of prefeudal or early feudal barter exchange," one newspaper sorrowfully remarks. So let us return to the past? Yes, that is the conclusion thrust upon us. And a little idea is foisted on us (I have often heard it): If these democrats cannot even supply Moscow with bread, how can they be allowed to run the country! And anyhow—look!—they are preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. One day soon they will take every last crumb away from the workers and hand it over to the exploiters. And they will start to shoot the peasants like rabbits. They will sell off everything they can to Western capitalists. Massacres of Communists will begin.

All this is presented quite seriously. The "Action Program-90" prepared by a certain Russian Democratic Forum, of which no one had ever heard before, has been made public. Attempts are now being made to portray this program as a plan for the seizure of power by democrats, despite the fact that democratic forces have publicly emphatically dissociated themselves from this frankly provocative document.

Where did the "Action Program-90" spring from? Maybe it really was prepared by a small group of immature extremist people who had no idea of the consequences of their "creativity." But why then was this chosen as evidence of our democrats' counterrevolutionary intentions out of the multitude of similar appeals (there are hundreds and thousands of them on the walls of buildings, in entrances, in pedestrian underpasses)? Who needed to compromise the broad democratic movement and why? It would be useful to find out who circulated the "Action Program-90," and for what purpose, to party committees and party publications, with appropriate recommendations. Remember that in March 1988 a similar method was used to indicate what the reaction should be at local levels to N. Andreyeva's article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

What is the aim of the present offensive against the democrats? Is it only to denigrate and discredit, or is there a more serious task? Let us note that antidemocratic putsches have been carried out in certain countries under similar ideological camouflage, under the slogan of "defending the constitution, order, and the people's interests."

Let us consider: How real is the threat of a coup, and from what quarter? When it comes to the democrats, it is difficult even to imagine how they could do this when they lack control over the Army, have influence only in a number of cities, and are without a majority in the Union parliament.

Now for the question of whether there is a realistic prospect of an anticonstitutional coup by those who possess the necessary means for this. Perhaps I am downplaying the extent of the danger, but here too I see no possibility of a coup on the scale of the whole Union. Decentralization has gone too far. And it is clear that any attempt to establish an imperial dictatorship would cause a multitude of Afghanistans, which it would not be easy to deal with. But in Russia, at least theoretically, this possibility cannot be totally ruled out. It is technically very simple to implement it. "You would need just one Taman division for this," a Western expert in the mechanism of coups reflecting on the problem with regard to our situation remarked. But I think that even potential would-be Bonapartes must realize that the problem is not the seizure of power: It is virtually there for the taking. The problem is what to do with it then. How to cope with the problems rather than go down with them. At the same time we must not be complacent. The present antidemocratic campaign and certain behind-the-scenes maneuvers that can be divined only from indirect evidence show that we cannot passively wait and see what course events will take. Whereas before the right-wingers used only legal means of struggle (the creation of the Russian Communist Party, for instance), strong-arm methods may also be used now. I would like to regard these conjectures as a great exaggeration, but the situation is such that it is better to take no chances.

But why has the offensive begun precisely now? Once again I refer the reader to the aforementioned publications, where he will find the answer. What does the campaign against the "500 days" program show (incidentally, it is virtually identified with the "Action Program-90"—perhaps the reader will get everything mixed up and he may conclude that it is Yeltsin who is preparing an anti-Gorbachev putsch)? Just one thing: The right-wingers are in a hurry to compromise the democrats before the latter begin to introduce market mechanisms. But the main point lies elsewhere. First, to prevent the consolidation of left-wing forces and, second, to thwart rapprochement between the left and the center. Seemingly the summer dialogue between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was not to everyone's liking, as E. Volodin quite frankly admits in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "This was yet another attempt to foist on supreme power a so-called left-centrist bloc in which the existing leadership (the center) would carry out the will of 'left-wingers.'"

Thus everything is now being done to turn Gorbachev against the democrats. Look how the arguments are interwoven: The left-wingers are artificially creating difficulties so that they can overthrow both the government and the president on a wave of popular discontent.

At any rate (whether because of pressure "from the right" or because of other reasons) the alliance between Gorbachev and Yeltsin looks extremely fragile for the present. You cannot help wondering: Indeed, does it exist at all? There is no sign of consensus between the center and Russia on the cardinal issues of market reform and the future of the Union. And the lack of unity in Moscow is echoed in confrontation at local level, deepening the social and national confrontation there. So a very great deal depends on whether our two leaders are able to find a common language and whether the forces backing them begin to move closer together.

However, there is also another viewpoint that says: The importance of the left-centrist bloc should not be exaggerated. There is a need for strong, totally independent presidential power. This view may indeed have been correct a year ago, but now, in conditions in which a number of independent states are emerging on the basis of the USSR, presidential rule is acquiring different features. I think that in the new community of states toward which we are moving there will be a need for some sort of center, but in a totally new form and with new functions.

The center must rest on a certain social and political base. But in current Soviet society the social base of centrism is either very insignificant, or absent altogether. At the crucial moment when new structures are being formed, a centrist policy may even become an obstacle to reform.

Today the moment of truth has arrived for Gorbachev and his team. Maneuvering between left and right has exhausted its reserves. Any continuation of this line (at least at the present time) threatens to lead to a situation where the president will forever lag behind a departing train. It is this that happened to a number of leaders in East Europe who, after initiating reforms, were unable in time to abandon former stereotypes and an obsolete political line. Any delay in making a choice may lead to still more undesirable consequences: The president will find himself in the conservative camp without himself desiring this.

So is the only political solution for Gorbachev to side with the left-wingers? "No," I sometimes hear some people say, "Gorbachev no longer needs the democrats. They must go on without him." To be honest, the president's constant waverings are sufficient grounds for disappointment. But let us consider matters calmly. Gorbachev was, and remains in the eyes of the whole world, the main architect of perestroyka and the man who eliminated the constant threat that emanated from the East. He was and remains the international safeguard of our reforms. No one (for the time being, at any rate) can replace him in this role. Even financial credits are still granted to us "against the security of Gorbachev." So the democrats need Gorbachev just as much as he needs them. But a far more important point is that society needs a bloc between them. A left-centrist coalition could lessen the polarization of social forces and prevent civil confrontation.

The democrats' leaders are now well aware of this, as their quest for an alliance with the center shows. Is it possible not to see the outstretched hand? Is it worth paying attention to extremists and provocateurs? There are plenty of them on the margins of any society. And to accuse left-wing forces of a conspiracy against the president is simply ridiculous. Gorbachev is the living guarantee of the very existence of these forces.

A great deal in our troubled time will depend on how the democrats behave now. It is important not to yield to provocations, not to lose your self-possession, and not to take reckless steps.

What are the priority tasks for the democrats? There are probably two. The first is to overcome their enthusiasm for the political game and for pure parliamentarianism; to surmount the temptations stemming from the proximity of power. The tone of society cannot be determined on the basis of the people who attend demonstrations. The great masses of working people have no inclination to attend rallies and demonstrations, but it is those masses that will determine the outcome of the political struggle. And it is for them that it is necessary to compete, which is something that the democrats at present underestimate.

The second task is to seek consensus with everyone who has no interest in deepening anarchy. To win over the moderates and make allies of the neutrals. "Anyone who is not against us is with us" is the only possible and necessary policy in conditions where the social fabric is coming apart at the seams. Here too the most important thing is to overcome intolerance and to prevent a neo-bolshevik syndrome from emerging. What do I mean? I mean what has already happened to the new ruling groupings in East Europe—a vigorous desire to finish off all opponents and dissidents, a desire for an absolute monopoly, and a "witch hunt" primarily against Communists and everyone who was "implicated." And many people were implicated in the past. This sad experience is influencing sentiments within our society—not only among the nomenklatura and in its entourage, not only administrative and economic cadres, but also rank-and-file Communists.

A young man recently came for a job at the institute where I work. "I want you to know all about me," he declared. Good grief, he has done time in jail!—I could not help thinking. But no! It transpired that the newcomer had just been a Communist Party member and was now afraid that this fact in his past might influence his professional future. He had been a rank-and-file party member. So what are those who are customarily described as "apparatchiks" supposed to feel? There is a dual pressure here: the intolerance of some and the skillful fanning of fears by others. The latter point applies to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, which is expressing certainty that there are bound to be pogroms of the nomenklatura and even members of their families will not be spared. Yet among the "apparatchiks" there are many people who can and must be involved in constructive work.

What am I driving at? The point that soon even a left-centrist bloc may not be enough and a need will emerge (it already has emerged) for broader consensus. The ship is sinking, and the struggle for the helm is becoming pointless and dangerous. We must more rapidly fix the hole in the hull, and do so all together. A little while ago I was simply shocked to hear a democrat whom I respect say: "A critical moment may come when it will be necessary to compromise with Polozkov's party." Now I view that scenario with perfect equanimity. Yes, there are people and forces with whom no dialogue is possible. But on the opposite flank there are also people with whom we will clearly have to sit down at the negotiating table. Both in Russia and in the republics. For instance, it is not clear how the power crisis in the Ukraine can be resolved without such talks. By a tug of war? By using the militia or "separatist" military formations? This would inevitably lead to bloodshed. In Poland, for instance, when everything was coming apart at the seams, as in our country, the opposing forces concluded a truce and sat down at a roundtable for talks. Admittedly, the truce was temporary, but it enabled society to stop at the brink of the abyss. In our country it will very soon become finally clear which scenario is preferable—a left-centrist bloc or a broad coalition of national salvation. Any other scenario will mean a slide into the abyss.

However, consensus and a broad or narrow coalition cannot be regarded as an aim in itself—once we have achieved it, we can relax. It is the basis for solving the most vital problems. The first of these is the fate of the Union. Unless we make progress on this issue, we will not get on top of the economic reform either. We will risk producing only the most general outline of a solution of this problem. I think matters should not be reduced merely to dialogue among certain republics, or between them and Russia. In both the former and the latter cases the luckiest or most persistent republics will gain certain advantages. The others may feel wounded. A new round of conflicts and infighting will be inevitable.

In my view, the best thing would be to hold multilateral talks in which both the center and all potential state entities take part. Their aim must be to elaborate the basic principles for the formation and existence of a new community of independent states and to define their mutual obligations to each other. It is also important to make provision for sanctions for nonfulfillment of those obligations. The most debatable issue here is the role of the center in a new community. But even this issue is perfectly soluble. It is merely necessary to determine what function the member states delegate to the center (defense, communications, monitoring nuclear power, creating interethnic contingents to resolve armed conflicts between states, and so forth). These functions will determine the possible structure of the center. Personally I envision a two-tier structure. The first tier is a council of presidents or leaders of individual states in which Gorbachev could occupy a fitting place as chairman. The council would deal with general, strategic questions of the development of the new community, with resolving contradictions between individual members, and with coordinating their foreign policy. The second tier would be a professional executive organ that would exercise the management functions within the charge of the center.

Stabilization of the state structure would also facilitate a gradual improvement of political life in individual republics and states. The power structures that have now emerged in most republics are clearly temporary. They now do not fully reflect the shifts in social interests. So should we be in a hurry to create something new? No, to travel that path would be once again to form structures destined to become obsolete in a year. After all, even the correlation of political forces has not yet finally stabilized anywhere. Of course, the old structures will curb the process of the development of a new social and political reality. But there is a clinching argument against undue haste in creating new structures. Namely that haste may cause new upheavals in an uncontrollable society.

So before taking the next step, we should find a firm foothold, stop our fall, and consolidate our position. This is possible only via the achievement of consensus; that is, by ceasing to push each other into the abyss. After all, the fighters forget that they are roped together. But we must begin with a left-centrist bloc; while there is still a chance. Otherwise the choice will be made for us—and against us.

Kamchatka Alternative Television Criticized

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26 Sep 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondents A. Androshin, V. Fedotov, and G. Yastrebtsov: "NLO over Kamchatka—Concerning Commerce Together with Sensuality and Politics on One TV Channel"]

[Text] Petraplovsk-Kamchatskiy—*The session of the Kamchatka Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, forming the executive organs of authority with considerable delay, has refrained for the time being from confirming V. Korotkikh in the position of chairman of the television and radio committee. One of the reasons is the dissatisfaction of the deputies with the fact that Victor Vasilyevich has launched a poorly controlled... NLO over Kamchatka.*

We will not tickle the curiosity of the reader any longer. The question is not about a flying saucer, or a messenger from distant worlds, but simply about a commercial program on Kamchatka television which comes out on the airwaves with a characteristically drawn vignette. The abbreviation "NLO" is deciphered in this case as "News. People. Frankness." In fact, this is the country's first channel of alternative television on an oblast scale.

"The passions surrounding it flared up immediately," says V. Korotkikh. "You know how many video salons and video bars have sprung up in the country. There are also quite a few on Kamchatka. With the appearance of "NLO," the incomes of television business men here has dropped sharply. So, it is they who are stirring up trouble....

We will say right away that this assertion is not entirely true, but a certain part of it is. Despite the apparent weaknesses and miscalculations of an organizational and artistic nature, which are inevitable with any new undertaking, the "NLO" program, as we noted, has won popularity among the residents of Kamchatka, and it keeps a lot of former inveterate visitors of videotheques close to their bluish screens at home in the evenings. What is it? It is several hours of air time daily (except Sunday) on a free TV channel. The time is filled with advertising, "cartoons," congratulations to anniversary and name day celebrants, or simply holiday congratulations, commentaries on events, and meetings with unusual people. Those who wish can buy air time to recite their poetry, or to sing songs.

At times, all of this is at the level of "skits," and, naively, it elicits ironical smiles. Nonetheless, many watch with interest, because other channels show endless meetings, forums, boring lines of professional politicians at microphones....

The creation itself of commercial and then also alternative television is a happy beginning for viewers, advertisers, and its consumers, and for television journalists themselves. The Kamchatka artistic group has only several persons who combine professions and who work, as channel director V. Lazarchuk attests, 13-15 hours a day. Moreover, according to state prices and at full economic accountability and cost recovery. They have already earned new Japanese equipment and transportation, and they have given several tens of thousands of rubles of income to the state. Many television viewers voluntarily pay dues (6 rubles per family), and they buy a "guaranteed coupon" that gives them the right to take part in a drawing for "NLO" prizes.

An unquestionable service of the collective is attention to the fates, needs, and worries of ordinary people, and the defense of their interests. These transmissions are usually conducted by V. Lazarchuk himself, peeping into run-down homes with a television camera, and photographing a line at a reception at an institution and everyday scenes on streets and squares. We watched with sincere feeling the report "The Living and the Dead" about people who live beyond the pale of poverty; and the research on medical service for the Kamchadals, the conditions of roads, trade in vegetables, and others, seemed successful. Events that seem to be important to the creators of the channel are illuminated effectively as a rule.

What do the arguments center on? The residents' criticisms of the oblast center, the press, and deputies are most often directed against excessive enthusiasm for sensuality and airing semi-pornographic foreign tapes—only God knows how they got to the Kamchatka television studio. But, perhaps, the main thing is: Dissatisfaction was expressed with the political tendency of the so-called independent commentaries which sociologist A. Lezdinsh presented. We talked with television viewers and opinions, as a rule, coincide: These comments (three appearances on the air—eight minutes each) are directed not at consolidating the perestroyka forces, but at inciting hostility and enmity between various social groups. The assessments and lectures were obtrusive and rather monotonous: The nomenklatura, and only it, was to blame for all of our troubles. The newspaper TIKHOOKEANSKAYA VAKHTA, for example, accompanied passages from Lezdinsh with a witty parody with these lines:

The one to blame for this,
Undoubtedly, it is the apparatus—
It is what is shaking the ground
And everyone's brains around.

The commentator does not conceal the sharply inimical attitude toward the leader of October, the "historical figure and fancier of locomotive rides." He unkindly declared the teaching of Marx to be bankrupt in a 30-minute "theoretical" conversation with the television viewers. He commented with contempt on the CPSU as a "dead political trend."

Well, certainly, the independent commentator can hold views that do not coincide, for example, with the opinions of Communists. This is like an "observer column" in a newspaper that is trying to be objective. The author of the column expresses his radical or conservative judgments. But right alongside there is desirable, if not mandatory, objective accurate information, and other judgments. Alas, it turned out differently on Kamchatka television. While having considerably more minutes of air time, opponents of Lezdinsh rarely debated with him on substance. Although, when Mr. Mashkovets, an ordinary local engineer and, incidentally, a recent CPSU recruit, was able on his own initiative to debate several "NLO" issues with the subverter of Marxism and Leninism, the latter, we note, lost his head somewhat and then chose to rid himself completely of such a rival. Play on your own field, rival, he says, and do not come close to my goal.

An independent commentary... Independent of whom? Of the CPSU obkom [oblast party committee]? Undoubtedly. Of a majority of the deputy corps of the oblast soviet of people's deputies? Also, perhaps, yes. But, then, it is clearly evident on whom A. Lezdinsh depends: He sings the glory of various destructive forces and, moreover, threatens the "Romanian version." He suddenly declared that Victory Day is not a holiday of the people, but of individual persons. When indignant television viewers, especially the military, rebuffed him, he changed course and tried to drive a wedge between the generals and "educated and enlightened officers."

There is a lot in the "NLO" commentator that is debatable and subjective, not only in evaluations of political and state figures, teachings, and the party. The trouble is that the television viewer at times cannot distinguish what is a reliable fact and what is a doubtful conjecture. Lezdinsh could spread an unverified rumor that someone was fired; give a damaging description, based on emotions and not supported by arguments, of a scientist who is well-known in the oblast; and carelessly quip about someone that "he is a former worker of the obkom, but he comes from a good family."

...When this material was already prepared for printing, it became known that A. Lezdinsh, not yet finished, as he put it, with his "divorce" from the local shipyard (where he was fired earlier), apparently started the same action with television after his recent removal from the direct airwaves. Despite the public's criticism, he stubbornly defends the right to conduct his kind of anti-state propaganda on state television. This kind of "alternative," of course, is highly questionable. And an independent commentary must be well-reasoned, unbiased, and honest.

Economic

IMF Aid to USSR Linked to Economic Reforms

91UF0027A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by M. Berger, IZVESTIYA special correspondent (Washington): "Our Reforms and the International Monetary Fund"]

[Text] **For several days during the past week the program for changing over to the market prepared by the "presidential" group was the subject of a thorough analysis in scholarly groups, business circles, and the official offices of the American capital. The program was submitted by the deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers, G. Yavlinskiy; the RSFSR finance minister, B. Fedorov; the department head of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Economic Reform; and other developers.**

The time chosen for the trip to Washington could not have been more fitting: It was then that people gathered from all over the world to determine the financial climate of the world. They had arrived for the annual session of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which our country has expressed a desire to join (after many years of rejection and criticism leveled against us). Will they believe our market intentions, will they find our reforms convincing, and, finally, will the developers themselves and the people who will be carrying out the market programs evoke confidence? When and under what conditions our country will become a full-fledged partner in world division of labor will depend largely on the answers to these questions, and the confidence of the reformers in their actions and, ultimately, when and at what price we will be able to pull out of our economic crisis will also depend on them.

Therefore it is understandable that representatives of the "presidential" group not only analyzed along with Western experts the program developed and discussed by our parliamentarians but also took advantage of this confluence of "financial forces" to establish informal contacts at the highest level. There were meetings with President of the Bundesbank K. Pehl, Japanese Finance Minister R. Hashimoto, and Bank of Japan President Y. Mieno, along with President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development J. Atali, Senator B. Bradley and R. Zelik, the closest adviser of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, and many others who will affect to one degree or another the answer to the questions raised above.

But from the beginning the program developed under the leadership of Academician S. Shatalin was subjected to thorough scientific scrutiny by an international group of experts, which also included economists renowned in the scholarly world, such as the economics professor of Harvard University and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences J. Kornay; the economic adviser to the Polish and Yugoslavian Governments and Harvard University professor, D. Saks; the chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Professor R. Cooper; the former Spanish minister of trade and finance, G. de la Dejesa; professor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former State Department consultant S. Fisher; IMF Fund Adviser J. Frenkel—a total of about 15 people.

It should be noted that the thorough discussion of the program was facilitated by the fact that with assistance from the Soviet-American fund "Cultural Initiative," it was very quickly translated into English (about 600 pages) and presented to the participants in the discussion in good time (with which, incidentally, according to eye witnesses, we do not always indulge our partners in scholarly discussions).

I shall begin with the fact that many complaints were made against the developers. In the opinion of J. Kornay, for example, indexation (proportional increase of incomes and payments in keeping with the growth of prices) could lead to an inflationary explosion which, in turn, would destroy the entire system of measures for stabilization. B. Bosuet, the leading scientific associate of the Brookings Institute and former adviser to President Carter on questions of wages and prices, noted that in questions of social protection one cannot give too much leeway to the local soviets. B. Bosuet thinks that they will solve problems of aid based on purely political considerations, that is, everyone will get aid and in that case the economy has a blow of inflation in store. The program should clearly determine how much social security will cost and who can claim it. D. Saks pointed out the fact that the first 100 days, that is, the stabilization period, the most important and the most critical, are not worked through well enough.

D. Soros, an American financier (cofounder of the "Cultural Initiative" fund and one of the organizers of the international board of experts), drew attention to the fact that the system of amortization measures envisioned by the program could also work against the market. Given a choice between a market risk and guarantees, even though they may be weak, many people might prefer to operate in a nonmarket environment, especially if one takes into account the administrative traditions and the absolute lack of market experience in our society. And the larger the scale of the insurance and amortization mechanisms, the simpler the possibility of using them and the greater the danger of never arriving at the market.

There were a great many disputes regarding prices and the prospects of eliminating the budget deficit. These same problems are the main subject of another round of discussions that took place in a special commission created by the IMF and the IBRD for studying the situation in the Soviet economy and introducing corresponding proposals for rendering possible assistance. About 15 experts of the commission (also armed with an English text of the program) headed by IMF official T. Ter-Mikasyan, tormented our developers even more captiously and were it not for the extremely busy schedule, from all appearances the discussion could have continued with undiminished interest from early morning until late at night.

I will not tire the readers with details from the purely professional economic discussions, the more so since it would take too much space to present them even in the most general outlines. In the Brookings Institute in whose auditoriums the academic—if one may call it that—discussion of the program took place, and in the IMF, and during a multitude of other meetings of representatives of the "presidential" group, they managed to eliminate some problems and some they did not; in some things they managed to convince the others and in some things they disagreed with them.

It is difficult to judge precisely the number of "agreements" and "disagreements" discovered during the course of these meetings and determine which predominated (it seemed to me personally that it was the former). But that is not the main thing, the more so since the points about which there were no doubts were not disputed and, consequently, did not enter into the discussion. The main result of the discussions, which are not over yet (just as they are not yet completed in the Supreme Soviet) may be the fact that, in the opinion of the majority of participants, they were actually dealing with a real program for the first time and with all its shortcomings this is indeed a market program.

Another important result of the Washington meetings is the impression made by representatives of the "presidential" group. Scholars and specialists, financiers and entrepreneurs who participated to one extent or another in the discussion of the program saw people speaking two languages they understood. First, English and second, the language of normal, generally accepted economic concepts and common economic sense, as they strove to create a normal economy in their country. And, judging from the conversations in the corridors, they did indeed make a strong impression.

To be sure, no less of an impression was made by the contradictory news coming from Moscow these days from the meetings of the country's Supreme Soviet. First the parliament is putting off making a decision on the programs for changing over to the market without showing a preference for any one of those presented for discussion. Then it actually approves all programs, which contain fundamentally incompatible approaches. As the FINANCIAL TIMES noted, such news was like thunder on a clear day and it appreciably undermined the group's efforts to convince the American public that it was about to take a large leap in the direction of a free market.

The events and actions are agitating the speakers more strongly and therefore we are not yet completely sure which program we will follow as we move toward the market, and there will not be complete clarity regarding the nature of the assistance to us and its conditions. But if one is to speak about tendencies, recently they have been developing in a way that is fairly favorable to us.

Indicative in this sense is the fact that for the first time in the history of the IMF and the IBRD, representatives of the Union government participated in the work of the session held in Washington (the delegation was headed by the chairman of the board of the USSR State Bank, V. Gerashchenko), even though, true, it was as guests. Naturally, many comments were addressed to the problem of our country's entry into the IMF. The very presence of a Soviet delegation at this forum could have been regarded as a sensation (and it is, partially), but our country has done a very great deal lately for the greatest possible inclusion of the Soviet Union in world economic ties so that each of these steps is regarded as something incredible.

An issue of ANNUAL MEETING NEWS published especially for the session raised this question in its first issue: "Will the Soviets be members of the IMF within the year?" In its commentary under this heading the newspaper wrote that now that political obstacles on the path to Soviet membership in the IMF have been eliminated, the main subject of discussion was economic problems. In the opinion of the deputy executive director of the IMF, R. Erba, the study of the application for admission will take from five to six months. They do not have the application yet but, according to sources from the IMF itself, they are working on the possibility of accelerated admission of the USSR.

The commission headed by Tereza Ter-Minasyan (the same one in which the program developed by the "presidential" group was discussed) is to submit a report on the condition of the Soviet economy by December of this year, after which it is expected that there will be an official appeal for admission into the IMF. Although, as F. Fogel, a former IMF and IBRD official, notes, if you want to avoid making a difficult decision, create a commission—such is the first law of world bureaucracy. But be that as it may, the special commission will consider the fund's possibilities in connection with the probable Soviet membership. The commission's conclusions will play a certain role also in the hearings in the U.S. Congress on questions of the IMF, which are scheduled for the beginning of 1991. In F. Fogel's opinion, the congressmen will need very weighty arguments in order to support the actions of the IMF, which could lead to a situation where the money from the American taxpayers would go to Moscow.

V. Rakov, one of the members of the Soviet delegation at the IMF session, in a FINANCIAL TIMES interview, said that the Soviet Union, with a quota of $4 billion, could count on a loan of $10-12 billion.

It cannot be ruled out, however, that the U.S. Congress might also impose some political conditions: liberalization of emigration legislation, revision of economic relations with Cuba, or significantly greater independence for the Soviet republics. Western observers think that this price might be too high for the Soviet leaders, and then there will be cause for rejection and the question of Soviet membership in the IMF will be set aside.

It is an open question as to whether political obstacles will arise again and whether they will be surmounted. And the question of whether or not we are capable of using the aid effectively and whether or not we are ready to fulfill the requirements of the IMF (in the broadest outlines they amount to conducting sequential market reforms) has been and still is the main one. And in this sense the assessments being given to our market aspirations and the confidence or lack thereof among international financial organizations, bankers, and politicians on the basis of their study of our programs and personal contacts are, perhaps, of decisive significance.

Role of State Bank Under New Law Examined

PM1110092390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by M. Berger: "Government and Bank: 'Divorce' in the Interests of the Cause?"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has approved at the first reading the draft laws "on the USSR State Bank" and "on banks and banking"—the first practical legislative acts from the package envisaged by the program for transition to the market.

It is true that it should be noted that with regard to the program itself the parliament has still not found its position but a reform of the banking system is proposed by all the programs submitted for discussion, which attests to the extraordinary importance of banking legislation. It should also be noted that each program develops in its own way the idea of bank regulation and that the Union parliament is examining the draft law prepared by the Union government. And this is undoubtedly one of the government's most resolute draft laws, since it finally suggests removing the Gosbank [State Bank] from subordination to the executive power.

And that essentially is what all the fuss is about: a dependent central bank in the state or an independent bank—what is the difference? This debate, which has been under way for a long time among a narrow circle of specialists, became a subject of attention for the broad public last summer, when the economist and parliamentarian N. Shmelev, addressing the Congress of People's Deputies, cited among the priority measures to lead the country out of the crisis the creation of a central bank independent of the government.

Why is this independence needed? To ensure that if the government suddenly decides to construct, for instance, an underground passage from Yevpatoriya to Zlatoust, it will not find any money for it apart from the money in the budget approved by parliament. But it is quite hard to admit that the majority of the Supreme Soviet might like this idea. Of course, the government should have the opportunity to implement a particular expensive project where necessary, even if it has not been envisaged in advance. But in that case it should not issue orders to the bank on the issue (printing) of the billions it requires, as has happened and is continuing to happen in our country, but apply for credits for a limited period and at interest rates to banks, enterprises, and citizens "upon receipt of a signature," so to speak, that is selling bonds and other securities.

He who prints money should not be its absolute manager or the country will never rid itself of pointless populist or simply unjustifiably expensive projects implemented at the expense of society by an executive power unstinting in its expenditure.

The existence of this simple dependence of the state of money circulation (and consequently of the economy as a whole) on the degree of subordination of the central bank is something that is obvious to far from everyone. Academician L. Abalkin, for instance, has frequently spoken of the persisting practice of some Western countries, where this subordination exists. There are indeed such examples but, incidentally, early this year FORTUNE magazine published a very convincing table under the heading "degree of dependence of central banks on the government and level of inflation in the country." According to the figures in this table, the lowest inflation was in the countries with the most independent central banks (FRG, Switzerland), while the higher this dependence, then the higher inflation.

Thus the emergence of a draft law liberating the Gosbank from the government's administration can be regarded as a very serious achievement. In general thoughtful banking legislation and an independent central bank acting on one level and commercial banks operating on another can, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Finances Minister B. Fedorov believes, became a force which will lead the economy out of its state of shock. In his opinion, the creation of a structure of economic management of the economy independent of the government, which the banking system could become, could under our conditions move reform forward from a standstill, especially as the creation of such a system is a purely organizational question requiring no impressive capital investments. But for all the merits of the proposed draft law "on the USSR State Bank," B. Fedorov believes that it is only a step forward, while today it is essential to take two steps. This switch to a new quality could ensure the creation of a USSR Reserve System—a voluntary association of the republics' central banks, a draft law on which has been elaborated by Academician S. Shatalin.

The law on the State Bank adopted for the first time in our history (until now its activity has been regulated by statute) provides for a number of important provisions whose implementation will undoubtedly serve the cause of reform. The safeguarding of the stability of a single monetary unit is defined in the draft as the Gosbank's main task. It also states that the ruble is the only legal means of payment throughout USSR territory which, under the conditions of the economy's "dollarization," which is encouraging the devaluation of the ruble, is of fundamental importance. It is true that the law also includes the possibility of using foreign currency with the Gosbank's authorization, and this could undermine the ruble's legal rights.

The draft, although it removes the Gosbank from subordination to the government, does not rule out all opportunities for financing the state debt through the purchase of securities issued by the government. In a number of currencies with very hard currency these operations are forbidden the central bank.

The banking system is the core of any normal economy. And if the discussion of the draft law develops its positive aspects and rids us of the negative ones then we have a chance of making considerable headway toward this normal economy.

Light Industry Development Plans Questioned

PM0810135490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 1

[I. Demchenko report under the rubric "On Topics of the Day": "How To Cure the Consumer Market"]

[Text] The critical situation in the consumer market is at the center of society's attention. USSR Supreme Soviet standing committees and commissions are discussing this problem.

The question of supplying the country's population with light industry goods and urgent measures to ensure the sector's operation was discussed 27 September at a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Consumer Goods and the USSR People's Control Committee.

The most important, although, of course, far from the most unexpected thing that the people's deputies and people's controllers established is that the situation continues to deteriorate. From the results of joint expeditions around Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan a voluminous report was prepared, in which the breakdown of the consumer market is described.

Let me recall: The policy of the priority development of light industry was proclaimed by the First and then the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, it was given material backing on the approval of the annual plan and state budget, and the Union parliament and government have repeatedly returned to the problem. But nonetheless as before there are no raw materials, there is no equipment, there is—as you know—no foreign currency, capital investments are not being assimilated, contracts are not being concluded, and accordingly there are no goods either. I. Gritsenko, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Light Industry, reported that in October 40 of the sector's enterprises will be forced to shut down partially or completely, and Deputy Trade Minister S. Sarukhanov added that stores in the country have started to close: There is nothing to sell.

Proposals made at the conference included seeking out foreign currency for the branch as a matter of priority, declaring the consumer market situation an emergency, appealing to the USSR president to use all his powers to impose order, drafting and issuing the necessary decrees.... It was eventually decided to put before the USSR Supreme Soviet the question of the need to do something urgently. Since the problem has already grown to such an extent that it is almost impossible to endure, there are no grounds to suggest that the Supreme Soviet will refuse to discuss it.

There are, perhaps, two main options for a solution. The first has actually already been adopted by deputies—transition to the market. But it is being dragged out for various reasons. The country now basically resembles a patient who has been promised a curative operation, and is waiting for it with great doubts and faint hopes of a miracle. But the operation keeps on being postponed; doctors conduct debates at the patient's very bedside about various methods of surgical intervention. The patient's doubts grow as he picks up information from the conversation about the possible difficulties, and hope constantly diminishes. At first, afraid of losing all vestiges of decisiveness, he says: "For God's sake do whatever you like, but make it quick." Then he starts to think: "Why not postpone the operation for a month or two? What if I were to get better in that time? And I can get around on crutches for the time being."

Our consultation is continuing all the time; therefore the danger unfortunately exists that the decision "to get around on crutches for the time being" will be adopted, that is, to return to the harsh and powerful administrative pressure on light industry enterprises, and their superior organs and subcontractors. The likelihood of this influences the whole course of discussion at the conference and conversations in the corridors. Unfortunately, because it is not immediately but only after a certain time, when the illness has gotten worse, that it will become clear that this measure cannot produce results, the time for it has passed irrevocably.

In light industry today, five enterprises have been completely bought from the state by their collectives, and the percentage that has gone over to the lease system is comparatively high. Management of the sector has been decentralized. In order to force labor collectives to fulfill the plan, which they did not wish to adopt, existing legislation would have to be altered, but it is obviously impermissible to do this, the more so for a single sector.

What can be done? First, prepare for the "operation." With the best will in the world I cannot fully share the optimism of those who think that shortages will automatically disappear following the transition to the market. Evidently time will elapse before the system stabilizes. It is another matter that the striving for equilibrium is built into the market mechanism from the beginning, and so it will come sooner or later.

But what is to be done now? The situation is indeed disastrous, and in the fourth quarter it will be worse, while for 1991 the volume of production is as yet supplied with only 60 percent of the necessary raw materials. The sector requires purchases of resources and equipment abroad, major investments, constant attention.... Deputies' vacillations are understandable: We should give, but on the other hand we have already given, and where is it all now?

Generally speaking, a tendency toward resource intensiveness, large volumes, excessive manning levels, and the expansion of the number of dependent facilities lies in the very nature of state organs. It is conditioned by the fact that they exist on impersonal state resources and not their own. That is why state organs always substantiate their requirements so convincingly. Only a parliamentary structure can counteract their natural wastefulness. Who, if not the deputies who approved the state budget, has the right to demand an answer from that same State Committee for Light Industry and from the Union and republic Councils of Ministers to the question of where resources earmarked for the development of light industry have been spent and why what was planned not been done? Of course, this is not too pleasant a procedure. But it is much more unpleasant seeing empty shelves in stores.

Coal Miners Call To Preserve Subsidies Criticized

FM1110090190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by I. Zhagel under "On Topics of the Day" rubric: "Coal: Prices and Subsidies"]

[Text] The leaders of 16 Donbass associations have issued an appeal to the USSR and Russian Supreme Soviets, the Union and republic government, and also to IZVESTIYA on behalf of their labor collectives. Here is an extract from their appeal:

"... We are concerned by the course of events that has arisen in the transition to market relations and by the fate of the Donbass mines and the sector as a whole. Owing to natural conditions and the existing price-fixing system, the mines are, as a rule, loss-making and could virtually all be closed. It is essential to preserve state subsidies for the coal sector, providing the enterprises with guaranteed supplies of the basic material and technical resources."

So, only yesterday the miners almost "brought down" the government, and today, just think, they are going to it with hat in hand. Only yesterday they were resolutely demanding a transition to market relations, and today they are fighting for guaranteed supplies and, what is more, for state subsidies—the very linchpin of the administrative command system's existence.

Understandably, a convenient opportunity arises in this instance to discredit the miners' movement and the workers' committees and to accuse them of incompetence. However, I think that the coal workers' appeal also gives us good grounds to critically analvze our own ideas about how things will be under market relations conditions for enterprises of the so-called basic sectors.

Hitherto, in all drafts for restructuring the economy, this, the biggest section of our national economy, has been viewed as also the most tightly regulated. Especially in the sphere of price fixing, which is supposed to ensure the normal development and stable working of all the other enterprises.

True, it was recognized that serious disproportions existed in the previous prices. For this reason it was proposed that these prices be leveled out, in order to eliminate the division of output into profitable and nonprofitable and to give all enterprises equal chances of making prices and implementing technical and social policy. At the same time, they were evened out by the administrative, centralized method, and already new wholesale prices for the main forms of industrial output have been projected and will operate from January 1991.

For example, prices for the coal workers' output will increase by 70 percent. Is this a large or small increase? And anyway, where did this figure come from?

It was chosen on the basis of the projected increase in other wholesale prices—for metallurgical output, machinery, electric power, and so forth. As a result of this realignement, an apparently balanced system is achieved which not only improves the material position of enterprises but also alleviates the state's burden of having to support loss-making and unprofitable industries. However, it is only on paper that all this looks good. What does it look like in reality?

According to estimates by experts at the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry, in order to compensate for higher material and equipment costs the sector's output prices should increase not by 70 percent, but by 220 percent. Keeping these prices artificially low increases the need for subsidies just to balance the books. According to preliminary estimates, subsidies have to increase from 8.6 billion rubles [R] in the current year to R25 (!) billion next year.

This example clearly shows that administrative price regulation and centralized price increases in no way facilitate transition to the market. The most likely result is that one set of artificially created disproportions is replaced with another, which only increases state budget expenditure.

To preserve rigid prices for raw materials and electricity at any cost is one of our outmoded dogmas in economics. Many countries live perfectly happily without it.

Scientific

Booster Rocket 4 Oct Launch Fails, Damages Pad

LD1110092790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0739 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Flight Control Center, 11 Oct (TASS)—On 4 October 1990, a "Zenit" booster rocket, used to orbit artificial earth satellites, was being launched at the Baykonur cosmodrome. The rocket was destroyed during the initial seconds of its flight. There was damage to one of the two launch pads of the launch complex. No staff were injured. A commission of experts is investigating the causes of the accident.

Kazakh Nuclear Fuel Plant Explosion Detailed

914E0001A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Oct 90 p 2

[Statement by B. Barchenko, Kazakh SSR people's deputy, worker of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead and Zinc Combine, recorded by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent Yu. Kirinitsiyanov: "Before and After the Accident"]

[Text] B. Barchenko, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] people's deputy, worker of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead and Zinc Combine, reflects on the lessons of a tragedy that took place in his native city: an explosion at a nuclear fuel plant (see RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 16 and 21 September 1990).

I learned about what had happened from my daughter. Calling me from Ust-Kamenogorsk, she said that there was panic in the city. People wearing gas masks and respirators were running through the streets. I reassured her as best I could. I advised her to close the transom and not to leave home. After all, I worked for 30 years in a harmful production environment.

When I started dialing Ust-Kamenogorsk later, nothing happened. Even the reception room of the party oblast committee [obkom] first secretary did not answer. They put me through to the reception room only after I called a long-distance telephone exchange using the government communications line. A secretary told me that a meeting of the Oblast Soviet Presidium was in progress. There was no other information. As far as the rest of the phones were concerned, fuses blew at the exchanges, according to the official version. When they finally switched back on, one of the activists who supported me in my election campaign managed to call me. He reported that officials, and primarily the management of the plant at which the accident occurred, concealed the true picture from the people. This was when I decided to fly to Ust-Kamenogorsk.

The data I was given by ecologist voters differed substantially from the official data.

I rushed to an extraordinary session of the city soviet. Chairman of the city soviet N. Nosikov gave me the floor very reluctantly. However, at this point I was given a letter from the workers of the Eastern Machine Building Plant, incidentally, my constituents. The people demanded honest and complete information.

One of the managers from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant poured oil on the fire. In the evening, speaking on television, he stated: There is no need to check children in the city, because even the rescue personnel putting out the fire in the center of the accident area were not injured... It turned out later that, putting it mildly, this was not quite so.

On the following day, a meeting of the city emergency headquarters was held. Certain discordant notes had to be introduced into the overall chorus of soothing voices. It turned out that the plant does not have an accident contingency plan, surprising as it may be. Indeed, Chernobyl did not teach us anything. Meanwhile, the "master" of both accidents is one and the same, the Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry. However, the fact that the ministry is imperiling the physical health of people is not the only scary one. It also cripples the people morally. I visited the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and met with General Director V. Mette. It appeared that his optimistic declarations did not reassure the people, just merely dampened their ardor.

Civil defense is a separate topic. Its representatives displayed complete helplessness once again. A message was broadcast on the radio after a long delay, and only on one channel rather than on three. Following a similar "glitch" during an earthquake, I addressed a deputy inquiry to them, but did not get a reply. Another detail: It turns out that the bulk of the means of individual protection are located in a village dozens of kilometers away from the city.

Finally, the mechanism was set in motion, if not without friction. Municipal services are washing the city and physicians are examining the sick. Finally, the Presidium of the oblast soviet made the decision to close down beryllium production. This is supposed to be a victory, but there is a strong bitter aftertaste. I foresee most powerful pressure from the mighty ministry. This is not the only thing that bothers me, though. I am afraid that the attitude toward the nuclear plant will be extended to its completely innocent workers.

The citizens found themselves in a disaster area, not only as a result of this accident, but also as a result of the long operation of giant nonferrous metallurgy and defense industry enterprise within the city limits. I propose to envisage for the citizens income tax relief and an improved supply of foodstuffs (meat, milk, fruits). To this end, deliveries to all-Union stocks from East Kazakhstan Oblast should be reduced at least temporarily. It is necessary to consider the issue of evacuating children to holiday homes and country schools.

However, this is not enough. I believe that the Ust-Kamenogorsk accident should become a stern lesson for all ministries, including "my own" ministry, the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. We should finally resolve to suspend all harmful production, and repair and adjust ecological facilities within a short period of time. Where are we to get money? Taking into account new approaches to taxing industrial enterprises, it is necessary to envisage the possibility of reducing contributions to the state budget and to superior establishments for a certain period of time. This will make it possible to allocate the funds saved for target-oriented ecological programs and reduce the probability of new catastrophes.

1957 Accident at Atom Bomb Plant Reexamined

PM1110093590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Special correspondents A. Pokrovskiy and G. Shcherbina report: "Can a Closed City Sleep Soundly?"]

[Text] As is well known, in the USSR it is not just specific documents or people, but whole territories that can be closed—that is, top secret. We often learn about this side to our life following accidents and tragedies, when the defense departments are no longer able to hold back information. The tragedy that took place 29 September 1957 at the "Mayak" combine in the city of Chelyabinsk-65 in the southern Urals was kept hidden from the people until last year. IZVESTIYA first reported the incident in A. Illesh's article "Thirty Years Before Chernobyl" (No. 194, 1989).

Here is a quotation from a report which was still classified top secret until quite recently.

"...An explosion occurred as a result of a breakdown in the cooling system of a concrete vessel containing highly active nitrate-acetate waste.... This led to the discharge of radioactive fission products into the atmosphere and their subsequent dispersion and fallout over part of Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tyumen Oblasts. Approximately 2.3 megacuries were discharged." (Some 50 megacuries were discharged following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station). This radioactive trail spread out more than 100km, affecting a population of approximately 270,000 people).

Nevertheless this event was not treated as a tragedy—on the contrary, everything was hushed up with the persuasive claim: The cost may be high, but it is the cost of a Soviet atomic bomb to serve the "cause of peace"....

Soviet scientist Zhores Medvedev, then a dissident, fell into a surprising "bracket." He reconstructed what had happened and published a book. And... accusations and denials rained down from both sides—Soviet and American. You can understand why our people issued denials. The Americans claimed that an explosion of this kind was impossible in order to protect their own nuclear departments. A commission of independent experts proved that Zh. Medvedev was right. But our country's public did not know this for many years....

However, people in the West did, nonetheless, know about the "secret" explosion. It is not surprising that the American scientists who were the first to visit Chelyabinsk-65 in the time of glasnost gave the leaders of the "Mayak" combine a photograph album containing old American satellite pictures of the enterprise and the city. Nor did the Japanese keep us waiting for a visit.... It was only then that Soviet journalists were allowed to go there, last. And that was only after the population of the southern Urals had been aroused by the news that construction had begun in the Chelyabinsk-65 area of a nuclear power station that would be "fueled" by radioactive products from the same "Mayak" combine. Widespread debate has now started in Chelyabinsk Oblast on this topic.

Time will tell whether the station will be built or not. However, the city and its population, cut off by force of circumstance from the "real world," still lead a difficult and strenuous life. "Mayak" is preparing to shut down its fifth and last reactor. It is mastering the technology for neutralizing radioactive waste by vitrification. Lake Karachay, where radioactive waste has been dumped for many years, is an open wound that is a source of concern. Its shoreline currently gives readings of 120 million (!) curies. Here is a question: If the nuclear power station intended to utilize the "fuel" here is not built, what will be done about the lake? Another extremely important issue is what the highly-skilled nuclear power industry workers are to do if they lose their production unit.

Diphtheria Vaccines Shunned Due To AIDS Fears

PM1110075990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Tosltov report under "Rumors and Facts" rubric: "Surely Diphtheria Is Not More Dangerous Than AIDS?"]

[Text] Moscow medics have noted with alarm a significant increase in cases of diphtheria infection among the capital's inhabitants.

The rise is almost double compared with last year. Nine people have died, including three children. Once a menacing and widespread illness, diphtheria has not presented a great danger in recent years. So why has it broken out again? In the opinion of experts, the cause lies in the fact that the inhabitants of Moscow are now extremely wary of inoculations. Many explain their refusal of vaccination by the fear of being infected with AIDS during inoculation and by doubt as to the quality of the vaccine.

The Moscow City Executive Committee Public Health Main Administration refutes these rumors. Information promulgated by the administration claims that the vaccine is up to the standard of the best Western samples, and is administered only via disposable syringes. The risk of fatal illness through refusing the inoculation is, medics claim, incomparably higher than that of being subjected to accidental infection with AIDS. Unlike the AIDS virus, diphtheria is easily transmitted by air or through droplets, and you can catch it from shared crockery and everyday objects and on public transport.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Coordinating Council Supports Union Treaty

LD1110015690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Information has been received that a Coordinating Council calling itself the Daugpilis Initiative was formed on 8 October in Vilnius.

It consists of chairmen of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian town and rayon councils who support the so-called new Soviet Union federation. In other words, they refuse to recognize the independence of their countries.

The Daugpilis Initiative Coordinating Council has adopted an appeal to the Supreme Councils of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania which, among other things, expresses itself against the intentions to conclude economic and political treaties between Russia and the Baltic republics.

The Daugpilis Initiative Coordinating Council consists almost without exception of the leaders of the [word indistinct] councils of Estonia and Latvia and of Polish local governments in Lithuania.

This meeting in Vilnius took place only two days after the so-called congress of the Vilnius land deputies adopted a declaration on the proclamation of the Polish national territorial land within the Republic of Lithuania.

This state of affairs was examined today by several commissions of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. They decided to submit this problem for examination at a plenary session of the Supreme Council.

Criticism of Estonian Government Activity Aired

LD1110074990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn, 10 Oct—Discussion of the agenda for a routine session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet boiled up into criticism for the legislative activity of the government headed by Edgar Savisaar.

The reason for this was a message from the government to the republic's Supreme Soviet, accusing the legislature of delaying the discussion of draft laws on profit and turnover taxes on enterprises which were presented to the Supreme Soviet by the government in the summer. The message notes that because of the slowness of the legislative body these acts cannot come into effect on 1 January 1991.

In view of the situation which has arisen the government decided to remove these drafts from the discussion and present them again on 1 May next year. In order to "gain practical experience," it proposed putting these drafts into effect "during the intervening period of its own accord."

Speaking during the debate on the government's message, Ulo Uliots leader of the Independent Democrat Faction, observed that the Supreme Soviet's legislative work is being complicated by two factors: the government's refusal to present a general concept of taxation and a "skeleton state budget", despite repeated proposals that it should do so, and also by the incomplete nature of the draft laws themselves.

Only deputies from the Estonian Popular Front—one of whose leaders is the prime minister—and the "Greens" called for the draft laws to be revoked. But they did not have enough votes and the Supreme Soviet managed to uphold its right to decide when and during what time scale to examine the draft laws. Local observers consider that the criticism which was heard within the walls of the legislature presages a government crisis which may culminate, if not in the resignation of the cabinet, then at least in a vote of confidence in its leader.

Estonian Popular Front Supports Government

LD1010140590 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn October 10 TASS—The Estonian Popular Front has issued a statement "on the balance of political forces in Estonia and the status of the Popular Front."

The statement points out that Estonia is witnessing the formation of "a self-regulating political organism, which is vindicated by the advent of new parties".

The Popular Front Council supports the government and points out that the treaties which it concluded with other states during the transitional period would remain after that period as well.

The Front urged the Estonian public to stand up against political forces which, for various reasons, hamper Supreme Soviet's activity.

Illegal Radio Station Broadcasts in Estonia

PM0410142890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 39, 7-14 Oct 90 p5

[Report by G. Guskaov Tallin: "On the Radio Warpath"]

[Text] "You are tuned to Radio Hope. We trust that the overpoliticized government and the premier so skilled in appealing to the West will make a thrifty use of the huge sum received from the empire so hateful to them.... The voluntary integration of enterprises in the integral association has been appraised by the Edgar Savisaar government as a direct threat to Estonia's sovereignty and independence, as yet another attempt by the centre to formalize the diktat of government departments under

Union jurisdiction and the state form of ownership. Edgar Savisaar has called upon world opinion to protest against Moscow's alleged intention to replace his government with a puppet government which will begin pursuing a blatantly colonial policy. What is this if not a bombastic show—of the same kind as the assult on the palace and coup d'etat of May 15 of this year...." Such talk can be heard daily: from 06:30 till 08:00 and from 18:30 till 20:00 hours. The new radio station broacasts in the 25 metre band, its transmitter having been mounted at the headquarters of a naval unit right in the city centre, near Toompea—the residence of the Republic's government and Supreme Soviet.

The new radio station announced its intentions at a press conference as early as August, "when a spokesman for Intermovement said that this would be their "mouthpiece", although the organization had lost all popularity in the Republic some time ago. Estonia's Ministry of Communications expected that this would be followed by an application for registration as required by law. But this did not happen.

"On August 29 we registered the appearance of an illegal radio station," says Valeriy Nazarov, state inspector of the Estonian Republic's electrical communications system, "whereupon we got in touch with the state inspectorate of the Soviet Union's communications system—no one had given permission there either. We took the bearings—the transmitter is in a military unit, but under existing regulations the radio stations of four government departments—the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Committee, the Ministries of Defence and Civil Aviation—are outside our competence. Yet broadcasts are by no means in the nature of confidential correspondence. In the long run, we found out that five frequencies had been allotted for this radio station by G. Kudryavtsev, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the USSR, on an application from the Command of the Tallinn naval unit."

"We favour pluralism in mass communication media," I was told by Rein Veidemann, Chairman of the Commission on Glasnost at the Republic's Supreme Soviet, "but there is a set procedure for obtaining the right to broadcast or publish a newspaper, and there hasn't yet been a single case of the Republic refusing to register any mass medium. The organizers of the new radio station evidently had no plans to announce their programme of activities, which is why they took this aggressive stance. The broadcasts over two weeks have shown that the radio station engages in direct agitation against the democratically elected authorities, sows interethnic strife and doesn't hesitate to make attacks and territorial claims insulting to the Estonian people. We see the activities of the new radio station as direct interference in the Republic's internal affairs, and documents pertaining to this are now being prepared by our Commission for consideration by Estonia's Supreme Soviet.

Papers Publish Estonian Privatization Plan

LD0610062290 Moscow TASS in English 1943 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Text] Tallinn October 5 ETA-TASS—Estonian newspapers published on Friday the document drafted by Estonian government about the general principles of privatisation which should become part of comprehensive stage-by-stage reform of property in Estonia.

The document says that chief purposes of the reform are the widening of the private sector and of the rights of entrepreneurs, as well as the limitation of the states' role in economic management.

Urgent economic measures to be implemented in three stages include the return of nationalised and forcibly socialised property, the realisation of the unused property of state enterprises, institutions and organisations, as well as of complete property of basic branches of the industry, construction, agriculture, servicing and trade, the social area and housing. There are plans for wide use of crediting and for leasing property with fixing the terms on which it can be bought out.

The document says that at present there is no need to link restrictions on the subjects of privatisation with Estonian citizenship. However, one should be registerd as an Estonian resident with a certain minimal duration of residency, for instance, ten years.

The Estonian Government will set up a department of state property to organise the process of privatisation. It will include representatives of various agencies and local government.

The privatisation is to be implemented publicly, specifically through sales or a competition. State enterprises can offer alternative programmes of their development.

The first stage of privatisation is planned to be started this year. For the second stage, the Estonian parliament must adopt the main legislative documents on privatisation. Individuals and organisations can also participate in editing the proposed concept, addressing their remarks and supplements to the Estonian Ministry of Economics till October 20, 1990.

Free Estonia Group Discusses East-West Policy

90UN2894B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 2 Sep 90 p 2

[ETA article by R. Amos: "The Search for New Solutions"]

[Text] The search for new solutions proceeded at a conference of the democratic association "Free Estonia" on 30 August, at which the foreign policy of the Estonian Republic and the organization itself was considered.

To avoid being too wordy, I will give the association's main viewpoints on East-West as well as Baltic policy.

As for the East, the main goal here is the Soviet Union's recognition of the annexation of the Estonian Republic and of Estonian statehood. Of course, to achieve this our large eastern neighbor must be ready to cooperate in the restoration of Estonia, and the Soviet Union must also be interested in continuing economic cooperation on the basis of an equal partnership. At the same time it is necessary to prevent the Soviet Union from using military force in Estonia, not to allow an economic war with the other half, and not to allow Moscow to intervene in Estonia's internal political processes.

But to achieve this goal it is necessary to take political reality into account. We must understand that the Soviet Union will be able to do without Estonia, but unfortunately Estonia cannot do without the Soviet Union. At present and for at least another 10 years the Estonian Republic will depend on the Union market. Unfortunately, it is a fact that Estonia has been and still is in the USSR's sphere of the military interests. One can assume that Russia is now the bearer of the destruction of the empire and the bearer of present interests.

In our Eastern policy we should now switch from antagonism to orientation toward concrete cooperation. We have good preconditions for achieving success if we understand that it is not just the central power that is to blame for all of our problems, but we ourselves and our inability to resolve things successfully with Moscow are also to blame. Unfortunately our force is only moral force based on historical truth and prudence. We can appeal only to the sense of justice and the conscience of the peoples. We should not overestimate the legal aspect, for in our life there is not nor can there be a court that stands above the peoples and the states. We will be able to receive support from the West only if it accepts our Eastern policy.

"Free Estonia" thinks that until statehood is restored we should participate actively in the internal policy of the Soviet Union in order to create preconditions, circumstances, and guarantees for Estonian independence. In the association's opinion, our delegation should not withdraw from the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. At the same time, participants in the conference think that we should support the aspiration to sovereignty on the part of other Union republics as well and recognize the self-determination of those republics that have decided to remain in the present Union or unite on a different basis.

To be knowledgeable of the political, social, and economic processes taking place in the Soviet Union, we should create an institution for studying the USSR. For the time being we should organize the study of the empire of socialism in our present scholarly institutions. This would help us to recognize all existing and future difficulties and problems. In negotiations with the Soviet Union we must speak not only about the growing advantage for the Estonian Republic but the advantage the Soviet Union could gain.

The goal of the negotiations should be complete restoration of statehood. Everything that could lead the negotiations into an impasse should be rejected. It is possible that a significant part of the problems related to relations between the future Estonian Republic and the USSR will be resolved during the course of negotiations between the two sovereign parties.

The Western area. It is recorded in the theses of the foreign policy of the "Free Estonia" association that the main goal of its foreign policy is to achieve the Soviet Union's recognition of the independence of the Estonian Republic. Based on this we should achieve for the Estonian Republic as a future sovereign state the status of an observer of international relations in the Western world. Estonia's global policy is seen as a clarification and recognition of the problems associated with Estonia both in Europe and throughout the world. The international community should be morally prepared for the restoration of our statehood. When speaking of Europe one should take into account that the development of our processes of democratization is regarded there as a favorable factor influencing the corresponding processes in the USSR. They want to see the Baltic area as a disarmed platform for economic invasion of the Eastern market. From the standpoint of "Free Estonia" everything else is trivial and insignificant.

Our country's foreign policy should be positive and we should look attractive in the international arena. If they do not consider us to be politically wise, they will not consider us trustworthy political partners either. And the basis of political trust is intelligence and decency.

At the conference a good deal was also said about the fact that in foreign political relations it is impermissible for political figures to exceed their authority. This is one of the most important signs of political culture. It was emphasized that we must evoke confidence as a state with a modern European way of thinking.

The Baltic area. It was accepted as axiomatic that the Baltic states will not become independent by either the military or the judicial path. There is no alternative to the political solution. We must achieve strategic and tactical cooperation among all three Baltic states. If this cooperation is to be reinforced there is no place for populism and struggle. The success of one state means the success of the entire Baltic area. Purposeful economic and cultural cooperation should be developed even more.

During the transition period there must be a center of political cooperation for resolving political issues of strategy and tactics. The Council of Baltic States could handle this successfully. Although as "Free Estonia" thinks, cooperation also requires a permanent organizational center which would be a unified information center and would prepare for the work of the Baltic Council. For example, at the present time the objective evaluation of Lithuania's experience requires a great deal of attention.

In addition to "Free Estonia" members, representatives of other parties and organizations also spoke at the conference. They expressed quite a few good ideas which could be of advantage not only to the Estonian state but to all the Estonian people.

Latvian Opposition Figures To Meet Nishanov

LD1010200490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1944 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 9 Oct (TASS)—Although the Latvian legislature has refused to participate in drafting and signing a Union treaty, opposition representatives in the Supreme Soviet of this Baltic republic yesterday left for Moscow and intend to have a conversation today with Rafik Nishanov, USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities chairman. He has been conducting a series of consultative meetings with the heads of Union republics to discuss the concept of a treaty.

The Latvian deputies of the minority faction believe that they are obliged to keep a promise made to their voters. Their election platforms contained a promise to work for a sovereign Latvia within the Soviet Union. "Our duty," they said prior to departure, "is to acquaint ourselves with the draft Union treaty and to tell the voters about it."

The representatives of the "Equal Rights" ["Ravnopraviye"] faction have taken a package of documents to Moscow. The Russian Supreme Soviet has been handed an appeal by a coordinating council set up on 6 October in Vilnius and uniting deputies of various levels from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The appeal—signed by the chairmen of the town soviets of Daugavpils, Snieckus, Sillamae, Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, and the deputy chairman of the Salcininkai rayon soviet of self-administration—expresses alarm over the exacerbation of the sociopolitical situation in the republics and the nature of forthcoming interstate treaties. It speaks of the inadmissability of treaties being signed without consideration for the views of ethnic minorities and of the actual situation that has developed in the Baltics.

Some of the documents will be handed to the leadership of the Soviet Union. One of them draws attention to the abolition of celebrations in Latvia of the October Revolution anniversary. What is more, the question arises as to whether the bodies of state power of the USSR will be able to protect the interests of those citizens who, on 7 November, a day of celebration in the USSR, will not attend work and will participate in meetings and demonstrations? Will they be protected from the inevitable sanctions for "absenteeism" by local managers?

Two deputies from the opposition faction have left for the Ukraine where they plan to meet legislators. They are also interested in finding out how the rights of the 92,000 Ukrainians living in Latvia will be taken into account when treaties between Latvia and the Ukraine are signed.

Latvian Party Publishing House Nationalized

LD0910231590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2033 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent Popkov from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The publishing house of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee in Riga has been placed under the guard of special purpose militia detachments.

[Popkov] There has been a controversy over the House of Printing, where almost all the republican newspapers and magazine have been published for a long time now. The situation here is reminiscent of a similar case in Lithuania, the only difference being that the Latvian Government did not simply nationalize the party publishing house but transformed it into a joint stock society, having proposed that part of the shares should be divided up among the former owner, that is the Communist Party, and the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines. The Communist Party did not agree to that, and as a result at its request the House of Printing was taken under the guard of the special purpose militia detachments.

Moreover, pickets are constantly on duty outside the House of Printing, and the most energetic of them have already managed to remove from the building the sign bearing the name of the former owner of the publishing house.

Latvian Deputies Object to Ending Soviet Holidays

PM1110083190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under "News of the Day" rubric: "Holidays Abolished"]

[Text] A considerable amount of space in Latvian republic newspapers was devoted to a republic Supreme Soviet session at which a law on holidays and memorial days was discussed and adopted. In this connection the SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA newspaper publishes a statement from the "Ravnopraviye" [Equality] deputies' faction which abstained from voting on the draft law.

The faction members think that "the content of the adopted law has a one-sided ideological bent and does not take account of the interests, views, and traditions of all the Latvian population." Under the adopted law 9 May, the Soviet people's Victory Day, is not considered a holiday.

In this connection the "Ravnopraviye" deputies' faction has requested the republic's inhabitants to express their attitude to the abolition of state holidays of the Soviet Union and Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], of holidays that have become national and widely celebrated by millions of people. The dates of 7 and 8 November, 7 October, and even 8 March [Women's Day] have been deleted from the list of state holidays.

Latvian Congress Demands Abrogation of Past Acts

PM0510104390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Third Session of the Congress of Citizens"]

[Text] The third session of the "Congress of Citizens of Latvia" was held 28-30 September in Riga, clarifying positions on a whole series of topical political and economic questions for the republic. Which precisely? First, the question of citizenship. The session deemed the "automatic conferring of Latvian citizenship on USSR citizens to be illegal."

The session "resolutely" opposed the "USSR's colonial policy in occupied Latvia." A special resolution indicated the need to "expose and bring to trial all those guilty of genocide against the Latvian people," including those who carried out illegal deportations. This resolution ordered that ways be found of "speeding up the voluntary repatriation of USSR citizens." The session also adopted an appeal to the republic's Supreme Soviet. In addition to the declaration of 4 May 1990 "On Restoring the Independence of the Latvian Republic," the supreme organ of power is ordered to deem invalid from the time of their adoption a whole series of legislative acts adopted in 1940, including the declarations "On State Power," "On Proclaiming the Land People's Property," and "On Nationalizing the Banks and Major Enterprises," along with a number of others.

The delegates' speeches voiced a considerable number of the now "traditional" reproaches and accusations against the USSR Armed Forces.

Landsbergis Meets With Icelandic Leaders 9 Oct

LD1010100390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1800 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Council, is on a three-day visit to Iceland's capital, Reykjavik, on the invitation of Iceland's Prime Minister Hermannsson.

A second conversation with Prime Minister Hermansson took place today.

A meeting was also held with the country's minister of foreign affairs, Hannibalsson. [passage omitted]

Further Meetings Planned

LD1010101290 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 22 Oct 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Icelandic officials reaffirmed their earlier-expressed position recognizing the right of the Baltic states to [word indistinct] which currently is not disputed in the West, either in a juridical or a moral sense. The Baltic states' position in the Helsinki II process was discussed.

Vytautas Landsbergis informed [his hosts] about preparations for interstate negotiations with the Soviet Union. Opinions were exchanged about the prospects for bilateral trade and humanitarian cooperation, as well as those concerning cooperation among north European states.

A communique was adopted following the meeting. [passage indistinct]

In the evening, Vytautas Landsbergis gave a news conference at the Reykjavik [name indistinct] Hotel. Moreover, tomorrow the Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman will participate in the opening ceremony of the Icelandic parliament.

Meetings are planned with Icelandic deputies and Iceland's opposition [words indistinct] [passage omitted]

Bickauskas Views Future Lithuania-Moscow Talks

LD1010203890 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—The Soviet Union should recognise that "it is not a mercy but a duty of the Soviet Union to restore the independence of the Baltic states," believes Egidius Bickauskas, Lithuanian permanent representative in Moscow.

In an interview with the MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY published today, he noted that "this would help generate confidence of the Baltic nations in the Soviet Union and decide all issues, taking into account the past 50 years which cannot be struck out of history".

Some groups in Lithuania have a biased appraisal of the situation in the USSR and want an "instantaneous solution of the key problems", he said.

He noted at the same time that "we should not underestimate conservative thinking in the Soviet ledership". He did not preclude a chance that "the sides will be forming mutual understanding for a long time and at great pains".

The Soviet leadership is not ready to recognise the act of Lithuania's independence, Bickauskas believes. According to him, it hopes that Lithuania "will eventually agree to sign a Union treaty, although on special conditions".

He expressed apprehension that "only a few Soviet leaders understand that it is impossible for Lithuania to be a signatory to a Union treaty".

Bickauskas noted at the same time that "there is evolution" in the minds of Soviet leaders. In his opinion, a consultative meeting between the Lithuanian and Soviet delegations on October 2 is a good example of this "evolution".

The Lithuanian representative refuted an opinion that "the Republic is dragging its feet with the start of official negotiations in order not to introduce a moratorium on the March 11 act of independence as long as possible".

He noted that the Republic stated the need to settle all questions on relations with the Soviet Union through negotiations right after the adoption of the act.

Bickauskas said at the same time that "these negotiations should be equal rather than talks between a suzerain and a Vassal".

Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium Meets

LD1110085590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] A Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium meeting was held today.

It was chaired by Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicius. The Presidium discussed cooperation between the deputies and permament commissions of the Supreme Council and the local government councils and adopted a corresponding decision. It was proposed that the Supreme Council deputies should regularly participate in the session of town and rayon councils, and representatives of local government should be acquainted with the preparation of documents concerning their affairs.

The Presidium passed a resolution on the explanation of the laws and other legal acts to the public. Lithuanian radio and television were instructed to allocate time for regular broadcasts on practical application of the laws.

The Presidium also discussed instances of insults to the deputies' honor and dignity in mass information media. Conclusions about such insults will be drawn by the mandate and ethics commission of the Supreme Council.

It was decided to hold an interparliamentary seminar 9-11 November in Vilnius, called: Postcommunist Europe—The Present Time and Prospects.

The Presidium listened to information by State Controller Kazimieras Uoka. Some other problems were also discussed.

Polish Autonomy Within Lithuania Proclaimed

PM1010140390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Dispatch by Major M. Sklyar under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Polish Autonomy Declared"]

[Text] On 6 October the participants in the second congress of Vilnius District [Kray] people's deputies ceremonially proclaimed that a new formation has appeared on the map as of now: the Polish National-Territorial District, with special status.

The congress' decision is a reaction to the fact that the problems of 300,000 Lithuanian Poles who reside compactly in the Vilnius area were ignored for many years. As noted by a memorandum on the situation of the Poles in Lithuania prepared by a group of eminent Polish scientists, the republic authorities put obstacles in the ways of Poles' obtaining higher education and are "blocking" their access to senior administrative posts....

The question of the district's young men carrying out military service was also raised at the congress. It must be noted that two parallel structures of military commissariats have formed in Vilnius area: the previous structures and the new ones, which are subordinate to the department for the protection of the region and Lithuania. Typically, very few people want to go into the Lithuanian Army. The congress coordination council has been instructed to prepare a decision on this issue as soon as possible.

'Sovereign Existence' Sought

PM1010122390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent N. Lashkevich: "Autonomous Polish District in Lithuania?"]

[Text] Vilnius—A congress of plenipotentiary representatives of soviet deputies at various levels in Vilnius district [kray] has been held in the small town of Eisiskes. It proclaimed the formation of a Polish National Territorial District.

However, it is not entirely certain that Polish autonomy will be denoted on the map of the republic. The idea of a national territorial formation is not supported by the Lithuanian leadership. However the congress, in whose work more than 200 delegates participated, still proclaimed the formation of a national territorial district on the territory of five southeastern rayons of Lithuania.

Approximately 18 months ago a whole number of village soviets declared the sovereign rights of the Polish minority. Some six months later two rayons—Vilnyusskiy and Shalchininkskiy—announced the creation of national territorial rayons. And now the logical culmination—the Polish National Territorial District.

Why have Poles begun consistently implementing ideas of a sovereign existence? I will not venture to assert whether or not it is valid, but the fact remains that Poles have taken alarm at many new aspects of sociopolitical life in Lithuania: the law on the state language which required that Lithuanian be mastered within two years; the heated debate mounted by academics over the ethnos of Lithuania's Poles and over Lithuanians; the impossibility of pushing through the idea of creating a Polish cultural center and a Polish higher educational establishment. People are also disconcerted by the likelihood of a new administrative-territorial division of Lithuania which they regard as an attempt to divide the Poles who live compactly in the Vilnius district. And the republic press has, alas, taken a hand in interethnic strife.

What has the Lithuanian leadership done during the 18-month wrestling of interethnic passions? With rare exceptions, no practical steps have been taken although everyone was perfectly well aware of the delicacy of the Polish question and its acuteness for Lithuania. Let us not forget that Vilnius district passed to Lithuania only in 1939—incidenrally as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which everyone condemns. This is why the Poles at the congress maintained that the present provisional Fundamental Law of Lithuania, based on the postulates of the bourgeois constitution of 1938, has no bearing on them.

Seeking to forestall events and at least somehow to reduce the intensity of the interethnic conflict on the eve of the congress, the state commission to study the problems of eastern Lithuania, headed by Vice Premier R. Ozolas, announced draft programs which it was said would help to remove many painful problems in interethnic relations between Poles and Lithuanians. Thus it was declared, probably for the first time at an official level, that the time allotted for Poles to master the state language would be extended, that Polish and other languages on the territory with a compact Polish population would acquire specific rights, and that maybe a Polish higher educational establishment would be created in Lithuania. But all these measures in fact came too late. The train, as it were, had left....

A statement by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium and Government, published on the threshold of the congress, once again shifted the responsibility for the "illegal and pointless" action in Eisiskes—this incidentally was said of an event which had not yet happened—onto the shoulders of "conservative political circles in the Soviet Union." The statement kept quiet about their own mistakes in national policy which had led to such dangerous tension between the two peoples. Fortunately, literally at the last moment the leaders of this commission and V. Landsbergis personally appealed to the inhabitants of Lithuania not to travel to Eisiskes for the purpose of picketing the congress—which is what a "roundtable" of certain political parties in the republic had been urging the previous day.

Largely thanks to this sensible appeal, the congress passed off calmly without excesses. The debate was heated. Several options were proposed for realizing Polish autonomy, but the chief question around which the debate ran high was this: Should there be a national territorial formation as part of the Lithuanian Republic or as part of the USSR? The first viewpoint triumphed, unanimously so. However the congress reserved the right to meet once again, and in the event of a negative response to its declaration of "independence" on the part of the Lithuanian "center," to have recourse to the second option or to other means of defending its national rights.

What will the parliament and government of Lithuania do? How will they respond to the declaration proclaiming the Polish National Territorial Vilnius District? Most likely they will declare that the congress decision does not have juridical force. Consequently, we are on the threshold of a new spiral of interethnic tension which could have unpredictable consequences.

Repeal of Anti-Polish Acts Demanded

LD1010104890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0400 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] The conference of regional delegates of the Vilnius region self-government councils has adopted a statement addressed to the Soviet and Lithuanian authorities as well as also to public opinion. The statement demands the revocation of the Soviet Lithuanian agreement of October 1939, the acceptance by the Lithuanian authorities of the status of Polish people in Lithuanian as proposed by the deputies of Polish origin, and the repeal of all the Stalinist legal acts, on the basis of which Poles were subject to mass repression (?in the 1930's to 1950's).

Soviet Armed Forces To Draft 11,000 Lithuanians

LD1010173690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2300 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Country Defense Department has obtained information that the Soviet Armed Forces' leadership is planning to draft 11,000 Lithuanian youths during the fall call-up. But the Deputy Director General of the Country Defense Department Algimantas Viatkaitis told Radio Vilnius that the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces itself did not expect to draft more than 2,500. The call-up is to begin on 23 October.

Today the so-called Coordinative Center for issues of military service held a meeting in the Vilnius municipality. The Coordinative Center—which includes MP's, members of local municipal councils, and officials of the Country Defense Department—discussed possibilities of protecting future draftees and those who had deserted their military units in the Soviet Army.

Meanwhile Audrius Butkevicius, director general of the Country Defense Department, has made a categorical statement in the state newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS today assuring that talks with the Kremlin will not start until the status of draftees has been defined in the protocol on the beginning of negotiations.

According to Audrius Butkevicius the protocol must include a clause saying that youths of conscript age shall not be induced to serve in the Soviet Army, intimidated or drafted by force during the whole length of talks. The head of the Country Defense Department pointed out that not a single youth from Lithuania who had at once refused to serve in the Soviet Army was subjected to manhunts, and only those who had left their military units were rounded up.

Lithuanian TV, Radio Broadcasting Changes Planned

LD0910115190 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Text] Two weeks ago I mentioned a session of the LRT [Lithuanian Radio and Television] board and the debate about the future of the Lithuanian radio second program. The second issue on the agenda of this session was the regulation of the political broadcasts on the state radio and television. Although this was the third such meeting, only now the final decisions have been made. The adopted resolution [word indistinct] that the present political broadcasts often lack basic political culture and tolerance and cause political tensions among the Lithuanian population. With this in mind the board has decided the following:

Firstly, the LRT rather than the Supreme Council or the Council of Ministers will decide about the (?forms) of presenting information about the work of the parliament and the government—that is, how the sessions, press conferences, and briefings should be covered. Live transmissions of these events shall only be broadcast if the issues discussed are of (?particular) significance to the entire Lithuanian population.

Secondly, all political programs will be produced and broadcast by the LRT. Representatives of all political parties and movements shall be invited to take part in these programs. Not a single political party or movement will be allowed to have its own autonomous programs either on radio or on television with the exception of the pre-election campaign, when such programs will be given the go-ahead by a separate decision of the LRT board based on the election law of the Republic of Lithuania. This decision came into force on 1 October. It was primarily targetted at Sajudis, as this was the only political organization which had its own autonomous programs. They were broadcast weekly on television and translated into Russian live on the radio. However, the last broadcast of Sajudis went on the air a little bit earlier on 5th September and the Russian translations were discontinued two weeks before.

So now LRT is supposed to be totally depolitized, although I don't really understand, no matter how good the intentions of this decision are, how it is possible at all to produce a single broadcast with representatives of (?dozens) of political parties and even a greater number of movements taking part.

RSFSR

Coverage of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Foreign Minister Appointed

LD1110093690 Moscow TASS in English 0928 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Report by TASS Parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov and Boris Zverev]

Moscow October 11 TASS—The Russian parliament today appointed Andrey Kozyrev as the republic's foreign minister.

Before the vote, Kozyrev set forth his programme.

Kozyrev, 39, is a career diplomat. He worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry since 1974. Before his appointment, he headed the ministry's International Organisations Department. Kozyrev has the rank of first counsellor. He has a candidate of science degree in history. Kozyrev is a member of the Soviet delegation at the 45th U.N. General Assembly session.

Silayev Speech 9 Oct

LD1010024190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2017 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Speech by Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers, at the 9 October session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin; from the "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Diary" program—recorded]

[Text] Since the adoption by the republic's Supreme Soviet of the decision approving, on the whole, the program for the stabilization of the economy and the transition to the market drawn up by the working group of Shatalin and Yavlinskiy, substantial changes have taken place in our society.

I am not referring to the continuing economic deterioration and exacerbation of the political situation. What I am referring to is a radical change of the situation around the program itself, of the transition to the market, and unfortunately not one for the better.

Almost one and a half months have passed since the presentation of the 500 days program to the USSR president and to the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. But the USSR Supreme Soviet has simply not adopted a decision on this matter. We do not know what it will turn out to be after 15 October.

At the same time, the events of the past few days show that, given such uncertainty in choosing one economic reform program or the other, for all intents and purposes a retreat from the principles of radical reform is taking place, the sovereign rights of the Union republics are being disregarded, and the entire system of economic relations in the Union for the year 1991 is being shaped on the basis of the old administrative and unitary principles. Thus, it is again proposing to transfer the Union state order to enterprises through directives, and as before it will encompass the overwhelming proportion of the output of the major kinds of products and goods. As you can see, there is no sign of the market here.

Thus, for instance, the Union state order for the rolling of ferrous metals is being planned by the USSR State Planning Committee at 86.1 percent output, for oil and liquefied natural gas at 37.7 percent, for commercial timber at 92 percent, for cement at 87.7 percent, and for newsprint 90 percent.

I have named those basic kinds of resources and output whose main volume is being produced on the territory of the Russian Federation.

I think it is becoming clear that in this case the government of Russia and other Union republics are being completely stripped of the possibility of implementing republican programs, even though the republican programs seek to develop the social infrastructure of the national economy.

The Union budget is also being shaped on the basis of old principles. In the first place, the task of financing Union programs is being resolved and the appropriate revenues are being determined, that is to say it is not the republics which by mutual consent determine the range of powers of the Union government bodies and the volumes of financial funds necessary for performing these functions. The USSR Finance Ministry and State Planning Committee continue to hand down expenditures which are not covered by the expenditures of republican and local budgets. It is clear that in this way we will not only reduce state expenditures, but as before we will not know the real magnitude of expenditures on defense, on government, etc. Moreover, calculations show that in this case republican budgets show a huge deficit.

Finally, the Union government again proposes keeping all foreign economic activity for itself, and hard currency allocations will remain the exclusive property of the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity. The USSR State Bank's monopoly is also provided for as before. The republics have raised the question of the coordination of a conversion program with them on more than one occasion, but their interests here are ignored as before. We only found out in the press that the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers will confirm a conversion program which we do not know about. On this account, we have sent an appropriate protest to the country's president in the name of the Russian republican government.

Thus we can make the following conclusion. The program... [applause, interrupting] Thank you.

Thus we can conclude that the Union government's program not adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet is being put into effect without prior agreement. Those in whose hands reside the real levers of economic power—the State Bank, the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, material resources, and reserves—are pursuing their policy in uncertainty.

Unfortunately, the Union republics actively participating in the work on the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy Plan and supporting it now are also forced to wait and see what the USSR Supreme Soviet will decide on 15 October, to make up their minds at their Supreme Soviet sessions. Finally, under the threat of realizing the most important stage of the 500 days program, the stabilization stage... under the threat of realizing this stage, the drawing out of the adoption of the program for a transition to a market economy at the Union level has led to the continuation of the same financial policy which has been pursued in recent times. Inflationary trends are forever receiving new impetus. Here I want to dwell on the question that was asked twice in relation to purchase prices.

We consider that a serious blow was dealt earlier by the unjustified increase without prior consultation of purchase prices on grain. As a result of this, we were forced to seek large funds on the same background of inflation to ensure subsidies on mixed feeds. The announced increase from 1 January 1991 of purchase prices on all types of agricultural products, especially meat, has led to a situation where the delivery of meat to the system of republican trade—including to our major industrial centers, northern centers, and so forth—has practically stopped.

The peasants, having understood the situation and the possibility of receiving from 1 January twice as much as they could get now for their goods, have stopped the supply of cattle. In this situation—I think you remember the tense situation when the current problems were discussed here at the Supreme Soviet—we were forced to bring forward the introduction of purchase prices from 1 Jaunary to 15 September. I think you also remember that this zone of high purchase prices ends on 15 December.

Nonetheless, this is a negative fact and I admit it. To a certain extent no account has been taken here of certain negative consequences connected with cooperative trade. A few days ago we examined that question specially and adopted an additional clarifying decision extending procurement prices to cooperative trade, that is an additional 900 million rubles [R].

Clearly the situation with regard to prices is not being stabilized by the latest decree which virtually legalizes the single-step increase in wholesale prices from 1 January on the basis of price lists drawn up by the USSR State Committee for Prices, as was also envisioned by the Union program.

With the implementation of this act, if it is put into effect the deficit in the republican budget will increase by over R70 billion. I think that many comrade deputies know about these so-called Tsinchagov prices. At the same time, no measures are being taken to tighten up financial and credit policy which is the basis of the stabilizing measures of the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program.

Does everything that has been said mean that it is time to give up implementing this program? No, it does not mean that yet. The republican government considers that the Union program adopted by you a month ago that is being worked on right now, taking account of the criticisms and proposals of the committees and commissions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the final analysis that should be implemented by it alone, will make it possible for the republic and the country as a whole to get out of the crisis.

How does the Russian Federation Government intend to act in this situation which has become considerably more complicated? Let me say right away that the main direction of economic policy worked out in the 500 days program—these are privatization, land and housing reform, the indexation of incomes, the creation of a labor market, and so on—can and should be implemented in any event, and practical work has begun in this direction.

At the same time, such measures as the reform of the banking system, the adoption of emergency measures to reduce budget expenditures, the alteration of the system of foreign currency deductions and the foreign currency regime as a whole, the reduction of expenditure on the defense program, and so on can be implemented only after adopting the union program by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It is also clear that the period of stabilization—the first 100 to 150 days of the implementation of the program—cannot be carried out in the way imagined from the start. More severe measures are required.

I will answer this question: These include a further reduction in state expenditure, and in the first instance of investment; the freezing of any small social programs; and a greater increase in interest rates for credit.

Evidently we will be unable to do without a serious foreign injection. Evidently corrections will be made to the thrust of many activities throughout the first 100 days of the implementation of the program. This pertains in particular to the income policy and some other provisions.

In this context one must bear in mind the fact that the program you have approved was worked out and submitted as a Union program, and that all the main levers of economic management continue for the time being to be concentrated on the Union level. Hence the tactic of further actions depends to a great extent on the decisions which should be adopted after 15 October.

For the time being, however, the RSFSR Council of Ministers has been working within the framework of the powers at its disposal. First and foremost, we intend to ensure a continuous monitoring of destructive processes which have been sharply accelerated. A system of socioeconomic monitoring—for which a single information network using the existing systems of ministries, departments, space communications, and other channels will be organized—is being set up in the republic. A set of parameters which must be permanently monitored is being compiled for this purpose. These are social indicators which will reveal the necessity of adopting decisions without delay.

The existing telecommunications network is in particular a very important issue since it fulfills the tasks of the centralized system of national economic management. Since we are talking of going over in a vigorous manner to new principles, extraordinarily vigorous action is essential to reconstruct the entire telecommunications system. What is also essential is that a measure of sovereignty is implemented, ensuring communications for the functioning of the market within and without the republics.

In these conditions the program provides for decentralization, for a broadening of the horizontal information flows. A large number of the new small- and medium-size enterprises requires that the number of communication points ought to be increased. All in all, it is proposed that the entire system of republican telecommunications will be overhauled. It is envisaged, by way of measures to be taken first and foremost, that the existing information systems of the State Bank and the State Supply Committee will be organized to serve the interests of the republic along with organizing information processing facilities in the RSFSR State Bank and the RSFSR Committee for Material Supplies. For the time being these resources do not belong to us. For the time being they are concentrated in the USSR Bank, the State Bank, and in the USSR State Supply committee. As you can see, here too we must do some very active work and achieve certain ownership transfers affecting a proportion of the management system being handed over to serve the interests of the republic.

In this case we shall prepare appropriate acts which will make it possible to implement our intentions. Evidently we will hardly be successful in doing it through decisions of the republican government alone. Over the next few days we shall submit relevant acts of this kind to the republican Supreme Soviet.

Investment in certain state resources to equip existing telephone and telex stations is planned, as is to bring in foreign capital to organize earmarked communications networks and communal communications centers in 50 to 60 towns in Russia. Of course it is not only internally that we have particular difficulties; internally they are huge, and we cannot function normally if we do not know the state of our markets every moment—financially, in the stock exchanges, labor, materials, and so on. But our link with the outside world is even worse. Here we have practically none at all. We have to make relevant gains here.

The attention of government bodies will naturally be given to those economic spheres upon whose normal functioning the satisfaction of the people's urgent needs depends. These are power and heat supply, the food industry, urban tranportation, communications, and some other things.

The possibility cannot be ruled out of introducing a special functioning regime in transportation and communication. To have management levers in emergency situations, we are working out a republican program for managing material reserves and stocks.

A special package of measures will be implemented in the social sphere. The aim of these measures is on the one hand to lay down a basis for a system of social guarantees to the citizens of the republic, and on the other to prevent a sharp drop in the standard of living should the situation become more difficult.

In the very near future, a republican employment service will be organized, an employment fund set up, and relevant legislative acts brought in. One particular aspect of the labor market in the transition period will be a combination of increasing demand on the part of enterprises for highly qualified staff, simultaneous with mass dismissals of people in connection with perestroyka in the economy. In these conditions the problem of organizing the recycling and retraining of staff is a very urgent one. A system for enhancing the qualifications and retraining of staff in the RSFSR, regional centers, and a network of consultancy services will be prepared in time to implement its functions in November this year.

In the framework of the implementation of the republic's employment program, by the end of this year programs will be elaborated for public works in the republic and employment guarantees will be ensured for those groups of the population who are unable to compete: women with young children, people approaching retirement age, invalids, and other categories. Conditions have been created to stimulate enterprises to create new jobs, and possibilities for employment in the cooperative and individual sector have been expanded. The implementation of the above measures will make it possible to lay down a basis for the formation of a labor market in the republic.

One of the most urgent problems remains the supply of goods for the money income of the population. The collapse of the consumer market and the worsening of social tension dictate the need to work out alternatives for fixing norms for the distribution of the most important consumer goods. To implement these tasks, the following is planned:

Determining a limited range of vitally important goods subject to distribution according to norms under strict state prices and in agreement with the Supreme Soviet of the republic;

Working out norms for goods so that they will be in accordance as much as possible with norms for the calorific value of foods and for rational use for the most important nonfood goods;

Creating a mechanism for monitoring how the goods subjected to norms are produced, distributed, and supplied to consumers;

Calculating and forming the necessary resources to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of all goods to the population in all regions of the republic;

Amassing goods resources over and above the designated norms for organizing trade through the retail network at commercial prices that will provide an opportunity to build up production and the consumption of goods;

Creating conditions to gradually abolish fixing norms as consumer goods production increases.

Here the economically profitable leading producers, republican state procurement, import purchases, and possibly a tax in kind will be the sources of the formation of goods resources. Here with respect to the tax in kind we should seriously consult our agrarian workers, including the deputies' corps. The main volume of work in this direction will be fulfilled by the RSFSR Ministry of Trade in cooperation with economic bodies and the local soviets. The period for completing all the groundwork is 1 December.

One of the immediate directions in the sphere of shaping a system of social protection for the population is the establishment of the amount of a living wage based on the minimum consumer budget. This index should be submitted to the Ministry of Labor in November. It will make it possible to evaluate realistically the standard of living of the republic's population at the moment that the program starts to be implemented, the numbers of the population below the poverty line, the distribution of the least-provided-for groups over the territory, and to work out an operational mechanism to support the different social and demographic groups and the minimum consumer budget needed for the list of goods belonging to standard distribution.

On the basis of the basket of a minimal budget one can establish the increasing cost of living for the least well-provided-for group of the population. A variety of measures are also being drawn up for maintainance of the non-ablebodied citizens of the republics. It is necessary to determine the numbers and structures of the non-ablebodied population that are below the poverty line to maximally embrace these groups with special aid programs.

Special attention in the conditions of the further depreciation of the population's monetary incomes is being paid to aid in kind—coupons for food; benefits in paying for housing accommodation, medicines, medical services; the free distribution of objects in everyday demand; and others.

In drawing up a system of social guarantees at the session, the difference in the conditions in which citizens live in different climatic zones as well as the differences in working conditions are taken into consideration. The state's guarantee to maintain the level of the population's incomes as prices rise is being ensured by a system of incomes indexes created in the republic. In drawing it up, it takes into account that 7.4 million citizens of the Russian Federation have an average per capita income of less than R75 a month, and more than 40 percent of the population are living in areas with difficult natural and climatic conditions where the cost of living is considerably higher than in other areas of the country.

In connection with the aggravation of interethnic relations, more than 150,000 refugees have arrived in the republic, and there is no guarantee that this figure will not increase. The development of the process of forced imigration dictates the need to adopt the law on refugees being drawn up by the USSR Council of Ministers. We are expecting to submit this law to the Supreme Soviet in October.

The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply for Republican and Regional Programs has prepared proposals for the resource provision of the Russian Federation's needs. The state order of the RSFSR regarding deliveries of output is understood as the guaranteed provision of supplies for republic and regional programs containing specific and achievable goals. It must also provide for resources to republican and local industries, and for other needs both of the republic and the regions, and also the creation of necessary reserves for standby and stabilization purposes.

The program which has been adopted is being implemented by means of purchases of output on the market by bodies of the republican contracting system. The republic's state order sets the delivery of output and the amounts of purchases which on the market do not ensure the guaranteed fulfilment of our tasks. The advantage of accepting and fulfilling the state order is agreed fixed prices, a reduction in taxation payments in the budget, and in part the material and technical supplies the enterprises provide in return. It is envisaged that the territorial material and technical supply bodies of the RSFSR State Committee for Supply will be transformed into Russian trading and intermediary associations, and that they will be given the right to run things in a fully economic way. However, the implementation of these proposals in practice runs counter to the Union state order system and requires a legislative decision by the republic Supreme Soviet. A draft law on the republic's state order will be presented to the republic Supreme Soviet before 15 October.

The need for rapid, coordinated, and tough action makes special demands upon executive power bodies at different levels of government. After choosing a particular plan of action, we must ensure unity in the decisions at all links in the economic management structure, and certainly in their execution. Evidently changes in the work methods of the Council of Ministers itself and the formation of a thorough structure of state bodies directly engaged in implementing the reform, right down to the rayon level, will be needed here. The main thing is to overcome the paralysis of power which is totally impermissible in a deep crisis. Perhaps one ought to make use of such organizational forms of interaction between local soviets and executive bodies that would change the duality of power which has come about in certain regions. Both in the Presidium and I understand in our republic Supreme Soviet, we are examining the question of interaction and mutual relations between legislative and executive power bodies. This is an extremely important issue. Resolving it successfully will create the necessary favorable conditions for the work of the republican government, too.

A most important area of our activity in preparing and implementing the program for the transition to the market is the preparation of a legal environment in which new economic relations can be developed. Specific proposals for the protection of all forms of ownership, for ensuring personal security and for combating crime, including economic crime, have been presented in the section of the plan by the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Regardless of how the political situation changes, new economic legislation is necessary and we must pool our efforts in the compilation and adoption of the draft laws package. Evidently at the forefront are laws which make it possible to take practical steps to change ownership relations, legislation on the budget, and taxation and land legislation. With our present complex mutual relations with the Union bodies of government, nothing prevents us from carrying out the privatization of those types of state ownership which are owned by the republic and by the public, implementing the land reform, creating a republican contract system and so on—one can continue this list.

At the same time, given the uncertain conditions in which the RSFSR economy will operate in the near future, the state orders, prices, hard currency deductions, budget system of the Union, and food fund make it more difficult in turn to define the main parameters of the economic regime of territorial and national-territorial formations. Nevertheless, during the second half of October we plan to prepare a proposal on the formation of a system of local budgets, the handing over of specific types of state property to local soviet jurisdiction, and defining public-owned facilities. Simultaneously we shall recommend the procedure for privatizing state property. Here the scheme for the working out normative acts can be as follows: the Council of Ministers prepares proposals, proceeding from the general strategy of reform; they are subsequently examined with the participation of local representatives; and finally a small working group emerges and includes experts from the autonomous formations, krays, and oblasts.

The republican budget provides for a subsidies' fund to assist individual regions whose situation may worsen considerably during the transition period to unified rates of tax deductions. Target programs will be worked out for depressed regions. A regional job placement program is envisioned. Evidently it will be on the basis of experience that has been gathered that we shall put forward our proposals concerning changes in the organizational structures of government on the local soviet level. In their practical actions the autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts can be guided by the plan as amended, the one you were given today, and can be guided by the methodological documents that will be sent out as and when they have been prepared.

Comrades, the government is currently working intensively on the republican budget for 1991. Several variants of the budget have been compiled, taking both existing and new prices into account. The president's latest decree compels us to seek a variation get a balanced budget in the new system of prices. Let me say right away that if these wholesale prices on all the main types of industrial output are introduced, the budget deficit will in this case reach R80 billion. This is naturally impermissible, and the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program put forth other ways here.

I would like to stress that in this situation the adoption of new state programs, whether investment or social, will ultimately result in the acceleration of inflation and an additional lowering of the real living standard of broad social strata. For this reason we would like to ask you to adopt a very attentive attitude to the expenditure clause of our future budget.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that to ensure the normal operation of republican organizations, the transition to a market requires additional budget expenditures—for unemployment benefits, for the indexation of incomes, and for assistance to citizens finding themselves below the poverty line. On the other hand, the budget should anticipate applying tax benefits and rebates for the provision of economic incentives, and the development of some of the most important directions in our areas—social ones in the first instance—and for the development of small-scale enterprises and farms, and for providing favorable bank credits.

The proposal of the government on changing the tax system, on the procedure for forming a republican and local budgets, and on interrelationships with the Union budget has been prepared and will be submitted to the committees and commissions of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in the coming days—well at least prior to 20 October.

One of the unresolved matters is the implementation of foreign economic activity. There has already been discussion about this here. One ought to be clear that today all the main levers of this most important area at present remain in the hands of the Union Government. Evidently here too, as in the forming of the republican budget and the state order, legislative decisions are required. We can propose integrated principles to all Union republics for changing the currency regime as a whole; for setting the proportion of currency allocations to local soviets, to the republics, and to the Union; and for payment of the USSR foreign debt.

Similarly, legal, financial, and staffing provisions for foreign economic activity in RSFSR are being studied. Prior to 20 October we shall submit to you, esteemed comrade deputies, a draft law on the republic's foreign economic activity.

One of our most important problems is training cadres for economic reform. The state committee on science and higher education will create a network of regional centers for the retraining of specialists and elaborate new programs and educational supplies. The assistance of foreign specialists in the practical implementation of some economic reform measures and the training of our cadres is envisaged.

Comrades, in my report I have dwelt on a number of negative processes which objectively exist today and which we will undoubtedly come up against in implementing the program. However a significant portion of work involves the development of a social infrastructure, increasing the production of consumer goods, provision of economic incentives for all forms of entrepreneurial activity, and much more.

We regard the adoption of three republican laws as being the very next and extremely necessary actions. These are the law on the formation of a republican budget and on the budget itself for 1991; the law on foreign economic activity, which brings with it relevant foreign currency considerations and the basis of our budget; a draft law on the republic's state order; and two decsions on the territorial supply bodies and on banks. Thank you for your attention.

10 Oct Session Reported

LD1010230190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1956 GMT on 10 October carries the 47-minute "Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet Diary Program," comprising recorded highlights of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 10 October.

The program begins with the Supreme Soviet discussing whether to begin each day with miscellaneous matters. This is put to a vote, and it is decided to move it to the end of the agenda.

At 1958 GMT deputies begin to discuss the relations between soviets and executive bodies. The first part of article four of the document is discussed and put to a vote.

At 2012 GMT a deputy asks who is the author of this document which they have been discussing for three days and which no one understands. First Vice President Khasbulatov lists the various people involved in drawing up the document. Khasbulatov calls for a vote. There is confusion as to what is being voted upon. Khasbulatov says it is the law as a whole. It is passed by a large majority.

At 2018 GMT there is discussion of the draft law on referendums. Chapter Two is passed.

At 2019 GMT Khasbulatov says the final point on the day's agenda will be miscellaneous matters.

At 2020 GMT Deputy Chairman Isayev asks about the armored cars that were discussed at a previous session and Yeltsin's planned security measures. Khasbulatov says the press reports are unfounded.

At 2021 GMT Deputy Dzhamaldinov asks about meat supplies and prices in Dagestan and about dual pricing on cigarettes.

At 2025 GMT a deputy expresses concern about the likely effect of market relations on the peoples of the North, and Yakutiya in particular.

At 2027 GMT a deputy says that the decree on power is not being fulfilled in the localities, particularly with regard to dual functions of officials in Yakutiya.

At 2029 GMT Manayenkov calls for a change in electoral law. Khasbulatov agrees.

At 2031 GMT a deputy complains about the failure to finish voting on the law discussed today. Khasbulatov calls for deputies to register. Only 56 percent of deputies are still present, which is not a quorum.

At 2025 GMT a deputy returns to the question of the refusal of the Gorkiy autoworks to make armored cars for Yeltsin and Silayev. Khasbulatov says steps are being taken.

At 2036 GMT a deputy calls for the Supreme Soviet to discuss the various sovereignty declarations that are being made in parts of the RSFSR.

At 2039 GMT Yevtushenko calls for the ethics committee to study the question of quorums.

At 2040 GMT a deputy says the Supreme Soviet must establish a mechanism to ensure that its decisions are fulfilled.

Khasbulatov then discusses tomorrow's agenda. They will work until 1700. Khasbulatov suggests that "miscellaneous" be reduced to one hour per week. This is not agreed upon. Fifteen minutes per day is suggested. This is not agreed upon either. The program ends at 2043 GMT.

Silayev Discusses 500 Days Plan, Solzhenitsyn

90UN2908A Moscow SOVETSKIY SPORT in Russian 27 Sep 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Russian Cabinet, by SOVETSKIY SPORT Chief Editor Valeriy Kudryavtsev, in Moscow: "Bitter and Sweet Fruit"]

[Excerpts] *Last Monday at about three in the afternoon a shiny and imposing black limousine eased gently into the parking lot of the SOVETSKIY SPORT editorial office. The kind which is customarily seen in the Kremlin's Ivanovskaya Square but which are quite a surprise in our old Moscow yard which we share with a neighboring synagogue.*

New times, new people. This was Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of Russia's cabinet, coming to SOVETSKIY SPORT.

He remarked upon arrival that "...I have never before had meetings with any editorial office, with any specific newspaper. This is the first meeting, so you may credit yourselves with this."

Clearly we did so.

But now, the interview with the premier of Russia.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Ivan Stepanovich, it is said in our world that at your first interview you yourself do the talking, at the second you may ask the questions. First impressions last the longest. So then we newsmen, as citizens, as people living on the territory of Russia, would like to understand you and get to know the kind of person you are. Outwardly likable, there is no doubt....

[Silayev] I do not agree entirely, I think....

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Our girls will agree with this, particularly because of the gesture with the flowers—prior to the meeting, the prime minister had taken from the table the flowers intended for him and carried them over to the stenographers' desk. So as we understand it, Ivan Stepanovich is a man of a worker persuasion. He started out in Gorkiy as a plant foreman, but since the 1970's has held ministerial office. We will put the question squarely: Does he still remember that bitter, worker fruit; does he still recall its taste or has the sweet ministerial fruit already obscured it all? That is, does Ivan Stepanovich as premier, as a man, understand why we have such sullen, preoccupied, exasperated people? How do you react to the country's pain?

[Silayev] As regards the bitter and sweet fruit... I have to tell you that once in Moscow, in the Ministry of Aviation Industry, I wrote Minister Dementyev four memos asking him to let me go back to Gorkiy, for I greatly regretted the fact that I had been so incautious as to have consented to Comrade Dementyev to leave Gorkiy and my job as director at the aviation plant. I do not believe that the director's duties are to be envied but I did not care for being in the ministry.

I tell you frankly that I was torn away from my work, from contacts with people. Some 30,000 people worked at the Gorkiy Aviation Plant, it has an illustrious history, and I was proud that I had had the opportunity to head this outfit. We built a considerable amount, including sports grounds; and for a swimming pool I like others at that time was even censured, but thanked by the work force. This was all part of my past. We even had the Polet hockey team which managed to get into Class A Group II. I did not miss a single hockey game when our team was playing. This was interesting for me, and I took no less interest in it than in production activity. And I also take pride in the fact that I worked in the aviation industry as a minister. This is difficult work, aviation is aviation. I do not believe that a minister has it easy if he truly sets about his work in state-minded fashion.

Perhaps I will disappoint you, but I am not from a worker milieu at all, I am from a peasant family. I was born in the country and lived there for 17 years until I left for the aviation institute. I may tell you the following piece of information even: I had enrolled in the Moscow Aviation Institute but did not make it, did not get high enough marks, and subsequently I left for Kazan. So I cannot say that I set the world on fire. But I subsequently had the best relations with the Moscow Aviation Institute. As a minister, I annually invested 1 million rubles [R] in it, not resentfully recalling as they say that they had once declined to accept me.

I believe that wherever a person works—be he a worker, peasant, or minister—each of us has opportunities for working responsibly.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] The first question is of a political nature about Solzhenitsyn. Do you accept everything in his letter "How We Should Build Up Russia" or not? And the second question is this: The public health is currently going under, what measures do you intend to implement in this connection?

[Silayev] Concerning Solzhenitsyn, from the standpoint of his experiences and sincerity and fidelity to the ideas of the Russian people and their history and sufferings, I believe him and consider that he deserves every support. On the other hand he could, to put it mildly, feel particular disenchantment and grievance toward the previous authorities, and they are extended to today's authorities. And when I received from him a response to my letter, to a private invitation, I was not disappointed and have not changed my opinion of him. Naturally, his long life overseas and incomplete knowledge of all that is happening in our country today prevent him, it seems to me, from shaping his views in depth and somehow helping Russia to the full extent.

I believe that were we to accomplish his return to the motherland, this would be correct and that this would help him also—from the point of view that he would be among his own people, among Russians. I was very considerably impressed by the fact that in his family he actively maintains a reverence for Russia. He is trying to raise not only himself and his wife but also his children as Russians.

Our views might not coincide, but for all that I am inclined to believe that having acquired citizenship, Solzhenitsyn would return to the motherland and could work together with us here to revive Russia and serve Russia. I would not therefore reproach him for that on which we might not agree.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] The work in question—"How We Should Build Up Russia"—contains several words about sport. Solzhenitsyn writes that libraries and motion pictures should be financed by the state, but that the state should not finance sport with a single penny—it should have only as much as it can make itself. Ivan Stepanovich, in the current situation in which we are living right now, can this be put on an official footing here?

[Silayev] These words may not be adopted by the Russian Government either right now or at all. Solzhenitsyn cannot lay claim to absolute justice, to absolute truth, nor can any of us. I regard the physical culture movement as an opportunity for the recovery of the health of the nation. After all, we now need to be talking about both spiritual and physical recovery. There could be a minimum of government support in professional sport—it has its own rules—but as far as the formation of the Russian citizen, a true citizen, is concerned, we do not believe that it is necessary here to separate this movement from state assistance, we believe that it is necessary to support it by both finances and particularly by certain benefits for those who invest money in this business—exempting fully or partially from taxes for their philanthropy the enterprises which have acted as sponsors. Philanthropy will be beneficial to enterprises, plants, and factories. If they have invested money in, say, the budget of some local sports school, we need to take a look at this and relieve them wholly or partially of tax in order that this be beneficial to them.

As chairman, I have to build up the treasury kopek by kopek, but not at the expense of the sports movement creating our citizen today. I am not a supporter of taxing all that is connected with children's physical upbringing and with the whole mass sports movement. And I will continue this policy. [passage omitted]

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] The 500 days program will be operating in Russia as of 1 October. The market will move to the forefront. It is surely no secret that this program and the market itself will deprive a particular group of people not only of power but also of appreciable earnings. Naturally, these people will erect some kind of barriers. They are already being erected, as you know. What have the Russian Parliament and the Russian prime minister saved up for this contingency?

[Silayev] First, I believe that not all highly paid persons will stand in the way. I also am highly paid and have no intention of standing in people's way. Much will depend on civic positions, on human attributes. It will all depend on how we convey the meaning and import to everyone. But I do not doubt either that the following things will happen. Dishonest people will endeavor to earn at the expense of the labor of honest people. This is the first point.

Second, 73 years of our upbringing have molded positions and our views, including a rejection of much of what the West already has. This also is no less important, it is even the most dangerous thing in my view. We are all the while saying New Economic Policy, New Economic Policy. But at that time nothing had yet grown cold, certain strata had been wiped out in the revolution, but not all. Only four years had elapsed since October

1917, and the entire infrastructure and mercantile proclivity still existed. And for this reason the organizers of that period's New Economic Policy had no problems in turning around man's world outlook. The former stratification was still alive in the consciousness.

Today of course things are far more complex. We are also truly afraid that from the viewpoint of the so-called privatization, some people will be in a rush to purchase and hoard some things. There is already talk about capitalism, and I am already being asked tough questions. I put a note in my wallet. It had been sent to me by a deputy of the Union parliament at a recent meeting here in the Supreme Soviet. "Mr Silayev! When will you remove your mask. Will you be a yes-man to Yeltsin, the splitter of the Union, just for the sake of your position." An illegible signature, naturally. I voiced the regret that there are such incompetent people in our USSR Supreme Soviet. There are three grammatical errors here. Or was this written that way intentionally in order to preserve his alibi.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Three political errors! (Laughter)

[Silayev] Thank you. This deputy most likely does not realize that by today's standards the office of chairman of the republic Council of Ministers is rated below that of a deputy chairman of the Union Government, at least materially. But this is not the point. This is also after all, we will assume, a relapse or psychological mood. From the viewpoint of psychology our task is to work patiently, even in spite of such insulting questions. We will survive this also, just so long as our Russia keeps getting better, as they say.

What kind of measures are we adopting? Well first, for those who aspire to get rich on others' labor, there are certain classical principles: profit and superprofit, and at a particular level of profitability at that, will all be part of state revenue, including for the physical culture movement. It is very important here of course to have good inspectorates and to establish a system of liability for fraud and the concealment of income. This is the second, no less important problem. But you would not push me to reveal our secrets. The sooner a secret is revealed, the earlier those who like to defraud the state will make preparations, and it will then be more difficult for us to realize these principles.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Ivan Stepanovich, I meant the people currently in office who will put up obstacles in every possible way. You wanted to obtain a Russian television channel but did not, although Moscow is the capital of Russia.

[Silayev] Very well. I understand. Well for a start, we removed all ministers in the Russian Government. They may well have been good people, but could have hindered us because of their old principles and views. We did this and things have become easier. And in order that we not be impeded, as they say, from outside there is the Declaration on Sovereignty. The Russian Government should avail itself of it. We are in fact counting on this.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] We are continually asking about the same thing, about the health of the people. Rather the ill-health of the people and the absurd symbol of it—23 kopeks from the republic budget per capita. Could you not formulate here what the government, the Council of Ministers intend to do to extricate the people from the crisis? I understand that you might be referring to Machuga [nominated to be Russian minister of sports] and his activity. If he makes it, he will certainly begin to pull us up. But what kind of strategy does the Council of Ministers have on this score?

[Silayev] I did not intend to refer to Machuga. I have already said what I think about him. If you expect me to put piles of gold for the sports movement in this year's budget, I have consequently embarked on the wrong business. We will very soon be having to solve such problems as, say, unemployment. And there will be no getting this money from anywhere or anyone. We need such money in the budget to finance programs for the payment of unemployment benefits. Unemployment is essentially appearing already, but the unemployed are currently without rights. We will have much expenditure connected with particular costs of the first year. Nonetheless, I promise that in our laws encouraging one sphere of activity or another and the main driving force of society—the producers of all material and other assets—we will invest encouragement for support for the sports movement.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Do you have bodyguards or not? We were visited prior to our meeting with you by World Chess Champion Kasparov. He has bodyguards....

[Silayev] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin assigned me two young men just two weeks ago. They hamper me, and generally speaking, I do not care for this business. But since the chairman of the Supreme Soviet has so decided, I am forced to agree. [passage omitted]

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] What side are you on in respect of the unity, union nature, and sovereignty of the republics?

[Silayev] You know that Russia, the leadership... I refer to the congress, the Supreme Soviet, and the government... we support the Union for all that. Naturally given the preservation and revival of our sovereignty. We support a single Union currency, we support a common foreign policy, and a number of other functions should be Union functions. [passage omitted]

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] You have said that you share the idea of the preservation of the Union in the structure which it has now....

[Silayev] No, I did not say that, but please continue....

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] ...Solzhenitsyn writes in the reflections mentioned today that 12 republics will depart this Union—whether we try to hold them or not. Three will remain—Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine or Russia Minor. And he says that such a Union is historically logical—with what would you take issue? And a second question. Obviously the Russian Parliament has now adopted a hard line position toward the Union Parliament. What is the explanation for this? A desire of Russian members of parliament to defend their sovereignty?

[Silayev] Well, as far as the Union is concerned I apologize, I did not in the least mean that both our parliament and government support the preservation of the existing structures. After all, it is precisely on the grounds of our approaches to the new principles of this structure that there has been certain unpleasantness. We are being criticized, by the president included. We mean that it is only on the principles of economic union that it is possible today to hold on to the evolved Union of Soviet Socialist—there is now an argument as to whether these are states or republics, it is true. The republics have declared their sovereignty and have called themselves sovereign states. When we speak about the Union, therefore, we proceed from the principles of the sovereignty of Russia, but considering the economic and profound ties of practically all the republics, we consider it impermissible that our society be allowed to disintegrate.

Serious processes of political disruption are under way—this much is clear. And it was not we who initiated them, I have already spoken about this. We wish by our program to hold on to this Union, not by force but by economic advantage and good sense. And we will succeed if only because we have today prepared economic agreements with all republics. Even Estonia, which did not take part in the elaboration of the program, has agreed with the plan of economic union.

So all the republics are agreed that it is necessary to keep our Union together on an economic basis, although there could be different political structures. It is on this that we are counting and building our fundamental line of activity.

You know that Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia were right from the outset a kind of basis and structure which was subsequently enveloped by and transformed into the Union. But you know that speaking of political guarantees is very difficult today. After all, it is not simple political processes which are under way in the Ukraine. They are very complex in our republic also. But not simple there either. And many voices of all kinds are being heard there also about secession not only from the Union but also about separation from Russia.... It is therefore even more particularly important to say here that we and the Ukraine have such profound economic ties that breaking them in order to separate.... This is inconceivable. It would mean throwing the economy of everyone, us included, even further back.

Yes, concerning the hard line positions of the Russian Parliament, I would say on the one hand they ensue, for all that, from the actions of the center, by force of inertia. Heed is not always paid to our sovereignty, not from reluctance even but because traditional policy is being employed. You know this—first centralization, then distribution to us from the Union pot. We want, as do you too and the Russian people, all that we create and all that we earn in the republic, we want a substantial part of this amount to go toward satisfying the requirements of the Russian people. This is what we will defend. It is in this soil that the seriousness of the contradictions is heating up.

We have increasingly less time left on the trust which has been allotted us. This can only be regretted. Of course we react painfully to all indications of an encroachment on the proclaimed sovereignty. For this reason we would like now for this period—three weeks—to pass as quickly as possible. Good sense will prevail, I believe, and the program will be adopted. And we will then be satisfied that we are adhering to the positions of Russian sovereignty. [passage omitted]

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Be so good as to say one or two words about your family.

[Silayev] Mine is a good family. I have good boys. Both play tennis. The younger one is my partner. He works in the Mathematics Institute and is preparing to defend his thesis—this is his fourth year as a graduate student. He does not earn much—R150 to R160. Of course we help as best we can. My eldest son is a doctor of technical sciences. He also plays sports a little. But he has two boys. A grandson was born recently. I have a granddaughter. Now that I have a grandson, I am a wealthy man. For this reason he has given up sport somewhat. [sentence as published] My wife has a medical education, but she is now retired on pension. She is the same age as me. And in a month I will be 60.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] I returned yesterday from your Nizhniy Novgorod and two pictures came together in my eyes. I recalled from Gorkiy's "Mother": the whistle drove sullen, preoccupied people to work. You do not hear that whistle in Nizhniy now, but you look at the people: sullen, preoccupied.... Ivan Stepanovich, how far off is the time when the great Stalin words: "Life is better, life is happier..." will finally come to be. (Stir in the hall)

[Silayev] The 500 days program will stabilize the country's economy. And who will be living in what way then is a special question. Much will depend on who shows what he can do and how in market relations: from the viewpoint of self-sufficiency, enterprise, responsibility, and discipline. Whoever gives all that he can give in order to earn commensurately, consequently he will be happier, some other people not very happy....

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Is it true that the plant, when you worked there, called you "Ivan the Terrible"? (Stir in the hall)

[Silayev] I do not know why, but they did.... This made an impression on me. The Terrible was, after all, a founder of the Russian state. This is pleasing. But that I was some kind of ferocious person.... I have never raised a hand even against my sons.

When I became minister, they called Dementyev "Peter the Great" and me "Ivan the Terrible."

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] Do you go to see hockey in Moscow?

[Silayev] I do not have enough time, I watch it on television.

[SOVETSKIY SPORT] But Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev went, if you recall....

And how did it all end for him?

Economics Minister Interviewed on Foreign Aid

PM0510133890 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No 18, 28 Sep-4 Oct 90 p10

[Interview with RSFSR Economic Relations Minister V. Yaroshenko by L. Telen—place and date not given]

[Text] The Soviet Union cannot solve its problem behind an economic iron curtain, but only in co-operation with foreign businesses, according to Viktor Yaroshenko, Russia's new Minister of Foreign Economic Relations.

In an interview with MOSCOW NEWS he said: "We cannot do without foreign aid and I don't feel ashamed to admit it.

"Virtually all countries whose economies have collapsed have been put back on the rails by a worldwide effort. Just think of Japan Germany and South Korea."

The Russian parliament was the first to adopt the radical Shatalin plan for switching to a market economy. The largest Soviet republic is prepared to press ahead with reform while the central government is drafting an all-Union economic pact.

Mr Yaroshenko even envisages the possibility of the Russian cabinet seeking extraordinary powers from the republic's parliament should the federal government impede Russia's radical reforms.

Russia's confidence stems, among other things, from the fact that it is the only Soviet republic capable of repaying its share of foreign debt.

One of the crucial ways of easing the burden of the external debt and rebuilding the economy is getting foreign businesses interested in co-operating with Soviet enterprises, Mr Yaroshenko said.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Foreign businesses were interested even before: we sold our resources to them in exchange for low quality consumer goods and second-rate foodstuffs. Do you intend to exploit the same interest?

[Yaroshenko] No one will believe me if I say that we will stop exporting raw materials tomorrow. We desperately need massive supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods to stablise the internal market in the first 100 days of the 500 envisaged by the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy programme.

But during the same 100 days we will begin to restructure fundamentally our foreign economic policies.

[MOSCOW NEWS] How can you do that in the absence of competitive Soviet goods?

[Yaroshenko] Trade is just one of the spheres of foreign economic relations. We are counting on new forms of co-operation.

[MOSCOW NEWS] But what incentive is there for foreign businesss to run risks? Political instability and half-hearted economic reforms have scared off even our long-standing partners.

[Yaroshenko] That is true. I should like to point out, however, that political changes in the Rusian Federation and the radical economic policy it has declared are viewed favourably by our potential partners.

We must promote competition on the domestic market. Even if our citizens are prepared to invest their liquid assets in production facilities, this will still leave the bulk of our fixed assets (worth about two trillion roubles) in the hands of the state. Consequently, the state monopoly will continue.

What can be done about it? Ten to 15 per cent of state-owned property can presumably be sold to foreign companies. Primarily factories that are unable to operate on their own and sites not earmarked for housing.

Another option is concessions. We have lots of opportunities in this area. Why shouldn't we lease areas of burnt forest to foreigners? We lose 5-7 billion convertible roubles nannually because we do not know how to use burnt wood ourselves. We could also lease abandoned farmland on a longterm basis, provided the foreign companies agree to grow farm produce there.

It's not just to get more ready cash. Whatever is to be produced by concessions or grown on the leased land will add to our wealth. The goods and provisions will be ours. The nightmarish prophecies of certain politicians about the "imperialist sharks" exporting our soil by the trainload are absurd. We intend to allow foreign companies to reinvest their rouble profits, too.

[MOSCOW NEWS] How can you make all these plans while the land and forests are controlled by local soviets?

[Yaroshenko] Show me a local council that spurns profit. The hard currency earned through foreign deals will not be appropriated by the ministry.

Generally speaking we do not intend to interfere with grass-roots foreign economy. The main agents will be the local councils and enterprises. all foreign currency proceeds will be retained by the seller, subject to taxation by the all-union and Russian governments, which should not exceed 40 per cent.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Are you sure that industries will not just export their raw materials or goods badly needed on the domestic market?

[Yaroshenko] The ministries are there to regulate such activities and to lay down the rules of the game. There are taxes, of course. Taxation ought to stimulate the export of processed goods rather than raw materials. The greater the amount of processing and labour required to produce something, the lower the hard currency tax will be. Similarly, customs duties can make the export of goods badly needed on the domestic market unprofitable. On top of that, there are licences and export-import quotas to be fixed by our ministry.

[MOSCOW NEWS] You have already been doing that, as far as I know.

[Yaroshenko] Yes, we have issued one of the first licences to the Istok Company, headed by Artem Tarasov, for the sale of petro-Chemical waste, which we cannot reprocess and normally dump on land or at sea. The consequences of such barbarity are evident.

[MOSCOW NEWS] While delegating authority down the line, the government has to retain responsibility and guarantee the trustworthiness of Russian businesses to their foreign partners. Aren't you worried that the taxpayers might have to pay heavily for the small risk that our entrepreneurs will be taking?

[Yaroshenko] I hope not. The Russian government will borrow hard currency and distribute it to enterprises, companies and associations that really need it. In cases of misuse we shall fine the culprits severely. We do not intend to grant imported equipment or goods free of charge.

[MOSCOW NEWS] You seem to be determined to pursue a perfectly independent course. But there is an all-Union government, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, plus the State Commission for External Economic Relations. Are you prepared to co-ordinate your authority with the rights of those agencies?

[Yaroshenko] We are not going to get involved in a tug of war. The division of functions will come about naturally. At the first stage we will ask all enterprises—including those subordinated to the all-Union ministries—to pay a hard currency tax to the Russian budget.

We hope for an early conclusion of the all-Union economic pact, which is expected to show who is responsible for what in particular the Soviet Union's foreign debt.

The Russian Federation is the only Soviet republic capable of paying its share of that debt under any formula. The forthcoming Union treaty is bound to clear away all uncertainties.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Are you sure your ministry can make do with the rights you've got now in the absence of an all-Union economic pact?

[Yaroshenko] I'm not sure. We must make do with what we have. Frankly, we must do better than that, because the success of this first critical stage of the 500-day programme depends primarily on our foriegn trade activities. Both the left and right wings are fully aware of that. Therefore I can understand the support of the former, and the fierce resistance of the latter.

We have already begun negotiations with the countries in the Pacific rim that were previously neglected for ideological reasons. They are ready to deliver cheap high-quality goods. We have signed a $600 million protocol of intent with South Korea. Negotiations with Hong Kong and Singapore are under way. We are busy licensing export-import operations, fixing quotas and accrediting foreign companies.

If the USSR Government continues to obstruct the radical reform I will not exclude the possibility of the Russian cabinet seeking extraordinary powers from parliament. Otherwise, we might have to choose between observing the old laws and meeting the demands of the new times.

Party Secretaries Consult Experts on Economy

PM1110081590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Consultation With Experts"]

[Text] A meeting between secretaries of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee and social scientists and specialists from a number of USSR and RSFSR central economic departments held 4-5 October discussed problems of the switch to market relations and the main planks of the RSFSR Communist Party's socioeconomic policy.

During the frank debates, diverse and at times diametrically opposed viewpoints were expressed on questions of economic development and on ways to ensure stability and society's entry into the market. Particular attention was paid to the place of labor collectives in the system of production relations which are being reformed, to constitutional guarantees of social protection for working people, and to an increased role for local soviets in developing self-management of territories. The need to inform the population extensively about all aspects of the switch to a market economy and to publish and discuss alternative variants of economic programs was stressed.

In the opinion of most speakers, the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee must define its position in relation to various programs more expeditiously and more precisely and put Communists in the picture about documents discussed in the Union and Russian Supreme

Soviets. Participants in the meeting favored the active involvement of the party's intellectual potential in working out the strategy and tactics of the RSFSR Communist Party's activities.

The speeches showed a constant awarness of the urgency of adopting a range of measures to stabilize the economic situation in the country and restoring broken economic ties.

The participants in the meeting recognized the importance of continuing to elaborate the socioeconomic sections of the main areas of the RSFSR Communist Party's activities, taking the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress as a guide.

Taking part in the exchange of opinions were members of the CPSU Central Committee and RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, Communist people's deputies from Russia, press representatives, and party staffers.

RSFSR Unions Congress Resolution on Unity

904D0241A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Sep 90 p 1

[Resolution of Russian Labor Unions: "FNPR: For Unity of Action"]

[Text] **The decisions adopted by the constituent congress of Russia's labor unions are introducing qualitatively new trends to the country's union movement. We publish a resolution of the constituent congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] labor unions on the unity of the country's union movement.**

The radical renewal of all aspects of the life of our society has led everywhere to an understanding of the historical inevitability of the creation of a Union of sovereign states uniting on a voluntary and equal basis, given the signing of a Union treaty. Similar processes are occurring in the country's union movement also. The formation of union structures on new, democratic principles has begun. The RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions [FNPR], the Georgian Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the Lithuanian Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Estonian Central Trade Union Alliance, and the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Federation of Independent Trade Unions have been formed in the current year.

At the same time the working people of our country understand full well the need for the preservation of unity of action of the trade union centers of sovereign states and sectoral Union federations. Under the conditions of an all-Union economic market with a diversity of forms of ownership and types of employers, only the united and coordinated actions of the unions will help defend the working people's rights at the time of the solution of such problems—which are becoming internation problems—as the price of manpower and migration, employment and all-state programs pertaining to stimulation of the creation of jobs, social safeguards and pensions, and so forth.

The elaboration of a common position and common strategy of the country's unions in the world trade union and workers movement, and participation in the activity of the International Labor Organization and other institutions of the UN system, remains no less important.

On behalf of the member organizations of the FNPR, our constituent congress declares that the unions of the Russian Federation firmly support the need for the formation of a strong, authoritative, and efficient trade union center of the country and the strengthening of the unions' unity of action.

The seriousness of the situation in the country, the stage of transition to the market that is just beginning and which will be difficult for all, and the socioeconomic difficulties that will be inevitable for the working people require of the unions the highest responsibility, a balance of word and deed, and a search for prudent compromise in the formulation of a common position in defense of the working people's vital interests. We propose the immediate commencement of the formation of a single union center of the country on a fundamentally new basis.

The model of a new union trade union center proposed by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Eighth Plenum no longer, it would now seem, corresponds to the new realities of the situation which is changing rapidly in the country and the union movement. The three-tier composition of the highest directive bodies—Central Council, Presidium and elective Secretariat—essentially repeats albeit under a new sign the present cumbersome structure of the union hierarchical ladder from the pinnacle of which, as before—following countless meetings—directives, instructions, and orders would flow to the primary organization.

The congress deems it impossible to agree with such principles and instructs the FNPR Council to embark immediately on consultations on this question with the trade union centers of the Union republics and sectoral trade union federations (councils, committees).

The congress proposes that the country's trade union organizations examine as an alternative the principles of the composition of the trade union center elaborated by the FNPR Council. The functions of the elective body operating between all-Union trade union congresses here could be performed by a small coordinating council which would be formed from an equal number of representatives from each member organization, meet as necessary, and adopt decisions on the basis of consent. An Executive Committee composed of the chairman of the confederation, his two deputies, and the leaders of the trade union center's standing commissions will be formed for organization of the business of an apparatus of experts, consultants, and specialists of the minimum numbers and the exercise of day-to-day representative, coordinating, and protocol functions.

The congress expresses confidence that the creation of a Union trade union center on the basis of which we propose will put an end to the omnipotence and diktat of the unwieldy trade union apparatus, lead to a genuine consolidation of the country's trade union movement, and permit the coordination of the member organizations' concerted work in the name of the interests of the working man.

RSFSR, Turkmenia, Kirghizia Sign Agreements

PM1010134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Documents Signed"]

[Text] Agreements between the Governments of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Turkmenia, and Kirghizia were signed in Moscow 9 October.

The agreements envisage in particular that reciprocal deliveries of output will be maintained in 1991 at not less than the 1990 level and that measures will be taken in future to equalize the level of such deliveries on an equivalent basis.

It has been decided that the conclusion of contracts and the signing of agreements or protocols on definite fields of economic and cultural cooperation are to be completed by 1 November 1990.

The agreements were signed by I. Silayev, Kh. Akhmedov, and A. Dzhumagulov, chairmen of the republics' councils of ministers.

The agreements have come into force.

Politburo's Shenin Attends Moscow Party Plenum

PM1010115790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Working People's Interests Are the Criterion"]

[Text] A 5 October Moscow CPSU Gorkom [city committee] plenum voiced serious concern at the political and socioeconomic situation which has taken shape.

After discussing the report by Yu.A. Prokofyev, member of the Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Moscow party gorkom, the plenum participants pointed out that crisis phenomena are building up constantly in the country and the city.

The CPSU gorkom deems it necessary to transfer part of the state property to labor collectives free of charge.

The plenum participants urged Communists and all Muscovites to participate in the festive demonstration in Red Square 7 November.

O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in the plenum's work.

Sverdlosk Food Crisis May Prompt 'Extreme' Moves

LD1110032490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] The risk of a worsening of the public and political situation in Sverdlovsk Oblast, caused by the breakdown of the consumer market which our correspondent has reported on more than once, has forced the people's deputies at a session of the oblast soviet today to adopt a statement to send to the USSR president and the Union and republican governments.

The specific character of Sverdlovsk Oblast, where heavy industrial and defense industry enterprises are concentrated; the centralized allocation of production; and the low proportion of agricultural output do not allow our need for food to be satisfied. Today there are shortages of all foods here. The chronic shortage of food is felt by children's preschool institutions, hospitals, and workers' canteens at factories determining the economic stability of the country's economy. At the same time the people of the Urals, overcoming failures in material and technical supplies, are fulfilling their contract deliveries to other areas. The people's deputies have demanded the adoption of extreme effective measures to guarantee the oblast food in the quantities determined by government decisions.

If this is not done within a week, the statement says, the oblast soviet of people's deputies reserves the right from 1 November to use extreme measures to defend the interests of the population, including halting deliveries of industrial production and raw materials produced in Sverdlovsk oblast.

The document adopted at the session, which has been sent to the central newspapers, stresses that this is a forced extraordinary measure aimed at defending the electorate's interests.

Western Republics

Belorussia's Kebich Criticizes Union Leadership

LD1010195290 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Palchevskiy]

[Text] Minsk October 10 TASS—Belorussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich heavily panned the activities of the all-Union leadership in an address to the special session of the republican parliament here.

Talking about the programme for the transition to market relations that is being debated by the session, he lashed out at a decree by the Soviet president on priority measures to switch over to a market economy.

Kebich noted that the decree provides for sharp price hikes on fuel and other raw materials, leaving prices for end-products at the same level.

According to the prime minister, this will lead to a considerable decrease in budget revenues and a growing deficit for Belorussia, the economic potential of which is based on the development of engineering and instrument-making.

He stressed that if arguments by the Belorussian Government are not taken into account, it will reserve the right not to fulfil items of the presidential decree concerning price formation.

Kebich also criticised Moscow's action programme for the near future and the concept of an all-Union treaty.

The republic must now be confident that functions it delegates to Moscow will be fulfilled efficiently and with the Republic's constant participation, the prime minister stressed.

The Belorussian version of the transition to a market includes the distribution of land to peasants for life-long possession without the right to sell it, the privatisation of small and medium enterprises and the establishment of joint stock enterprises and companies and a republican banking system.

Kebich Interviewed on Transfer to Market Economy

LD1010090490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Excerpts] An extraordinary session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet opened in Minsk today. The main question on the agenda is the program for economic reform in the republic. Our correspondent Petr Mokritskiy invited Vyacheslav Frantsevich Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, to the microphone:

[Begin recording] [Mokritskiy] Vyacheslav Frantsevich, are we repeating what has already been worked out in the Union legislature, or is this primarily a Belorussian way of transferring to the market?

[Kebich] We have not rejected all the good work which has been done both in the Union legislature and other groups, but I have to say that, as I have already indicated in the speech I made, not everything which has been worked out suits us. This is because neither the structure of our Belorussian republic nor the conditions from which it is starting made it possible to apply what has been worked out in other Union republics and in particular in the Union legislature. Therefore in the region of about... [Kebich changes thought] there are about 20 features that are most distinctive, perhaps a bit less or more—it is difficult to say at the moment. There are some which concern only the Belorussian way to the market.

[Mokritskiy] Here at the session today we have heard many points and particulars about this transfer, both in your report and in the speeches of the deputy chairmen of the Belorussian Council of Ministers. But still, let us name the main thing. What would you single out as...?

[Kebich, interrupting] There are many main things. But first, the most important thing is what I spoke of in my report, the fact that we must not in transferring to the market connect this question, the transfer to the market, with a general increase in prices. Second, we think that if today's confused credit and finance system in the Union does not work, if there is no common market, if there is no Union treaty, that means that we will be forced to adopt our own monetary unit. Third, we are in favor of all enterprises without exception being the property of the Belorussian people, including defense enterprises in particular. As for those sectors that are involved in defense, they must place their orders at these enterprises on a contractual basis. Yet another feature is that in our view both railway and pipeline transport should also be either Union republican property, individual associations, or in the final analysis belong only to the republic. We also defend the view that it is necessary to have one's own system for training cadres because to count on someone else to train our cadres for us when today there is virtually no such possibility at all—we also take this on ourselves.

[Mokritskiy] In your report you named a period of two years. This is more than was foreseen, let us say, in the Shatalin program. But what do you think—will we manage in that time to overcome the negative crisis phenomena of the republic's economy?

[Kebich] [passage omitted] If the people do not see an improvement it means that no kind of program will work. [end recording]

Republican Leaders on Belorussian-Kazakh Accord

LD0610090190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Report by Minsk correspondent Petr Maklitskiy on Belorussia-Kazakhstan cooperation accord with recorded remarks by Belorussian Council of Ministers Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich and Kazakhstan Council of Ministers Chairman Uzakbay Karamanov]

[Text] At a meeting in Minsk today, leaders of Kazakhstan and Belorussia signed a statement and a bilateral intergovernment agreement. Specific areas were mapped out for economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two republics.

Here is a report by Petr Maklitskiy, our Minsk correspondent:

[Maklitskiy] Priority mutually beneficial cooperation was mapped out at today's meeting in Minsk. In this matter, both sides proceeded on the basis of the economic potential possessed by Belorussia and Kazakhstan.

Immediately after the signing of the cooperation agreement between the two republics, I interviewed Vyacheslav Frantsevich Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers.

[Begin recording][Kebich] All of you are well aware that Kazakhstan is a grain producing republic while we are a republic importing grain. Therefore it is very important for us to have stable, good, relations. This guarantees that we shall always have grain, and therefore bread. If 1 million tonnes of grain are supplied to us in excess of the state order, this is a very significant figure, very significant in relation to the 6.5 million tonnes that we have most frequently had and a very significant addition to our bread table.

[Maklitskiy] Belorussia, of course, must in turn supply its own output.

[Kebich] The output for our part will be tractors and motor vehicles, if one considers major output from the technical production point of view, as well as consumer goods, of which there are still too few in Kazakhstan. In addition, on the basis of nonferrous metals such as aluminium and others, we will create joint production facilities. In view of our technical potential and the available manpower potential there, plus the raw material resources, we will begin functioning in this regard. We will in general think about the possible creation between Belorussia and Kazakhstan of a kind of association. [end recording]

[Maklitskiy] Here is what Uzakbay Karamanovich Karamanov, the chairman of the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers, had to say when I asked him about the effectiveness of direct contractual links.

[Begin recording][Karamanov] I assess them very optimistically. I think that the agreement that has just been signed will benefit both Belorussia and Kazakhstan because we are not only preserving our existing links, but are indeed increasing them, not just in monetary terms but also with regard to quality. [end recording]

Belorussian Bid for UN Aid to Chernobyl Viewed

PM0910140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Mikhail Shimanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Belorussia Seeks UN Aid"]

[Text] Minsk—In his speech at the UN General Assembly session, the head of the Belorussian Government proposed adopting a special resolution in connection with the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

The day before a group of UN staffers headed by Gerald Hinteregger, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, visited Belorussia. They are studying the situation in order to work out recommendations regarding the elimination of the aftermath of the disaster, whose resolution requires the involvement of the international community. Special attention has been devoted to supplying the afflicted areas with the latest medical equipment, medicines, and baby foods.

IZVESTIYA has already reported that this summer the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet declared the republic a national ecological disaster zone. How has the United Nations reacted to this decision adopted by the Belorussian parliament? This question was put to the group leader. Hinteregger replied that this is a new question for the United Nations, and this means that it has not yet worked out a concept on how to react to a decision of this kind.

Belorussian newspapers published the speech delivered at the 45th UN General Assembly session by V. Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers. In particular, the head of the Belorussian Government said that a special UN resolution must be adopted reflecting the understanding of the planetary nature of the Chernobyl disaster and formulating steps to coordinate the actions to be taken by specialized establishments within the UN system to overcome the global and localized consequences of the disaster. V. Kebich also proposed transferring the Belorussian SSR from the category of donor country to the category of recipient of UN technical aid for the reconstruction period.

'Serious Problems' Hamper Moldavia Army Call-Up

LD0910122290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0556 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev, 9 Oct (TASS-Moldova-PRES)—Military commissariats trying to implement the call-up to the ranks of the Soviet Army from the Moldova [Moldavia] SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—a republic in the southwestern USSR—are experiencing serious problems. A decree of the President of Moldova has cancelled acts of USSR legislation in the republic on compulsory military service and envisaging criminal charges for those evading it. A decision by the Moldova Supreme Soviet has pledged the government of the republic to hold talks with the USSR Government on Moldovans performing their military service on Moldovan territory and also to study issues involved in setting up national military units.

The leadership of the military council of troops in the southwestern sector has appealed to those liable for call up, to servicemen's parents, and to the republic's people's deputies. The appeal says among other things that the suspension of the all-Union law "on universal military duties" and of several other acts of legislation and the adopting of the decision by the republic's Supreme

Soviet "are premature and cannot be implemented until a Union treaty and laws on defense and on the status of servicemen are adopted".

The "appeal" stresses that "destructive forces are striving to slander the Soviet Army and want to sow the seeds of passivism in the minds of the people, especially young people, and to devalue such important concepts as internationalism, friendship of the peoples, and defense of the fatherland". The command of southwestern sector troops considers that the role of the Armed Forces as guarantor of peace and security of the peoples cannot be underestimated and calls upon local bodies of state power to assist with the fall call-up.

The Government of the Moldova SSR has set up a republican call-up commission which is to monitor the precise implementation of the decree of the president of the republic "on the call-up of Moldova SSR citizens for military service". The decision by the republic's Supreme Soviet lays down that all citizens due to be called up for real military service in fall 1990 should report for medical examination but should only be sent to the USSR Armed Forces if they apply in writing and with written permission from their parents. So far those liable for call-up are not rushing with these applications.

Moldavian Journalists Set Up Association

LD0810201190 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fyodor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev October 8 TASS—Journalists in Moldavia have set up an independent association, designed ito protect them from political and administrative pressure.

The Sobkor Association unites correspondents from large newspapers, news agencies and the Soviet radio network.

Within the association they also set up an independent journalists' organization, accountable only to the board of the Union of Soviet Journalists.

The association's members pledge to provide truthful news about life in Moldavia. They retain the right to make subjective comments on developments, but will bear personal responsibility for their stories.

Members also pledge to rely in their activities on the declaration of human rights.

The association plans to estbalish close contacts with other bodies of journalists in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Moldavian TV's Languages Policy Criticized

LD0510220190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1230 GMT 5 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Moldova's [Moldavia's] national television and radio were criticized in the republican legislature. The media have reduced unilaterally broadcasts and publications in non-Moldavian languages, and as legislators noted, this has had a negative affect on the information available to a considerable part of the population about the situation in the republic and has narrowed the population's awareness of the government's true intentions, in particular, about Moldova's sovereignty. Provisional committees of the so-called Dnestr and Gaguaz republics have mentioned this too. How is the situation developing, what moves are being made towards the viewer under the circumstances?

[K.M. Pyrtsaka, deputy chairman of Moldova's national television] We will broadcast in five languages at least. The thing is that a sector for broadcasts in Ukrainian is opening, and also in Hebrew and Yiddish. I think we will be the only republic broadcasting in Hebrew. Currently we are preparing programs in Moldovan, Russian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian languages.

Ukraine Legislature Evokes Criticism, Support

PRAVDA Reviews Situation

PM0910134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondents M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov under the rubric "News from Kiev": "The Needle Has Moved Toward 'Stormy'"]

[Text] With the start of October, the needle of the republic's political barometer has swung sharply toward the designation "stormy," although the weather out of doors is sunny and an "Indian summer" is in full swing. The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session which began on the first day of October outlined a constructive agenda consisting of several dozen items. Their fruitful discussion and the elaboration of acceptable decisions could, without doubt, tangibly stabilize the situation in the republic.

But it became clear even before the session began that there are forces which will make desperate attempts to torpedo its constructive course. The conference of the association of democratic soviets of people's deputies and democratic blocs in the soviets, totaling 89 people—one USSR people's deputy, six deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet, eight people representing four oblast soviets, and another 32 representing city and village soviets—decided to declare an all-Ukraine strike on the day the legislative session opened, under the slogans: "Disband the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet!" "Government, resign!" and "Reject the all-Union treaty!"

The press reported that the association's appetite was impressive: All enterprises would cease operating and shut down, and at least half a million demonstrators would take to Kiev's streets. Then, they said, people would listen to the association.

But fortunately the reality proved far removed from the "democrats'" intention. Of the 25 million working people in the Ukraine approximately 10,000 responded to the strike call. Although the planned million-strong demonstration did take place, it was mostly "exporters of revolution" from Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts who participated in it. However the organizers of the "large-scale" action did not abandon the preplanned program.

On the second day of October, demonstrators gathered once again beneath the windows of the legislature, but in considerably smaller numbers since most of them had gone home by bus and train. But a group of students pitched tents in a square in downtown Kiev and declared a hunger strike with the same demands for the disbandment of the republic Supreme Soviet, etc; the same slogans; and the same banners—yellow and blue and Bandera's red and black.

On 5 October L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, visited the students on hunger strike. He urged the young people to be prudent. The previous day a representative of the "People's Council" had talked with them there. He expressed admiration for the action undertaken by the students and... went off to have a bite to eat.

The ultimatums are making people increasingly indignant. In an appeal published yesterday war and labor veterans urge: "Brothers and sisters! Look the truth in the eye! For those who recently marched along the Kreshchatik with their faces distorted by ferocious malice, shouting 'Get! Ganba!' ('Out! Shame!'), and with a wreath of barbed wire are literally copying the pranks of fascist thugs. We who have known the atrocities of the Hitlerite monster are telling you this."

They have planned a demonstration in defense of democracy and civic peace for 6 October and decided to lay wreaths at the memorials to Lenin and the October revolution.

IZVESTIYA on Criticism

PM0510133590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Sergey Tsikora under the "Direct Line" rubric: "In Search of Stabilization Measures"]

[Excerpt] Kiev—The Ukrainian Government has submitted to the republic Supreme Soviet a package of urgent measures to stabilize the economic situation in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The discussion of this question, which is a painful matter for the republic, was complicated by two incidents. In the morning there was a clash between the militia and a group of demonstrators outside the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet building. As deputies were told, around 20 demonstrators and 15 militiamen were given medical assistance. A commission has been formed to investigate this incident.

The other unpleasant incident in Kiev was the beginning of a hunger strike by 123 students. They have set up camp in a square on the Kreshchatik [boulevard in Kiev]. The students are demanding that the property of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the republic Leninist Communist Youth League be nationalized, that parliament be dissolved, and that new elections be held.

It was in this tense atmosphere that the government had to report on measures to stabilize the economy. A. Statinov, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, informed deputies about a couple of dozen government proposals which are supposed to stop the drop in the living standard and create a basis for the first step toward market relations.

Among the government's primary concerns is to prevent the mass export of agricultural output and other goods from the republic. Officials will be fined between 3,000 and 5,000 rubles for violations.

Clearly it will be impossible to avoid using the unpopular measure of the rationed issue of goods solely to the republic's inhabitants on presentation of their passport. Those who refuse to conclude contracts in accordance with previously established economic links will be liable not just to the sanctions applied before, but also to a fine of 50 percent of the value of the order they refused to carry out. The sum will go into the local budget.

Because of the chronic shortage of gasoline, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers proposes to introduce temporary rationing of the sale of gasoline to owners of private vehicles and to open filling stations where gasoline is sold at commercial prices for hard currency.

Representatives of both the left-wing and the right-wing factions made criticisms. The increase in the output of consumer goods planned by the government—5 percent on average for articles in short supply—aroused the most objections. This, deputies believe, is far too little to saturate the market and decrease tension.

Details of the all-Ukrainian strike scheduled for 1 October were disclosed. V. Gladush, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers who addressed the session, told deputies that it was not on a republic-wide scale. Enterprises named by the strike committees as participants in the strike in most cases did not stop work. This is true particularly of the Kiev S.P. Korolev Association collective. The strike was supported in 31 enterprises employing just over 10,000 people. This is a very small number if you bear in mind that 25 million people go to work in the republic each day. [passage omitted]

Interrepublic Trade Examined

LD0610200690 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] Today the second session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme

Soviet continued its work in Kiev. The members of parliament worked at the standing commissions. More than 30 draft laws had been submitted for the consideration of the current session within the framework of the declaration on Ukraine's state sovereignty. They touch upon various spheres of life. For example, at the commission on questions of the activity of the soviets of people's deputies and the development of local self-government, the draft law was considered envisaging further expansion of the right of the local authorities on their respective territories. Here is what Vladimir Zheliba, a chairman of the Kirovograd regional soviet of people's deputies and commission member, said about the necessity of adopting the above draft law:

[Unidentified correspondent] We are waiting for the adoption of the laws on local authorities and about local self government, said Vladimir Zheliba. We do not have such laws so far. It is difficult for us to build our relations with the Union enterprises and also with all infrastructures which exist on the territory of the region, district, village, or settlement. We are all talking about power of the soviets but when will it become real? When will it be based on our laws as should be the case in the state of law? said Vladimir Zheliba.

[Announcer] Our reporter also visited the sitting of the Supreme Soviet's commission on questions of state sovereignty, interrepublican and interethnic relations. The deputies were discussing a national concept of business relations of the Ukraine with other Union republics. The members of the parliament have to correct certain mistakes the Ukraine's government had done in between the parliament sessions. In part the government did not sign several agreements on the interrepublican level, says the head of the commission, (Mikula Shulda).

[Correspondent] We need a qualititatively new approach, says (Mikula Shulda). Some deputies reject the signing of any agreements with the Union and with other republics. In fact it means that we should not trade with anyone and produce everything only ourselves. But this is wrong. It can be so. That is why we need a new approach in this respect. We have to find a specific project for the Ukraine, that is the distribution of labor within the new Union of republics as sovereign states. We have to determine the role of the Ukraine in this Union. We don't know yet with what republics we shall conclude agreements but it is clear that we cannot exist without economic contacts. That is why it is necessary to hold talks. We should have our concept of transition to new relations with other Union republics and after that we will know which agreements we'll conclude, said (Mikula Shulda).

[Announcer] Today a delegation of Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, headed by Deputy Chairman of the Parliament Boris Isayev, arrived in Kiev. The members of the delegation held talks with the leaders of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet. Tonight a press conference was held on this occasion.

Kravchuk Meets Hunger Strikers

LD0610203490 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Excerpt] The Congress of Ukrainian Trade Unions continues its work in Kiev. [passage omitted]

The delegates appealed to Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, who was present at the Trade Unions Congress, with a request to meet with the students who continue their hunger strike in downtown Kiev. Kravchuk fulfilled the request and spoke before the delegates of the congress after he met with the students:

I think there is too much fuss about that event, said Leonid Kravchuk. People gather in the square and make a show of them. The students behave themselves correctly, cautiously, and with respect. What are their demands? Their first demand is that the Supreme Soviet should resign. My answer is as follows:

There are different views at the Supreme Soviet as to its resignation. I, for instance, know the unofficial views of Yavorivsky, (Povlichka), (Yefnovsky), and many other deputies. They believe that today this would be absolutely inappropriate. We would draw our people into new elections, new meetings, new political passions and lose a year, a year and a half, with the election of new authorities and the taking on of its duties.

I express this view saying that today this is unnecessary. Today we need to solve the issue of a transition to a solvent Ukraine peacefully. And now, as far as the Union treaty is concerned, this for us is not a pressing issue. More urgent are economic problems. When we solve them we can then proceed to political agreements. This will take time as we have 28 more laws to adopt.

I called upon the students to understand that the demands they are making can only be solved in the course of a very long period and then they will be solved in accordance to law, fairness, and in the interests of the Ukrainian people, said Leonid Kravchuk in his speech at the Congress of Trade Unions of the Ukraine after his meeting with a group of students who are staging a hunger strike in downtown Kiev.

Ukranian Veterans Appeal

PM0510140590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Ukrinform-TASS correspondent under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Veterans Appeal"]

[Text] Kiev, 4 Oct—"The Tragedy of the Past Must Not Be Repeated"—this was the headline in Ukrainian newspapers under which an appeal to the republic's working people was published today. It was made by the republic War and Labor Veterans Council, the Union of Ukrainian Workers for Perestroyka, the Ukrainian supporters' organization of the Antifascist Resistance Movement, and the Kiev City War and Labor Veterans Council.

The appeal says that while healthy forces are striving for constructiveness and civil peace, leaders and activists of the URP [Ukrainian Republican Party], SNUM [Independent Ukrainian Youth League], and Rukh's [Ukrainian's People Movement for Perestroyka] extremist wing are trying to destabilize the situation while sheltering behind slogans for perestroyka and democratization.

Harmony and restraint, labor and reason, respect for the law, and the rejection of evil and enmity are now needed more than ever before, the appeal stresses.

The appeal contains a request to the republic's Supreme Soviet and government to take all necessary measures to defend the constitution, genuine freedom, and democracy.

The appeal's authors call on all those committed to the ideas of democratic, humane socialism and civic peace and national harmony to take part in a demonstration by Kiev's war and labor veterans and working people scheduled for 6 October in the Ukrainian capital.

Veterans Rally in Kiev

LD0710015590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Report by V. Lyaskalo from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A republican meeting of war and labor veterans, fighters from the antifascist resistance movement, has been held in Kiev.

[Lyaskalo] The meeting's participants passed a number of appeals and resolutions calling for adoption of the Law on Parties and Public Organizations and the Law on State Symbols to be accelerated by the republican Supreme Soviet. The veterans oppose the desecration of Lenin monuments and the rehabilitation of Bandera supporters. The law should stand in the way of anybody who strives to revive the shameful manifestations of nationalism and neo-totalitarianism, says an address passed by the anti-fascist veterans.

The thousands-strong demonstration ended with flowers being laid at the monument to Lenin and the October Revolution. And there was a sort of symbolic meeting of two generations on the October Revolution Square, which is currently the venue for a political hunger strike by students. One would like to believe that this dialogue will help each of them to understand one another.

Deputies Support Union Treaty

PM1010134390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent M. Odinets: "Appeal of 32"]

[Text] Kiev—Republican central newspapers have published an appeal by USSR people's deputies from the Ukraine to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. It states the following:

"While welcoming the adoption of the Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty and fully supporting the idea of national rebirth, at the same time we express concern at the processes under way in the republic and at the position of a section of the Ukrainian people's deputies on questions of the new Union Treaty and the way to go over to a market economy.

"The development of events shows that the proclaimed political and economic sovereignty of the Ukrainian state assumes at the present time a hypertrophied form of national isolation because certain sociopolitical forces have adopted a policy of the Ukraine's nonparticipation in the new Union Treaty. Such a stand cannot be regarded as constructive since it is a question of creating a fundamentally new Union of sovereign states to replace the collapsing totalitarian system.

"The economy of the Ukraine, like that of the entire country, is in a crisis state. The foundations of the administrative-command system have been undermined and ways are being sought to make the transition to a market economy. It is an indisputable truth that the Ukraine is profoundly integrated in the all-Union national economic complex, and so its refusal to participate in the new economic Union of sovereign states, including the all-Union program of transition to the market, will lead to the disruption of the established interrepublican economic ties which threatens to halt many production processes and enterprises in the very near future and will exacerbate sociopolitical tension.

"In the present situation it cannot fail to be noticed that the Ukraine's state sovereignty perceived by the people is being used increasingly by the republic's conservative forces for the veiled revival of the old administrative-edict system, only with the center now not in Moscow but in Kiev. We are convinced that within the framework of the renewed Union, the Ukraine will be able to resolve most efficiently the problems of genuine national rebirth and become a really civilized and prosperous state.

"Mindful of our responsibility to the voters and the entire people of the Ukraine, we appeal to our republic's Supreme Soviet to display political wisdom and maturity, and based on objective reality rather than on the ambitions and aspirations of particular political groups and trends and proceeding from the adopted declaration of sovereignty, to join in the process of creating a new political and economic union of sovereign states."

There then follow the signatures of 32 USSR people's deputies.

Military Service Resolution Passes

LD1010150990 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by Ukrinform-TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyanskiy]

[Text] Kiev October 10 TASS—After two days of heated debates, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution on republican citizens' military service.

The resolution envisages that, beginning in autumn 1990, draftees will be sent mainly to Army units situated in the Republic.

An exception has been made only for those drafted this autumn and next spring to the parts of the Soviet Army and Navy ensuring strategic defence in the Republic's interests. Quotas for such drafts have been determined by the republican government.

Citizens of the Republic will also be sent beyond its borders to get specialist military training, on condition that they will return to the Republic. The resolution does not forbid citizens from serving in other republics on a voluntary basis.

The parliament decided to ban the use of Ukrainian citizens serving in the Army to resolve interethnic and other conflicts beyond the Republic's borders without the approval of the Ukrainian parliament. The resolution instructs the republican government to ensure the return between October-November of all citizens serving in such units and military building detachments.

The parliament approved a number of cases when persons might be exempted on military service, which had not been named in the legislation, including those whose families have members who were killed or became invalids while performing military service.

The parliament decided to introduce state insurance of the health and life of citizens serving in the Army and institute compensation in case of physical or psychological injuries. The republican government has been instructed to submit proposals concerning the establishment of alternative service in the Republic by May 1, 1991.

The parliament considered it necessary to set up a standing parliamentary commission on outer and home security and a plenipotenitary delegation to hold consultations with the Soviet parliament, the Ukrainian government and the Soviet Defence Ministry.

Student Hunger Strike Continues

LD1110073690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2055 GMT 10 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has not voted for the government's resignation. Today Kiev went to the streets, blocking the Kreshchatik [Kiev's main street]. Students have been on a hunger strike on Revolution Square for the ninth day.

The situation is critical for the health of these young people, and a government crisis was about to erupt in the building of the Supreme Soviet. The students have proposed two conditions indispensable for stopping the hunger strike: the resignation of government leader Masol and a solution to the issue of carrying out routine military service. The latter was satisfied.

Deputies today adopted a decision saying that, starting from this fall call-up, conscripts would be sent to units situated on republican territory for carrying out routine military service, and a quota would be established to provide for strategic defense.

Then Vitaliy Andreyevich Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, spoke at the session. He reported on the government measures to stabilize the economic situation in the republic.

Ukrainian Trade Union Federation Founded

LD0710024790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1457 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Report by UKRINFORM-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Alla Mosiyeva]

[Text] Kiev, 6 Oct (UKRINFORM-TASS)—A fundamentally new structure—a Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine, which numbers in its ranks 26 million people—has been created at the inaugural congress of the republic's trade unions which ended today. Unlike the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions, formerly in operation and which has renounced its powers, the new association is intended to promote to the greatest extent the development of democracy in the trade union movement and the protection of the working people's social and economic interests.

The congress stressed that strengthening the sovereignty of the republic, creating genuine bodies of popular power and developing a multiparty system will present the trade unions with the need for serious changes in their strategy and tactics of actions. Also important is the uniting of efforts and the attainment of the organizational unity of the trade union movement. According to the delegates of the congress, the principle of federative association corresponds most to the development of democracy within the trade union movement.

The delegates issued an appeal to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], protesting the adoption in the past few years of Union legislative acts which in their view are openly anti-union in nature, discriminate against this largest of all public organizations, and ignore it as the empowered representative of the workers' interests. The congress considers it essential for the parliament of a sovereign Ukraine to adopt a law on trade unions in the near future.

Taking part in the work of the congress were representatives of various political parties, public organizations, and movements.

Ukrainian Nationalists Plan Referendum

LD0610132690 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 6 Oct 90

[INTERFAX report from the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Day by Day" program]

[Text] The registration of citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic [ukrainskaya narodnaya respublika] is continuing in the Ukraine at the initiative of the All-Ukrainian Inter-party Assembly [Vseukrainskaya Mezhpartiynaya Assembleya] which unites various opposition parties and organizations. The latter association is striving for the restoration of the citizenship that was proclaimed in March 1918 by the central Rada, the Ukrainian's bourgeois government.

INTERFAX was informed by (Petr Kaguya), one of the leaders of the Inter-party Assembly, that to date over 750,000 people have registered. The aim of the present campaign, (Kaguya) emphasized, is to stage a kind of referendum. If 50 percent of the republic's adult population, plus one, registers with us, we shall be entitled to convene a national congress—an alternative to the present authorities in the Ukraine.

Lvov Deputies Voice 'Concern' at Rail Strike

PM0910184190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Stepan Troyan under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Oblast Soviet Against Strike"]

[Text] Lvov—At a news conference in the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies profound concern was voiced at the strike which the country's railroad workers have scheduled for 15 October.

"It is probably impossible to imagine a householder who, having acquired a house, has begun to renew things in it and suddenly seizes an axe and begins to destroy one thing after another," said S. Davymuka, chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee. "Something similar could happen if the railroad workers halt the locomotives next Monday. Is there any need to explain that if the railroads die all life will die. What are needed above all now are economic stability, strict professional subordination, and a high degree of executive discipline. On the eve of the Ukraine-wide 1 October strike, the oblast leaders visited the collectives of the railroad subdivisions and in talks with workers, engineering and technical personnel, and employees tried to prove what a pernicious effect it could have on the economy in the period of preparation for the winter. Unfortunately not everyone heeded the voice of common sense—and here is the sorry outcome: After two hours or even one hour of 'time out' the trains on the Lvov railroad took two days to return to their normal rhythm."

It is easy to imagine what will happen if the electric and diesel locomotives stop running for eight hours, or especially for a whole 24 hours. And surely one cannot overlook the fact that many international trains pass through Lvov! The disruption of the railroad will worsen the already parlous supply of food to the population. Nor can the construction workers, who are waiting for materials to erect housing, manage without rolling stock.

"We appealed to the leaders of the local organizations of all parties and social formations," added I. Gel, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, "asking for them to go to the railroad workers and explain to them the misfortunes a strike will bring. They are utterly unpredictable for a Ukraine in the process of acquiring sovereignty. Anarchy on the railroads is above all a blow to the forces which really want to see the people and the state wealthy and happy. No one is against the railroad workers seeking and getting fair treatment, but other strata of the population should not suffer from their actions."

Ternopol Nationalizes Party Property

LD0810142490 Moscow TASS in English 1416 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Novak]

[Text] Kiev October 8 TASS—The Presidium of the Ternopol City Council (western Ukraine) decided to nationalise all property belonging to the regional Communist Party and Young Communist League committees on the territory within the council's jurisdiction. It is to become municipal property. The Ternopol procurator was advised to punish anyone who obstructs the implementation of the decision.

The Secretariat of the party Regional Committee had transferred part of its administrative building to city authorities shortly before this decision. But this action did not satisfy certain people.

"We believe the decision by the council's Presidium is unconstitutional and unlawful," says a statement issued by the Bureau of the Communist Party Regional Committee and published in the regional VILNE ZHITTYA (FREE LIFE) newspaper. "The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law on property in the USSR in March 1990. It sanctions various forms of property, including the property of public organisations, that is the property of the Soviet Communist Party too," the statement says.

Lvov Oblast Soviet Examines Privatizing Housing

91UN0015a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by S. Troyan: "The Lvov Version of the Housing Market"]

[Text] Lvov—The Lvov Oblast soviet of people's deputies has adopted a decision on the main provisions of a housing reform.

The upcoming housing reform is worth talking about in greater detail. Here is what V. Yarovskiy, the oblast executive committee chairman, said:

"Let me start by saying that the project was initially called 'On the Transfer of State Apartments to Citizen Ownership.' But journalists rushed to announce how well my fellow countrymen were living in their own apartments for which only yesterday they were paying for municipal services. Even IZVESTIYA (No 262) printed an INTERFAX report 'State Apartments Now Owned By the People of Lvov.' But it was not all so simple....

"Yes, at first it really was planned to transfer state housing gratis to those living in it. However, it was ultimately decided that some would be gratis while others would be for payment. Each inhabitant of Lvov, for example, can expect a gift of eight square meters. This means that a family of five receives 40 square meters gratis. If you have a large apartment and it is very good, you pay the city for the surplus. On the other hand, if the apartment is crowded you get a discount, a credit, or a check. In time, when the housing market emerges, you will be able to sell your own small apartment and buy a large one—your discount will have paid off.

"And at the same time we cannot force everyone to assume ownership of his apartment of house. We have determined at least 15 categories of citizens who would need social safeguards when this kind of housing reform is carried out. They include low-income families, war and labor invalids, person who were illegally repressed, and so forth. Incidentally, in Lvov more than 8,000 apartment tenants receive not only free housing but additional payments for capital repairs or reconstruction. And payment for good housing is seen differently depending on its quality, the area where the house is located, and the availability of community services. And this is fair.

"The transfer of apartments and houses to private ownership will be done in stages. Even though it has become "emaciated," the state inventory is nevertheless still preserved. Those who simply cannot afford to acquire a fine apartment can still count on it.

"The deputies have totally rejected the "Zhilye-2000" program as unrealistic. Suffice it to cite this fact: At the moment that the program was adopted, the waiting list for housing was 25,000 families. It is impossible to bring order with this kind of waiting list. This means that only one lever remains—the economic lever. Those who over the next five to eight years do not acquire an apartment will receive promissory notes especially for this. The authorities at the local level must guarantee the owners of those notes not only a plot of land but also construction materials and transport and bank loans. We shall see to it that none of these documents is subjected to inflation. If you have a promissory note do not sit idle. State, cooperative, and private enterprises are coming to the aid of the builders. Many people will have to set to with the trowel. Without real work the dream of resolving the housing problem will be no more than the latest myth.

"This year the oblast will be developing the construction base using twice as much funding as the past two years. And in the future the figure will be more than triple the figure today. Local authorities have already started to cooperate actively with cooperative, lease, and small enterprises engaged in the production of construction materials. A reorientation is taking place, moving away from industrial construction to housing construction. Money for this is coming from the sale of housing and from industrial enterprises whose contribution to the oblast budget should be realistic. Banks loans and citizens' personal savings will help, and also special loans, lotteries, and other things that today are nontraditional forms of capital investment.

"Prescriptive enactments will also underpin the housing reform, of which I have mentioned only a few of the urgent problems. They will be ready in December. And starting with 1991 we shall begin to implement the program of housing privatization."

Donbass Gives Militia Appeal Mixed Reception

PM0910123790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent B. Glotov under the rubric "What People Are Saying": "People Are Tired of Rallies"]

[Text] Donetsk—The militia workers' appeal to representatives of sociopolitical formations and to all inhabitants of Donetsk Oblast, published in several local newspapers, has elicited an ambivalent response. Some people, even including entire labor collectives, readily supported it while others asked in bewilderment: What does the militia want?

"Assistance and purely human mutual understanding," S. Gavrilenko, chief of the oblast internal affairs administration, explained. "We are asking the people of Donetsk Oblast and the leaders of various sociopolitical formations to give us the opportunity to engage in full in our immediate task of ensuring the safety of citizens and catching criminals and rendering them harmless."

But is anyone really preventing them from doing so? As it turns out, yes. The point is that militia workers are not spending time searching for dangerous criminals but, for the most part, are on guard during strikes and all kinds of sanctioned and unsanctioned rallies.

The wave of street democracy in the Donbass has further inflamed the already inflamed passions. Not only the militia is suffering from it. Voices are being heard increasingly frequently in local newspapers claiming that many rallies, at which destructive forces play first fiddle, arouse nothing in people but irritation and displeasure.

V.I. Malev Elected Zoporozhye Party Leader

PM1010114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Party Obkom Plenum"]

[Text] Zaporozhye, 5 Oct—A plenum of Zaporozhye Obkom [oblast committee] of the Ukrainian Communist Party was held here today to examine an organizational question.

In connection with his election as second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, G.P. Kharchenko was released from his duties as obkom first secretary. V.I. Malev, general director of the "Transformator" Science-and-Production Association, was elected first secretary of Zaporozhye Obkom in a multiple-candidate vote.

Caucasus

Coverage of Armenian Supreme Soviet Proceedings

To Meet Only on Mondays, Tuesdays

NC0910113590 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Text] The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet will convene only on Mondays and Tuesdays, with the remaining days slated for the meetings of the parliament's standing commissions. These commissions draft bills on issues under their jurisdiction to be presented to the session for confirmation later.

Today the people's deputies continued to debate the bill "On the Government of the Armenian Republic" which will delineate the government's status, the main directions of its functions, its program, and the rights and duties of the members of the government. The bill includes more than thirty articles. In addition to those articles, the deputies' proposals too have to be debated.

Dear compatriots, we will inform you of the decisions of the Supreme Soviet in our broadcasts during the coming days.

Briefed on Gas Pipeline

NC0910114090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, opened today's morning session and presented the agenda of the issues to be debated.

Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers, spoke next and informed the deputies that the government has discussed the future of Nairit scientific-production association. A government commission of experts and scientists has been set up and is engaged in a comprehensive study of whether or not to operate Nairit. The commission is studying the future of the chloroprene rubber and latex production sectors and problems related to the production of these materials.

Vazgen Manukyan also informed the deputies that the government and a group of deputies are making efforts to restore the gas deliveries through Azerbaijan. The negotiations inspire hope that the gas pipeline might resume operations this week.

As regards the gas pipeline passing through Georgia, the construction work there is continuing. However, (?new complications arise) constantly and serious negotiations are being held to resolve them. Hopes pinned on that gas pipeline could hardly be realized soon.

Vazgen Manukyan than nominated Genrikh Kochinyan to the post of minister of automobile transportation. The latter presented his program to the parliament. The deputies in their speeches referred to the numerous problems existing in that sector and to the fact that the nominee had the necessary scientific and practical experience. Genrikh Kochinyan was elected minister of automobile transportation with majority of votes; 105 deputies voted for, one against and (?three) abstained. [passage omitted]

Miltitary Draft Decision Adopted

NC1010125890 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, opened today's session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and congratulated it on the occasion of the publication of the first issue of its organ HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN.

He briefed the deputies about this morning's meeting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium which discussed the issue of supplementing the number of standing commissions. It was decided to resolve this issue next week.

Next, the deputies continued to debate the bill on the Government of the Armenian Republic. The article on the party affiliation of government officials was subjected to a particularly prolonged discussion. It was decided to delete this point from the bill until the Supreme Soviet adopts the law on the Parties and Public Organizations. The deputies then passed the law on the Government of Armenia.

The next point on the agenda dealt with the bill on the Local Self-Administration Organs. However, considering the prevailing situation and the fact that USSR President Gorbachev has issued a decree calling for the start of the Fall military conscription, the deputies instead discussed the bill on the Military Conscription. The bill had two components: In its first section, the Defense and Internal Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet (?proposed) to suspend the president's decree in Armenia. The second part of the bill called for the release from prosecution of those Armenian soldiers who were forced to leave their army units because of the unbearable conditions in the units and [words indistinct]. The Soviet Army leadership has instituted criminal proceedings against these servicemen. The legislature also passed this decision and then started to debate of the bill on the Local Self-Administration Organs.

Armenia Considers Reopening Closed Chemical Firm

LD1010050690 Moscow TASS in English 2150 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Garriy Galustiyan]

[Text] Yerevan October 10 TASS—The Armenian parliament was discussing on Tuesday the restarting of the Nairit chemical firm in Yerevan, which was shut down last January due to environmental pollution. The firm is the only enterprise in the USSR producing many types of goods.

Republican Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan told the session that a government commission was set up to restart pollution-free workshops of the firm. It consists of researchers and various specialists.

As for the output of ecologically harmful substances, including chloroprene rubber, the decision will be taken later.

A nationwide shortage of chemicals manufactured in Yerevan puts into jeopardy the production of many goods, including cars, lorries, tractors, shoes and medicines.

The damage to the Soviet economy will total about 14 billion roubles this year alone.

In the opinion of president of the republican parliament Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the restarting of the chemical firm will also be of great importance for the republic, provided the enterprise uses new technology and reliable filters which will help bring the nature-protection level to international standards.

Today's session again discussed the bill on the Armenian government.

Armenia 'Condems' Deputy's Arrest in NKAO

NC1110112290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1715 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Message to Safonov, commandant of the state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, from Lev Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium; date not given]

[Text] The Presidium of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet categorically condemns the detention of Roles Gevorgovich Agadzhanyan, the people's deputy of the Armenian Republic [from Abovyan]. Your illegal action is a blatant violation of the existing [USSR] Constitution, relevant legislative acts of the Armenian Republic, and well-known international norms. We demand his immediate release.

[Signed] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet

Azerbaijan Appeals to USSR Concerning NKAO

NC0710202190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Text] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, has conveyed an appeal to Anatoly Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The appeal said:

On 3 October, the representatives of the European Parliament tried to travel from Yerevan to Stepanakert, which is in the Azerbaijan SSR's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], without informing the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Azerbaijan SSR president. The members of international organizations cannot travel to the territory of the sovereign state of Azerbaijan without informing the authorities or without being invited, particularly not to an area in which a state of emergency has been imposed. The attempt that was made was also concealed from the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Azerbaijan SSR Foreign Affairs Ministry.

We assess the matter as a new provocation by the Armenians who continue to interfere in Azerbaijan's internal affairs and try to disrupt stability in the NKAO and the entire region, maintain the attention of international organizations on the NKAO problem, and slander the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR, presenting it as an antidemocratic institution. With the help of the opportunities created by the [word indistinct] organization of the Armenians who live abroad, a wide-ranging effort is being made in the United Nations, [word indistinct], and other international [word indistinct] organizations to provide support for the Armenian claims for NKAO's annexation.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet protests against this state of affairs and urges the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee to condemn the attempt aimed at weakening the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. Following the latest meeting with President Gorbachev, the Republic's leaders have tried to contribute to the establishment of law and order and to determine ways of carrying out significant work. However, all this is possible only under conditions of unconditional compliance with Azerbaijan's constitutional rights and sovereignty.

Azerbaijan NKAO Organization Committee Meets

NC1110111490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 9 Oct 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers report on the regular meeting held in Stepanakert by the Azerbaijan Organization Committee for the Nagrono-Kakarabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. In view of the rumors that secret elections to the local soviets are being held by the Armenians, the procurators, leading officials of the rayon militia departments, and the workers of the [word indistinct] and the law enforcement organs were called to attend the meeting. They were seriously cautioned that they will be held responsible if unauthorized elections are held. Meanwhile, NKAO residents were informed that the Republic's Supreme Soviet, in compliance with its decision to organize elections in the NKAO and the Shaumyanskiy Rayon, will establish the date for the two regions' elections in the near future. On the other hand, the press committee condemned the open letter signed by [name indistinct] and other cultural figures.

The meeting also discussed other matters. Gadzhiyev, Guseynov, Muradov, Gadzhiyev, Rakhim-zade, and Polyanichko, who are the leading officials of the organization committee, addressed the convocation. Salakhova, chairwoman of the Baku Women's Council, briefed the meeting on the visit of the Azerbaijan women's delegation to Moscow. The meeting also considered the information given by Major General (?Ishlutin), head of the USSR operations and investigation group, on the inquiry that is being carried out in connection with a convoy of vehicles in Mardakertskiy Rayon that was fired at on 11 July 1990, the destruction of the house of Ishanova in Stepanakert, and the killing of [name indistinct] and others in the town of (?Tur). Comrade (?Ishlutin) disclosed that the crimes are being investigated and that the related files on the work that has been carried out will be submitted to the courts.

Azerbaijan Party Expels NKAO Raykom Officials

LD0910082690 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 21 Sep 90 P2

[Text] By a decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, the activity of Askeranskiy and Martuninskiy party raykoms [rayon party committee] in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] has been suspended and the raykom buros disbanded. V.Ye. Kocharyan, first secretary of Askeranskiy Raykom, and O.I. Yesayan, first secretary of Martuninskiy Raykom, have been released from their posts and expelled from the ranks of the CPSU for crudely violating party discipline, turning the raykoms into headquarters for the nationalist and separatist movement, and kindling interethnic differences.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided to disband the Askeranskiy and Martuninskiy Rayon Soviets of People's Deputies.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Election Results Viewed

LD0610195890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1937 GMT 5 Oct 90

[From the "Vid" program]

[Text] INTERFAX reports from Baku that the results of the 30 September elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic have been summed up. In the overwhelming majority of constituencies the names of the deputies have already been announced. They are mainly party officials and major economic leaders. According to data from the Azerbaijan's Peoples Front, 75 of the 81 secretaries of town and rayon Azerbaijan Communist Parties committees who ran for election have become members of the republican Supreme Soviet. Democrats received over 20 deputies' seats.

Geydar Aliyev, former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and former member of the Politburo, now a personal pensioner, gained 95 percent in his constituency, Nakhichevan. Well, we congratulate him and invite him on to our program.

Elections did not take place in the nine constituencies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast nor in Shaumyanskiy rayon.

Georgian Opposition Parties Hold Elections

LD0910125990 Moscow World Service in English 1045 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] Elections to the Georgian National Congress have been held on the initiative of 42 opposition parties. It is thought in the republic that the congress may become an alternative body of power. According to preliminary reports, 53 percent of voters took part in the elections; they were boycotted by the national movements of the Abkhazians and Osetes who live in the republic. The organizers say that the creation of a national congress is essential because the official structures are incapable of representing the national interests of the Georgian people. There are plans to stage a campaign of national disobedience against the new Georgian Supreme Soviet if, in the view of congress supporters, its position is insufficiently patriotic or undemocratic.

Central Asia

Gorbachev Greetings on Kazakhstan Holiday

PM0910161190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Message from Mikhail Gorbachev congratulating Kazakhstan on Republic Day; date not given]

[Text] To the working people and Communists of Kazakhstan

Dear Comrades!

I cordially congratulate you on "Republic Day."

Kazakhstan's statehood was established together with Soviet power and became the determining factor in Kazakhstan's political, economic, and sociocultural development. Relying on the friendship and assistance of the whole Union, the republic's workers, peasants, and intelligentsia created strong industrial and agricultural production and achieved successes in developing science and culture. Kazakhstan's sons and daughters proved their adherence to the socialist option on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and in everyday peaceful work. The republic became a second motherland for many Soviet people.

Possessing very rich natural resources, Kazakhstan's industrious people make an inestimable contribution to providing the country with metal, fuel, and food, to strengthening its defense capability, and to the conquest of space. The republic's Communist Party plays an active role in sociopolitical processes.

Kazakhstan's working people have done a great deal to implement the ideas of perestroyka. But still more complex tasks lie ahead. It is necessary to carry out a radical reform of the economy, make a spurt in satisfying the people's vital needs and resolving social and ecological problems, and strengthen the traditions of internationalism and fraternal friendship.

I wish the republic's working people and Communists successes in creative work on renewing our state and asserting humane, democratic principles and norms of social life.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev.

Kazakh Deputy Premier Discusses Market Economy

LD0910155790 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Gennadiy Isakov]

[Text] Alma-Ata October 9 TASS—"Kazakhstan will advance towards a market economy somewhat slower than the rests of the country, and the period of transition will last longer," Kazakh Deputy Premier Karatai Turysov said. He said that there is a need for well-considered decisions, guiding by the actual state of affairs and the fact that there are different conditions in various regions.

Turysov made the statement after the special working group of the Kazakh government completed a draft programme of transition to a market and submitted it to the republic's parliament.

The reform will consist of three stages. The political situation should be stabilised before the end of this year. State discipline and law and order should be strengthened. package of legislative acts suiting new conditions should be adopted.

The first elements of the market mechansim should be set into operation throughout 1991. The economy should be privatised and new prices should be introduced. The shaping of the entire market sytem will be started in 1992.

The draft programme envisages free enterprise and competition of producers, reduction of centralised investments, anti-monopoly measures, land and banking reforms, and the normalisation of the consumer market due to increasing output. The possibility of unemployment will be met by a state service of employment and the provisions of funds for benefits. Much attention will be given to the problem of social protection of people in the low-income bracket. only people with fixed incomes will be compensated for losses from inflation.

Pursuing the policy of political and economic sovereignty, Kazakhstan intends to preserve and develop ties with other republics, he said.

Kazakh Deputies Urge Alternative Sovereignty

PM0910162190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Vladimir Ardayev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "'Democratic Kazakhstan' Presents Its Draft"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—A group of Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies has issued a statement on the creation of the "Democratic Kazakhstan" parliamentary faction.

As the statement points out, the deputies' group's immediate aim is to "destatize the Kazakh Communist Party through the depoliticization (departyization) of the executive and the judiciary." The group members' "Draft Declaration on State Sovereignty and Fundamentals of People's Power in the Kazakh SSR" largely serves the same purpose. Its content is largely different from the provisions of the "official" draft which has been published.

According to the alternative draft, the Kazakh SSR is to independently resolve questions of the republic's state, territorial, political, economic, and social organization and be a sovereign subject of international relations. It voluntarily enters the state formation—the Union of Republics—to which it delegates some of its powers.

The fundamentally new provisions of the alternative draft declaration on sovereignty and the fundamentals of people's power deserve special attention. For example, it states the following: "In the Kazakh SSR ethnic origin, nationality, language, religion, and membership of political parties are not registered or taken into account in the citizen's legal status. The Kazakh SSR guarantees its citizens the right to union citizenship and to citizenship of another republic or country in accordance with its laws."

The draft also provides for the separation of political parties in the republic from the state. All forms of state support for political parties are banned, as are the creation and activity of primary party organizations in state organs or at state enterprises and in institutions and organizations. The property of social organizations and political parties created using state resources are to be nationalized.

Kazakhstan Sovereignty Declaration Criticized

PM0910144390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Yeremeyev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Criticism of Draft Declaration"]

[Text] Aktyubinsk—Members of the Aktyubinsk sociopolitical club "For Perestroyka" have submitted a request to Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet deputies not to rush the adoption of a declaration on the republic's state sovereignty.

The draft declaration, which has been published, was sharply criticized at a session of this democratic club which carries influence in Kazakhstan. The authors of the draft were accused of producing a clumsy and shortsighted hodgepodge. But the main complaint is that the rights of other nationalities, whose representatives account for more than 60 percent of the republic's population, are ignored. People of various nationalities agreed on the need to prepare and discuss alternative drafts which do not equate the indigenous nation and the people of Kazakhstan.

In the view of Marat Ospanov, chairman of a Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet standing commission and honorary cochairman of the "For Perestroyka" club, power was usurped when the draft declaration was being prepared: It was not even discussed in the republic parliament's standing commissions.

"I consider this a most blatant violation," the people's deputy stated.

He also stressed that the emergence of this contradictory document is a result of the fact that the reforms are the work of the "old team" which in Kazakhstan retains its bureaucratic customs.

New Newspaper Published in Kazakhstan's Pavlador

LD1010093190 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 8 Oct 90

[Summary] The first edition of a newspaper entitled DAVA has been published in Pavlodar. This newspaper is the organ of the Republican Kazakh Language Society of the oblast organization. Its initial circulation was 10,000.

Politics Causes 'Difficult Situation' in Kirghizia

LD0910192390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Federov in Frunze, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The processes of democratization and the transfer of power to the soviets are taking place throughout the country painfully and not as quickly as many people had imagined. There is a difficult situation in Kirghizia. The creation of a parliamentary group "For democratic renewal and civic harmony in Kirghizia" [Deputatskaya gruppa "Za demokraticheskoye obnovleniye, za grazhdanskoye soglasiye v Kirgizii"] has been announced in Frunze. This is what our own correspondent Vladimir Federov reports.

[Begin recording] [Fedorov] At the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic it became clear that the governing party apparatus, which had slackened the reins at the stage of the elections, firmly intends to rectify the mistake and to put the People's Deputies in their place—the earlier place where the voting machine always used to stand.

In any case, since then all major decisions have been made only in the Communist Party's Central Committee and in the Republic's Council of Ministers. The stated times for convening the parliamentary session have been postponed on various pretexts, and, in this way, the corps of deputies has found itself divorced from effective influence on life.

The deputies' group founded the other day, which comprises 114 parliamentarians out of 350—that is, virtually one-third—has published a policy statement headed "Remove perestroyka from its anchor!". The group is internationalist in composition and is not exclusive regarding party membership and territorial affiliation.

[D. Saadanbekov] In our republic, the conservative milieu has turned out to be very aggressive and tenacious. The first session showed that here, yes, the democratic process is very far off. Without contested elections, without contested decisions the discussions have been one-sided and the elections to form the government passed off in a very formal way—virtually in half a day.

Well, just imagine events which are shaking the whole country and even the whole world are taking place in Osh Oblast, and the Supreme Soviet has still not reacted to this. Surely they cannot be normal? This indicates that certain conservative forces are consciously and deliberately doing this so as to somehow blunt the acuteness of the question. Maybe we are in the minority at the moment, but we intend.... [changes thought] Our position is left-wing radical. Let me make that clear. And from tahh position we shall put forward our programs, both for the transition to a market economy and for—it is being discussed today—the introduction of presidential rule.

We have already drawn up our program for the mass media in the Supreme Soviet, and most importantly for public organizations and parties. [End recording]

Tajik Supreme Soviet Extraordinary Session Held

PM0910153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent L. Makhkamov: "Reaching the Powerful"]

[Text] Dushanbe—To determine their attitude toward the programs for the stabilization of the country's national economy and the transition to a regulated market economy and proceeding from the republic's socioeconomic situation, the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet met for an extraordinary session.

They had to discuss painstakingly, point by point, the position of the republic's government set forth by I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet Presidium commission of experts.

The deputies recognized that the main condition for emerging from the crisis and successfully implementing the measures envisaged by the president's program is the pooling of efforts of all the sovereign republics. The deputies noted repeatedly that the proposed program is based more on the potential of the republic's economically powerful rather than on the interests of the republic which have found themselves in a most difficult position on the threshold of radical reform. Proceeding from this, the session elaborated proposals which should be reflected more deeply and painstakingly during the program's definitive working over.

A resolution was also adopted on the improvement of the draft of the Tajik SSR's young men into the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

Rules For Military Draft Modified

LD1010094190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1405 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Nina Merezhnikova]

[Text] Dushanbe, 9 Oct (TASS)—Today a republican supreme soviet decision has been published in Tajikistan on improving the draft of youths to the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. Commenting on this document, Bakhrullo Barotov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary commission on youth affairs, told a TASS correspondent that thousands of youths from Tajikistan serve in the Armed Forces each year. However, because of poor knowledge of the Russian language, weak health, and other reasons a significant number of those drafted for military service carry out their constitutional duty in military construction units where the negative phenomena in the army environment are most acutely manifest.

This gives rise to the protest of servicemen's nearest and dearest and many pubic outcries. The solution to the problem is seen in improving the order of drafting and military service of the youth of Tajikistan. Thus, parliament has decided from this fall to draft youths to military construction units primarily on the territory of the republic.

The decision provides for a number of other measures designed to protect the rights of youth of draft age and the interests of their parents and families.

One of the paragraphs of the document is dictated by mercy. It provides for the cancellation of enlistment for military service of youths whose brother has died while on military service, both in peacetime as well as in Afghanistan. New rules for the postponement for enlisted men with families are provided for.

The Tajikistan parliament has charged the republic's government with preparing lists of proposals on the matter of organizing alternative versions of military service by the end of the year.

Uzbek Defense, Social Protection Commission Meets

LD1110083690 Tashkent Domestic Service in Russian 0100 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Excerpt] A scheduled session of the commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] for questions of defense and the social protection of servicemen has taken place. Questions related to preparations for the [word indistinct] of the call-up in 1990, the implementation of the decree of Karimov, the president of the Uzbek SSR, on measures for the improvement of the call-up system and military service for the young people of the republic, and the decision of the republic's Council of Ministers which was adopted in line with the decree, were examined. Problems associated with the mutual relations of the organs of law and order with the military procurator [word indistinct] of military committees were also discussed.

Officials of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR, representatives of the procurator, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Public Health of the republic, the military procurator, the military commissariats, and the chairmen of the rayon executive committees of the city of Tashkent participted in the session which was chaired by Niazmatov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet commission for questions of defense and the social protection of servicemen [name and title as heard]. Major General Makhmudov, military commissar of the Uzbek SSR, and Bakhramov, the minister for public health, spoke at the session. The importance of strengthening the military commissariats with cadres who know the Uzbek language, and the further strengthening of [word indistinct] with the military units, where the young people called up from our republic are doing military service, was stressed at the session. Many other problems associated with the improvement of the call-up system and military service of the young people of Uzbekistan were raised. [passage omitted]